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Abstract
This thesis explores issues of trust and power in marketing and finance relations for
small scale farmers and traders in Ghana. It is based on detailed qualitative and
quantitative surveys with vegetable farmers, traders and agricultural input sellers in
the Brong Ahafo Region. The study concentrates on the livelihood coping strategies of
farmers and traders, and the indigenous institutional forms of marketing, finance and
access to resources. The historical and environmental contexts of these institutions are
explored. Of particular interest are the social relations and networks within rural areas
and between urban and rural areas that allow actors to access informal credit and
information with contracts based on trust. The mechanisms by which trust is created
include the formal and informal networks of working relationships, customer
friendships, pre-existing networks and intermediaries.
The study of the marketing system shows how farmers' and traders' enterprises in the
area build up bargaining power, and how the dynamics of these power relations
change. The roles of trader associations are also explored. These are strong indigenous
groups of women traders which have been able to sustain cooperation over many years
despite restrictions, and in contrast to many other forms of collective action.
The analysis relates the findings to the literature on socio-economics, institutional
economics, collective action and concepts of social capital. The findings have broader
relevance in that they explore the concept of social embeddedness of economic action,
and the need to base developmental intervention on existing systems if there is to be
support for sustainable rural livelihoods.
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Abstract
This thesis explores issues of trust and power in marketing and finance relations for
small scale farmers and traders in Ghana. It is based on detailed qualitative and
quantitative surveys with vegetable farmers, traders and agricultural input sellers in
the Brong Ahafo Region. The study concentrates on the livelihood coping strategies of
farmers and traders, and the indigenous institutional forms of marketing, finance and
access to resources. The historical and environmental contexts of these institutions are
explored. Of particular interest are the social relations and networks within rural areas
and between urban and rural areas that allow actors to access informal credit and
information with contracts based on trust. The mechanisms by which trust is created
include the formal and informal networks of working relationships, customer
friendships, pre-existing networks and intermediaries.
The study of the marketing system shows how farmers' and traders' enterprises in the
area build up bargaining power, and how the dynamics of these power relations
change. The roles of trader associations are also explored. These are strong indigenous
groups of women traders which have been able to sustain cooperation over many years
despite restrictions, and in contrast to many other forms of collectiNe action.
The analysis relates the findings to the literature on socio-economics, institutional
economics, collective action and concepts of social capital. The findings have broader
relevance in that they explore the concept of social embeddedness of economic action,
and the need to base developmental intervention on existing systems if there is to be
support for sustainable rural livelihoods.
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Rationale
Income generation is a key factor in support of sustainable rural livelihoods. The
ability of individuals or groups to develop enterprises depends on opportunities
generated by the market and also the ability to create the links and networks that
provide information, credit and other forms of support. The interaction of farmers and
traders, and the nature of the links between them, have rarely been studied in detail.
This thesis aims to analyse these interactions by addressing two interconnected issues,
one practical and one theoretical. First, the research examines the strategies of farmers
and traders that facilitate their access to resources for production and marketing
opportunities, and the historical precedents that shape and constrain their actions.
Second, the case study is used to explore broader issues of trust and power in
economic interactions.
The case study of small scale tomato farmers and traders in the Brong Ahafo Region,
provided in this thesis, explores the workings of a growing urban market through a
detailed study of market relations. It considers how social relations and market
processes can be understood and how the formation of trust, power and cooperation
can be conceptualised. A richer understanding of market processes is needed in order
to move away from the existing situation of poorly conceived development
interventions, especially related to the promotion of market oriented strategies such as
small enterprise development.
This thesis develops the concept of embeddedness of economic action in relation to
rural development in Ghana, grounding the analysis in a case study and drawing on the
literature of economic geography, institutional economics and economic anthropology.
The embeddedness approach, developed by Mark Granovetter (1985), calls for a social
analysis of economic action that is neither over- nor under-socialised. This involves the
study of individuals' agency where action is set within structures of social relations. Of
particular interest are the changing patterns of social relations. To understand how
markets work, it is necessary to find out how social relations are formed and are
sustained. This includes developing a clearer understanding of how individuals and
groups build up relations and how they are used.
1.2 Entry into the subject
The subject of this thesis emerged while working in Ghana for the UK Overseas
Development Administration (now the Department for International Development). I
was attached to a research project as a social scientist working with agricultural
researchers on post harvest technology development. It was my role to ensure that the
research involved the participation of beneficiaries and that potential interventions
would fit into the existing marketing system.
It soon became apparent that the existing system for marketing tomatoes involved a set
of highly complex, dynamic and diverse institutional forms. Throughout my 18 months
work in Ghana for ODA, I was able to observe these institutions. It was evident that a
crucial factor in the operation of the tomato production and marketing system was a set
of social relations that allowed many of the transactions to take place and shape the
outcomes. These social relations are centred around issues of trust and power. I found
that difficulties encountered in conceptualising these issues within mainstr am
economic theory meant that they were ignored by the development process. This is due
to the pivotal role that neo-classical economists have had in the development agencies.
I was dissatisfied with the neo-classical approaches that ignored these issues, and also
uncomfortable with the more structuralist-Marxist approaches that did not allow
sufficient attention to be paid to how individuals have room for manoeuvre. I realised
that a case study of these tomato traders and farmers could open up new areas of
interest and address the failings identified within mainstream development theory.
With this in mind, and with the opportunity to start a PhD, I set about exploring the
literature on social relations in economic activity. Mark Granovetter's seminal 1985
paper on 'Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness',
provided a theoretical context. This paper encapsulated the ideas of a continuum
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between agency and structure that fitted with my earlier studies that drew on 'actor
oriented approaches' to development studies (Long, 1992b).
The ideas developed in the thesis are based on an inductive analysis of the tomato
markets of Ghana. The research process benefited from my previous experience of
living and working amongst the farmers and traders. The research was driven by what
was observed, rather than simply seeing research as the exploration of some hypothesis
set after a literature search in British libraries. I returned to Ghana to explore the issues
of trust in more detail and have had the opportunity to visit Ghana for extended periods
twice since then. The initial work was wholly qualitative, although a short
questionnaire survey was carried out towards the end of the research period
concentrating on the extent to which there were contracts based on trust.
1.3 Research issues
The thesis is centred around a set of research issues or questions identified during the
research process. I have attempted to explore the institutional forms throughout the
tomato production and marketing system, starting with the farmers, then moving to the
interaction of farmers and traders and finally examining the urban marketing systems.
The central research questions can be stated as:
What are the interactions of farmers and traders that allow them access to resources
for production and marketing and what is the nature of these links?
Four sets of subsidiary research questions shape the structure and organisation of the
thesis. Each question relates to the institutional forms that exist, and how the analysis
of the nature of these institutions contributes to the examination of mlations of trust
and power.
How do farmers access resources to farm?
Farmers are not able to participate in tomato production and marketing unless they
have land, capital, labour and inputs. The institutional forms used to obtain access to
these key resources are explored in detail.
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How do farmers access markets and how do traders access producers?
What shapes the marketing process and the prices received by farmers?
How are the farmers and traders able to obtain information?
How are the traders able to secure access to finance for trade?
The livelihoods of the farmers and traders are shaped by the outcome of their
interaction. The complexities of the different marketing strategies were examined with
attention paid to those social relations of the market required to obtain access to
information and finance.
How are the urban market systems organised?
How can the role and survival of traders' associations be explained?
Continuing the exploration of the nature of the marketing system along the foo:1
led to the study of urban marketing systems. These are dominated by market
associations that play a major role in the interaction of itinerant traders and retailers.
The investigations reveal how social relations shape the institutional forms identified.
How are the social relations, based on trust and power, built up, shaped and
modified?
This question draws together issues that became apparent as the previous research
questions were tackled. The issues of trust and power emerged as key factors in
understanding the marketing and livelihood systems of the farmers and traders. For
these issues to be analysed and researched, it was necessary to gain a clearer
conceptualisation of how they are built up and how they operate.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis can be considered in five sections. The first sets out the theoretical
approaches and the methodology used to address the research questions (chapters two
and three). Second, there is a contextual chapter that details the social, political,
historical and environmental setting of the case study (chapter four). The third section
is comprised of three empirical chapters that explore the social relations and
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institutions in the case study (chapters five, six and seven). The fourth section refers
back to the theoretical issues posed in chapter two and draws on the empirical work to
contribute towards an institutional theory of market relations (chapter eight). The final
section concludes the thesis and draws out the implications for development theory
and policy (chapter nine).
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Chapter 2. Theoretical approaches to understanding economic behaviour,
markets and rural development
2.1 Introduction
This chapter covers a broad range of theoretical approaches to understanding
marketing systems and economic behaviour. The discussion provides an overview of
past and present major research paradigms' in development studies and relevant
social science disciplines covering structuralist approaches, neo-classical economics
and institutional economics. The chapter then draws on studies in geography,
anthropology and sociology to develop a framework for analysing social relations in
marketing systems and addressing the research questions set out in the introduction.
A theoretical framework for the research is proposed that is centred around an actor
oriented approach which allows for a balance between structure and agency in
research. How this approach can be used in the study of market relations is explored,
drawing on the literature of 'New Economic Sociology', 'socioeconomics' and
theories of the embeddedness of economic action in social structures. I argue that
these approaches open up opportunities for examining the concepts that are central to
an understanding of the social relations underlying the market process, namely
networks, norms, trust and power relations.
2.2 Neo-classical approaches
Changes in theoretical approaches in development studies reflect, amongst other
things, political changes in international affairs and policy. The present context for
economic and social development policy is shaped by the International Monetary
Fund/World Bank led efforts to promote the liberalisation of economies, reduce the
role of the state and encourage democratic governance. Enhancing the role of the
private sector has been at the centre of much recent policy originating from
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multilateral agencies and western donors. These approaches have been pioneered by
economists promoting an emphasis on neo-classical economic theory in applied
development. This paradigm presents economics as a science with universal laws
and a replicable model but cannot fully accommodate social and cultural issues. The
strengthening of this position since the mid 1980s is related to the decline in
structuralist/Marxist analyses that has mirrored the political shifts in Eastern Europe
and other parts of the world.
The rational choice theories that underpin neo-classical approaches have also
influenced the formalist paradigms of anthropology (Plattner, 1989b) and location
theory in economic geography, especially during the 'quantitative revolution' in the
1960s to 1970s. The approach was used to explain how factors of production are
allocated within and between regions. These approaches explored the production-
based environmental and technical conditions of existence. Much location theory
drew on the von Thunen model that explores how land use differs with according to
distance from a market (von Thunen, [1826] 1966). This approach concentrated on
transport costs and assumed the environment to be uniform. Other applications of
neo-classical approaches to economic geography include Central Place Theory,
building on the work of Christaller ([1933] 1966). This theory is used to account for
the size and location of urban market centres and has been applied to a range of
locations (Bromley, 1978; Skinner, 1964; Barrett, 1986). While the early models were
useful for the description of patterns, their ability to generate explanations was
limited (Barrett, 1986:221).
The neo-classical approaches see the allocation of scarce resources through the use of
market prices, leading to an "equilibrium position". The effectiveness of the
allocation of resources is investigated through analysis of prices which summarise
information about availability of resources, production possibilities and consumer
preferences (Scarborough and Kydd, 1992: 3). The main area of research covers
economic performance of markets by looking at economic efficiency objectives
'The `Kuhnian' idea of a paradigm is used here in a loose sense as there is never a
clear cut division between different approaches.
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(technical, operational, exchange efficiency) and other objectives such as innovation,
equity, and food security. A review of these is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Neo-classical economics can be seen as "an approach whereby they [economists]
derive rigorous propositions from a set of well-defined assumptions which- just tell a
'plausible story' about the world" (Baland and Platteau, 1993:17). Proponents of the
approach argue that it is a "sufficiently accurate picture for modelling real events ...
or that it portrays a desirable state of affairs for policy makers to work towards"
(Poulton et al, 1996: 10). In this sense it is normative and prescriptive (Plattner,
1989b :7).
The assumptions taken limit the descriptive ability of neo-classical approaches,
especially in non-western societies where the assumptions may hold less relevance
(Plattner, 1989b:12). Berry (1998:1) states diplomatically that
one of the principal strengths of economics as a discipline lies in its insistence
on the exhaustive pursuit of rigorous self criticism of logical arguments and
systematic testing of precisely formulated hypotheses. These pursuits are
founded on a formal body of theoretical argument which derives clarity and
power from its increasing use of mathematical language and modes of
reasoning, and coherence from its continued adherence to a core of common
assumptions. The consistency of foundational principles has both enabled the
development of a highly abstract and sophisticated body of theory, and limited
economics' contributions to understanding the often messy and ambiguous
realities of social life".
The main critique of these economistic approaches in the social sciences centres on
the use of four key assumptions: economically rational profit maximising individuals,
perfect information, homogeneous commodities and no barriers to entry. The latter
two assumptions may occur in certain markets although I show in later chapters that
their application to the rural agricultural markets of Ghana is highly questionable. The
first two assumptions raise more fundamental problems and are discussed next.
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The assumption of rationality
Neo-classical economics assumes that all individuals are economically rational and
will always attempt to maximise profit or utility. Sociologists and anthropologists
who favour rational choice theory approaches make a similar assumption in their
analysis of economic functions. It should be stated that proponents of these
approaches admit that individuals might be changed by circumstances, but assume
that individuals and their preferences are taken as given for the purposes of economic
enquiry (Hodgson, 1994b: 398). However, critiques of this assumption from
evolutionary / institutional economics, and other social sciences, have stressed that
economic behaviour is embedded in structures of social relations (Granovetter, 1985).
Mayhew (1994: 118) argues that choice is shaped by culture and that it is wrong to
assume that culture becomes a product of individual choice.
The assumption of perfect information
The neo-classical approach assumes that all actors have access to information and
knowledge on which to make their decisions. However, this is rarely the case in real
life situations where actors are constrained by lack of information regarding goods
which are not homogeneous, details of the transaction (such as price and
conditions/time frame of payment). They may also lack information on the
trustworthiness of other parties during exchange (Plattner, 1989c: 211-216).
Therefore such analysis fails to examine the costs of not having information that
might come in the form of risk aversion strategies or costly measures to obtain
information. Williamson (1985) refers to these costs as transaction costs and notes
that these will rise if communication is poor and contracts are not enforceable. The
assumption that there is perfect information implies that it is not possible to cheat, as
all actors have access to all information.
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2.3 New Institutional Economies
New Institutional Economics (NIE) has developed as neo-classical economists have
attempted to modify their key assumptions to reflect real world situations more
closely. NIE introduces the concept of transaction costs which are omitted from many
analyses because of the assumption about a "frictionless exchange process in which
property rights are perfectly and costlessly specified and information is likewise
costless to acquire" (North, 1990:11). North proposes that the key cost of transacting
is that of information. The cost comes from measuring the quality of what is being
exchanged as goods may not be homogeneous; protecting rights to the goods being
exchanged; and policing and enforcing agreements. These costs may increase over
longer distances and if contacts are more impersonal (North, 1990; Poulton et al,
1996).
There are varying definitions of an 'institution' and North (1990: 4) gives the most
inclusive one as "any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human
interaction 	  they consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten
codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules". He continues by arguing
that "an essential part of the functioning of institutions is the costliness of
ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment". North maintains that
institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of
production and exchange, and thereby the transaction cost: "the major role of
institutions in a society is to reduce the uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not
necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction" (ibid: 6). It should be noted that
North differentiates between 'players in the game' - such as organisations - and
institutions that he refers to as 'rules of the game'.
Williamson (1985) concentrates his analysis on contractual relationships and the
attempts to reduce transaction costs caused by imperfect information and the need to
adjust contracts. The importance of different costs associated with a transaction are
dependent upon the risk and uncertainty surrounding the transaction, the frequency of
transaction (it is easier to bear the costs of arbitration of disputes if transactions are
large and infrequent) and the investment in specific assets which cannot be used for
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other purposes (Poulton et al, 1996:12). The costs of risk and uncertainty of the
transaction can include the costs of restricting opportunism, such as the 'bonding
costs of effecting secure commitments'. A study of transaction cost economics
therefore shows that a contractual arrangement can still be 'efficient' when prices in a
bilateral contract are higher that those justified by production costs alone, as it
provides the incentives to invest that would not exist in the world of perfect
competition (ibid: 13). Williamson (1985:41) therefore proposes that studies of
contractual arrangements should not look at marginal analysis but rather should
compare institutional alternatives.
The NIE approach is based on the neo-classical concept of methodological
individualism which explains social phenomena in terms of the characteristics and
actions of individuals. This has been criticised by what has been termed the 'Old
Institutional Economics' school (Hodgson, 1994b; 1994c; Samuels, 1995). Samuels
(1995: 572) contrasts the concept of methodological individualism with an approach
that sees individuals and culture as mutually dependent. Mayhew (1994:118) states
that "there is considerable evidence that human thought and behaviour are not well
represented by maximisation models and the conception of action as rational".
The political aspects of markets are also important, and White (1993:1) states that the
idealised notion of 'markets' "abstracts from social, cultural, political and
institutional dimensions of real markets which cannot be sidelined as extraneous
impurities, but function as inherent, and in many cases essential, features of markets
in the kaleidoscopic diversity of economic life". He goes on to stress the importance
of looking at markets as embedded in social processes such as gender and class. To
that I would also add the issue of ethnicity. It is also necessary to examine which
social groups set the rules and how, and to avoid the functionalist approaches that
suggest civil society's goals evolve towards the 'greater good' of the society. This
issue is developed in chapter 8.
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2.4 Structuralist approaches
Structural paradigms came to prominence in geography and development studies in
the 1970s with a rejection of methodologies based on neo-classical economic
theories, quantification, and regional studies. Much of the influence came from
Marxism. In relation to research on markets and rural development, the range of
structuralist approaches concentrated on the impacts of social power and wealth on
inequality and control over the means of production. Research emphasised the
historical aspects of social relations, the role of structures along class lines (Plattner,
1989b: 16) and stressed the importance of the expansionary tendency of global
capitalism.
In the 1980s, development studies, dominated by Marxist paradigms were said to be
at an 'impasse' (Booth, 1985) with discussion forced into restricted channels:
"The major influences that had been influential in recent development
sociology were grand simplifications that were either simp. ly wrong (untenable
empirically, conceptually unstable or redundant) or were pitched at a level of
generality that made them irrelevant to the most important practical issues
facing developing countries" (Booth, 1994:5).
Edwards (1989), in his paper on the 'irrelevance of development studies', criticised
the approach for being "for the satisfaction of the researcher rather than the
researched" (1989: 119).
There were also criticisms that much of development thought and practice used
generalised and highly economistic explanatory frameworks and "seemed to neglect
or even deny much of what is specifically human about human societies: action and
interaction, history, culture and the 'social construction of reality' (Booth, 1994:5).
Long and Van der Ploeg (1989; 1994) criticise the structuralist and neo-structuralist
paradigms that focus on regimes of regulation and accumulation for their over
concern with central tendencies. Structural and Marxist approaches have also been
criticised for their lack of attention to complexity and the realities of local situations,
and the reliance for explanation on social structural factors (Long, 1992a; Edwards,
1989; Booth, 1994). Historical materialism is rejected as they "search for a structural
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explanation situated in the past. History never relates in a unilinear or uniform way to
the present or future" (Long and Van der Ploeg, 1994:80).
There has also been criticism from the populist school as set out by Chambers (1983)
and Richards (1985). They stress the self reliance of rural societies that is .ignored in
both the neo-classical economics tradition and in Marxist approaches to development.
However many populist studies tend to ignore the political economic context of such
societies with an often idealised conception of virtuous communities as homogeneous
societies without competing powerful interests (Scoones and Thompson, 1994; Peet
and Watts, 1993).
2.5 Towards a framework for understanding social relations in the market
system
Neither neo-classical economics nor more structuralist approaches allow for a rich
description and explanation of social and economic activity. The need to tackle the
issue of heterogeneity and diversity on the one hand, and the explanation of structures
on the other, has led to a range of approaches that explore structural diversity as well
as the diversity of actors' actions. These approaches examine the different
institutional arrangements across regions and countries which may be explained by
reference to, and comparison with other structural differences (Marsden and Arce,
1996; Jarosz, 1996; Butte] and McMichael, 1994). These are similar to the
methodologies of `structuration' (Giddens, 1984) and actor oriented approaches
(Long and Long, 1992). Giddens' concept of structuration acknowledges that
individuals are knowledgeable and capable while recognising the structural
constraints on individual action. The actor oriented perspective is similar in that it
stresses that social relations of production are constructed and changed by micro level
action that is embedded in the social and cultural context (Long and Van der Ploeg,
1994). These micro-processes also explain structures. Such approaches require that
the researcher take an inductive approach, and this will be discussed below and in the
next chapter.
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Actor oriented approaches have evolved from anthropological research that
developed in the 1960s and 1970s. Within economic anthropology there has been a
long running debate between substantivists, who stress the issue of cultural relativity,
and the formalists who analyse choice as the product of rational decisions. Criticism
of these approaches was based on the fact that some formalist anthropologists had
taken a 'voluntaristic' approach that "gave insufficient attention to how individual
choices were shaped by larger frames of meaning and action" (Long, 1992b: 21).
Formalists were also criticised for being ethnocentric and reductionist by offering a
"model of social behaviour based upon the individualism of 'utilitarian man' which
rides roughshod over the specificities of culture and context" (Long, 1992b: 22). A
similar debate occurred in sociology with critiques of both the over and under-
socialised concepts of economic behaviour (Granovetter, 1985).
On the other hand, critics of the actor oriented approach point out that these studies
tend to be at the micro level with a poor awareness of wider implications at the
regional and national level. The research is therefore seen as an end in itself, rather
than having some use and implication for policy and practice (Booth, 1994: 306).
Actor oriented approaches tend to reject the analytical categories such as agrarian
capitalism or rural proletariat in favour of "actors' self description" in an attempt to
reach a level of cultural relativism. However, there may be certain aspects of
differentiation that can reflect the main tendencies of our time such as inequality and
the relations of power that exist within national and international orders of the world
(Booth, 1994: 304). Gardner and Lewis (1996:25) point out the need for "post
modern 'stopping points' rather than endless cultural relativism ... one such point is
gender ... another is the politics of poverty".
A further problem of the actor oriented perspective, as set out by Long (1992b), is
that the inductive method does not give adequate attention to the role of the
researcher in shaping the research encounter and the influence of their existing
theoretical backgrounds on the building of theory (Drinkwater, 1992: 367).
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2.6 New economic sociology and socio-economics
The application of the actor oriented approach to economic action enhances the
understanding of how individuals operate within markets while at the same time
having their action embedded in social structure. Granovetter (1985) shows that a
sophisticated account of economic action must consider the embeddedness of such
structures and he criticises the New Institutional Economics approach for attempting
to understand societies, now and in the past, as "resulting from the pursuit of self-
interest by rational, more or less atomized individuals" (ibid: 482). He also warns of
the dangers of taking an over-socialised view as put forward by many of the
substantivists in economic anthropology (and structuralists) (Granovetter (1985).
The social structures that shape the actions of agents include power relations,
institutional frameworks, habits and cultural patterns. These, in turn, shape and are
shaped by cultural aspects such as norms, and networks of actors. History also plays
a role in shaping power relations and institutional frameworks in any particular time
or place. Much of the writing on New Institutional Economics has assumed that
institutions develop through the minimising of transaction costs by profit maximising
individuals. However, an analysis of transaction costs can be insufficient to explain
certain social phenomena especially when history and power relations are not
considered. In this respect the 'Old Institutional Economics' attempts to move away
from methodological individualism, where the individual is taken as given (Hodgson,
1998: 177), and look at institutions as formed and sustained by habits as well. Habits
are defined here as "a form of self-sustaining, non reflective behaviour that arises in
repetitive situations" (Hodgson, 1998: 178).
The theory of embeddedness of markets has been an issue at the centre of what has
been termed New Economic Sociology. New Economic Sociology accepts that the
social cannot be deduced from the economic, and that each transaction is embedded
in social relations. Moore (1997) reviews much of the literature relevant to less
developed countries and asks why this approach has not been taken in the past He
suggests that researchers were too influenced by the 'modernisation' paradigm that
assumed that personalisation of economic relations declined with 'development' and
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that business and society were separate spheres (Moore, 1997: 313). He shows that
much business is based on social interaction and creates social relations where they
did not exist before. These alternative approaches to understanding institutions and
economic change also stress the role of social relations and civil society that mediate
the space between state and market (Woolcock, 1998: 153), and lead to what Amin
(1996:309) refers to as a 'third way' between state and market centred approaches.
Social relations are defined in this research as connections, affiliations or bonds
between people or groups of people. Class is often seen as the most important aspect
in shaping social relations although others stress ethnic, religious or community
groupings. These can be seen on a variety of scales. This research concentrates on the
micro level relations and especially those shaped by trust and power. Individuals can
build these relations up through their own actions, although their actions are already
shaped by existing social relations.
These relations and links are referred to by some as 'social capital'. This has been
defined by Robert Putnam in his analysis of governance and economic development
in Italy as "features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993: 167). The
balance of attention given to each of these concepts varies according to the
researcher's viewpoint. Social capital can be seen at different scales, from the micro-
institutional level to more macro scales of analysis that examine its role in the
formation of state-civil society relations and economic development in certain
regions2. This study will examine the nature of social capital at the micro-scale.
Woolcock (1998:156) identifies a weakness in the theorising of the concept of social
capital, namely that some see it as a combination of ties and norms while others see it
2 Much of the interest in the this area has been fuelled by Robert Putnam's (1993)
book 'Making Democracy Work'. Critiques of Putnam point out that the reasons for
differences between north and south Italy can also be ascribed to different
explanations based on social relations and the semi colonial status of the south of Italy
or the role of the state in the development of civil society (Tarrow, 1996: 394; Harriss
and de Renzio, 1997). In such cases the reasons are political as much as cultural.
Harriss and de Renzio quote Portes and Landolt (1996) who give the example of
ghetto areas in the USA where there is much social capital but no assets attainable
through it to allow participants to rise above their poverty.
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as a 'moral resource' such as 'trust'. He asks whether "social capital is the
infrastructure or the content of social relations, the 'medium' ...or the 'message.' Is it
both?". Attempts have not been made to quantify social capital and its impact, as the
objective of the research is to get a clearer understanding of the processes involved
and to develop appropriate research methodologies3.
2.6.1 Networks
Networks are the most visible and clearly definable outcome of social relations and
part of social capital. For this reason they have received much attention in studies of
social capital and in theories of sociology. Social network theory has been a major
part of the discipline of sociology since the 1950s. Much of this work has ignored the
qualitative nature of the links, although Granovetter (1973) discussed the nature of
links with his discussion of the difference between strong and weak ties. Putnam's
thesis rests on the role taken up by the networks that ?cad to what he terms 'civic
engagement' (Putnam, 1993). Many analyses, especially those that attempt to
quantify social capital, concentrate on networks with an assumption that the quality
and quantity of associational life can be used as a proxy for social capital (Narayan
and Pritchett, 1997: 2). However, the links between networks and norms or trust are
rarely made clear.
Attempts to look at different forms of social capita) have tended to concentrate on the
different scales of networks (Harriss and de Renzi°, 1997). Woolcock (1998: 162-
178) distinguishes between the macro level (formal business, political and social
organisation of society) and the micro level (intra- and inter-community ties). He also
distinguishes between those links that are highly embedded in a community, and
those that are autonomous.
3 For studies on the measurement of the effect of social capital see Narayan and
Pritchet (1997) and Putnam (1993)
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While it is accepted that networks are important for the creation of social capital,
there is a danger of taking a romanticised view of networks, or 'the community'.
Amin (1996: 327) warns of the danger of ignoring the fact that civil society is an
arena for social contestation. Power struggles exist and affect which groups control
which resources and what they do with them. This raises the issue of who is included
and excluded in certain groups or networks. Levi (1996: 51) notes that
neighbourhoods are a source of trust and distrust as they "promote trust of those you
know and distrust of those you do not, those not in the neighbourhood or outside the
networks." Woolcock (1998:158-171) also warns of the limitations of certain
networks such as those based on close ties. This he sees as "being characterised by
an 'excess of community' built on such fierce loyalties and familial attachments that
members are discouraged from advancing economically, moving geographically, and
engaging in amicable dispute resolution with outsiders" (Ibid: 171). Members of such
communities may therefore be restricted in participating in wider networks because of
obligations. There is a need for inter as well as intra-community ties, what
Granovetter and Putnam term weak ties of horizontal networks.
2.6.2 Norms
Discussions on the nature and formation of norms of generalisea morality are
restricted as they are intangible and difficult to observe. Norms define what actions
are deemed to be right or wrong, and include customs of cooperation, reciprocity and
interaction with strangers. Furthermore, norms cannot be produced at will and their
creation or shaping depends on the cultural background to the relationship, including
market exchange contexts. Platteau (1994b: 795) states that
"to function effectively, at least in a long term perspective, the market requires
the society to be structured in a way that ensures a wide-spread prevalence of
abstract impersonal relationships among agents as well as the pervasive
influence of norms of generalised morality".
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) also recognise the importance of what they term
'value introjection' as a source of social capital, as it "prompts individuals to behave
in ways other than naked greed; such behaviour then becomes appropriable by others
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or by the collectivity as a resource" (ibid: 1323-4). This becomes beneficial for
economic development as risks are reduced and this in turn reduces enforcement
costs.
I make the distinction between 'norms of generalised morality' and 'trust'., although
some use the term 'trust' to refer to both. Putnam states that "trust itself is an
emergent property of the social system, as much as a personal attribute. Individuals
are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and
networks within which their actions are embedded" (Putnam, 1993: 177). However,
Levi (1996: 46-7) criticises Putnam for his loose definitions of the concept of trust as
he uses the term to refer to both expectations due to knowledge, institutional
arrangements and incentive systems that enable an individual to predict behaviour,
and to refer to general morality in the community itself Humphrey and Schmitz
(1996:10-12) make the distinction between generalised and selective trust, where
generalised trust includes both generalised morality and institutional-based forms of
trust (Zucker, 1986). Coleman distinguishes between forms of social capital that are
for all members of a group, created and destroyed as a by-product of other activities,
and other forms of social capital that are created by agents for their own benefit
(Coleman, 1990:317).
One of the basic norms on which personalised trust is built is that of generalised
reciprocity and the custom of co-operation. This can be seen as part of social structure
or a habit that allows the agents to assume away a certain amount of risk (Hodgson,
1988: 167). Levi (1996: 47) explains trust in strangers as coming from cognitive
mechanisms where the agents follow a rule without having to calculate each time.
This is similar to the concept of habit in institutional economics as defined by
Hodgson (1998: 178) and discussed in section 2.6. Norms are derived from cultural
patterns and habits in society as well as being reinforced by the use of trust. Norms
shape the actions of agents as reciprocity is the basis of personalised relations based
on trust. Some norms are more consciously applied. In such cases, norms of
generalised morality are based on the need for a social consensus that can enforce
sanctions on norm violators and thereby allow agents to trust each other.
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2.6.3 The dimensions of trust
As mentioned earlier, trust is an integral part of what is termed social capital. The
concept of trust has been studied in several of the social sciences in differing contexts
leading to a mixture of approaches and perspectives (Misztal, 1996: 13). A dictionary
definition of trust is "a firm belief in the reliability, truth or strength of a person; a
confident expectation; and a reliance on the truth of a statement without examination"
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1995). Shared expectation of good or likely behaviour is
the central issue in trust (Gambetta, 1988: 217; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996: 5;
Zucker, 1986: 54; Fukuyama, 1995). Trust operates when there is confidence in other
agents, despite uncertainty, risk and the possibility for them to act opportunistically
(Misztal, 1996: 18; Gambetta, 1988: 218). The concept of trust has been ignored in
much economic research as, under the assumptions of conditions of perfect
competition, the issue of trust does not arise since links between agents are not seen
to be affected by interpersonal behavioural traits and they do not have the opportunity
for dishonest behaviour (Furlong, 1996:3; Platteau, 1994a: 541). In the Twi or Brong
language, used by most of the farmers, traders and input sellers in the study area, the
English word 'trust' can be translated as gyedi. However, this can also mean
confidence, knowledge of a person's ability, belief and faith, and so the subtle
differences between these terms in English cannot easily be explored in Twi.
Trust can come from both generalised norms of morality and more personalised
sources embedded in social networks. Agents do not always aim to maximise the
profit, but may consider the minimising of risks and maximising access through
developing personal relationships with other agents. This is especially important in a
situation characterised by imperfect information and a lack of effective legal
mechanisms (Davis, 1972:211). It is central to any market transaction when agents
are not willing to rely on norms or institutional arrangements alone (Granovetter,
1985:490) or where the risk of other agents being opportunistic cannot be controlled
by legal means without prohibitively high transaction costs in terms of monitoring
contracts (Platteau, 1994b:756). Moore (1994: 819) states that "many transactions are
so complex that law cannot possibly cover all contingent circumstances", and in
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many countries there is no formal system of contracts anyway. Trust plays a major
role in reducing such transaction costs, especially when there is complex long
distance trade, through reducing the need for monitoring and information.
The close relationship between agents at different levels of marketing chains allows
them to have the benefits of vertical integration without the rigidities of hierarchical
structures (Clark, 1994:230; Braadbaart, 1994: 148). Personalised trading
relationships have been identified in a number of studies and should be differentiated
from close kinship links. Davis (1973) documents the suki relationships in the
Philippines, Mintz (1964) refers to the pratik relationships in Haiti, Finan (1988)
describes the fregues strategies in Northeast Brazil, Trager (1981b) documents the
onibara relationships in Nigeria and Clark (1994) describes the "customer"
relationships in Ghana. Trager (1981b) and Alexander and Alexander (1991:465-6)
report on the wide variation in the content of trading relationships and claim that
previous research such as that of Mintz (1964) and Davis (1973) ignores this.
The employment of trust depends on the probability that other agents will behave in a
way that is expected (Gambetta, 1988:217). An action based on trust can therefore be
described as a calculation (Williamson, 1993). There is debate over the extent to
which agents act under 'rational' choice or calculation, and the extent to which their
actions are embedded structures of social relations (Granovetter, 1985). Luhmann
(1979) sees trust as a way of reducing the complexity that comes from the freedom of
others and trust can make the calculation easier or not even necessary. Decisions on
whether to trust are not only based on calculations that consider information on other
agents and enforceable sanctions. There is a non-calculative side as well, in that
habits allow agents to assume away some of the risks. By reducing the number of
variables, calculation is possible (Hodgson, 1988: 167)
Zucker (1986: 60-65) has set out three "central modes of trust production" that are
based around selective trust. These are:
1. Process-based, where trust is tied to past or expected exchange such as in
reputation and gift exchange;
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2. Characteristic-based, where trust is tied to a person, depending on characteristics
such as family background or ethnicity;
3. Institutionally-based, where trust is tied to broad societal institutions. This can be
subdivided into person or firm-specific attributes such as membership of associations,
and, secondly, into intermediary mechanisms such as bureaucracy, banks - and other
formal mechanisms that can be seen to protect the interests of all parties to the
exchange. Zucker also notes that there is not an "evolutionary progression" from
process-based to characteristic-based, to institutional-based trust, as all are present in
all societies. Ethnographic studies have identified factors that shape the production of
trust, but none have explored the issue in detail.
2.6.4 Power relations
Cooperation can come about through both trust and coercion. Power relations are a
central feature in the formation of contracts, so the challenge for research is to look at
the power relations within cooperation and determine how trust production is affected
by unequal access to resources. Burchell and Wilkinson (1996: 6) found that in their
study:
"trading partners derive mutual benefits from cooperation in production from
which their incomes are ultimately derived, but they compete over the
proceeds of production because what one gets the others cannot have. Each
business relationship is therefore by its nature both rivalrous and
cooperative".
Power relations have wide implications as they shape the outcomes of all trade.
Differences in bargaining power result in differing prices and returns, and therefore
have a large impact on income generation. They shape the social relations in which
economic action is embedded, which in turn shape the access to certain key resources
and the bargaining power of agents.
Harriss (1993) has analysed the power relations in markets in West Bengal. These
include control over land and storage, generation and control of information, power
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through finance and credit, and political power. The control of capital can lead to an
increase in bargaining power and even exploitation of one party by another. This can
come from the interlocking of traders and producers with credit given in the pre-
harvest period and from the distress sales of farmers. Other sources of bargaining
power are the control of transport (Davis, 1973:202; Guyer, 1987:46; Saul; 1987:79),
knowledge of marketing procedures (Clark, 1994) and the organisation of the market.
Bargaining power through organisation of the market is often exerted through market
associations which may act to exclude others, exert control over the members and
non-members (Harriss-White, 1993) and minimise the transaction costs for members
(Smith and Luttrell, 1994).
Despite the considerable discussion of the term 'power' in the social sciences, the
ability to use it as analytical category is highly problematic because of the varied
definitions and interpretations. Complications in the use of the term power arise
because of the differences between 'power from', 'power to', 'power with', and
'power over' (Rowlands, 1997). In this study, I am most interested in understanding
how actors are able to affect others or secure outcomes over others. In this way they
have power over others, and power is seen as part of a zero-sum game where one side
gains at the others' expense (Allen, 1997). The power over is based on three other
forms of power: social structures or power from position and control of resources;
agency or power to affect outcomes; and collective power or power with others.
Much attention has been paid to the structural bases of power, most notably those
related to the issues of class and control of capital over the means of production,
gender, ethnicity and age. This base of power is seen as something that is an inscribed
capacity, or a position that is held or possessed. It should also be recognised that
individuals, whatever their position can affect the outcome by creating some room for
manoeuvring. The exception to this is some forms of slavery.
Exercise of power can be through individual and collective action and is produced or
generated through mobilising resources rather than being inscribed (Allen, 1997). I
refer to use of power as agency and include gaining power through both 'micro
strategies', and resistance. The micro strategies are similar to what Foucault (1977)
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referred to as 'disciplinary practices' such as surveillance of others. Surveillance in
organisations comes in the form of supervision, establishment of routines and
legislation to control members' behaviour (Clegg, 1989: 190). In this way the
methods of surveillance are a form of gaining power as well as allowing trust to build
up. Surveillance can have an effect through the watched being aware of the gaze or it
can be internalised with individuals assuming that they are always being watched
(Crang, 1994). Power can also be built up through what Latour (1986) refers to as
enrolment. Each actor has their interests and they attempt to get others to follow them
and fight for the same outcome. In this way power can be seen to have a negotiated
character of competing definitions and is built up by being reproduced both
consciously and unwittingly (Clegg, 1989). Power is also produced through
resistance. The simplest form of this is the threat to create delays, work slowly and
pilfer and in this way even the weakest parties can build up some power over
dominating agents (Scott, 1985). An understanding of agency involves analysis of
how the processes work, both consciously and through habits of thought.
The power over other agents is exerted through tangible threats or action, and/or
norms of behaviour. The norms include moral obligations and routine, habitual or
unquestioning compliance. These may result in agents accepting power over
themselves and also shape the nature of the threats and actions that can be
undertaken. The moral obligations are internalised and can be seen as a form of moral
economy (Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1976). Those with power are able to set the rules
of the moral economy through processes of socialisation and acculturation. Lukes
(1974) refers to this as the third dimension of power, where the values of the
dominant become internalised. Norms shape the power relations by restricting the
scope for complaints, and being able to avoid decisions and leave issues off the
agenda (Lukes, 1974). These issues are closely related to the ability of the more
powerful to exert authority.
The threats and actions that can be used to exert power over others are more visible
and easier to identify through empirical research. I have divided them into three
factors - strength, authority and peer pressure - which lead to a range of possible
sanctions; violence, exclusion, penalisation, shame and reputation loss. How power is
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exerted will be explored in the empirical chapters and discussed in detail in chapter
eight.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the major lines of academic debate that have shaped the
studies of social relations of marketing in less developed countries. The review of
alternative approaches suggests that there is an advantage to be gained from taking an
actor oriented approach that examines the coping strategies of agents and the context
within which economic action takes place. Research emerging in socio-economics
and economic sociology provide some tools which can be used to start understanding
market relations. Of particular interest for this study are the concepts of trust in
economic behaviour and the networks that support this. The analysis of power
relations in the market system is also important as it allows a deeper awareness of
how market agents can shape their outcomes.
The following chapters will build on this theoretical framework. The next chapter sets
out the methodology that has been used to investigate the research questions. It also
provides a methodological approach to understanding the embeddedness of economic
action in general. Chapter four will give a background to the case study: it explores
the historical and cultural underpinnings of markets in Ghana and introduces the
study area itself. The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter will be developed
in the following chapters by presenting the empirical work and relating it to a wider
literature on social relations within the production and marketing process. Chapter
eight draws together the various implications and proposes a framework for
understanding social relations in markets.
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Chapters one and two set out the research questions and the theoretical approach to be
taken. To reiterate, the central questions tackled by this thesis were stated in section 1.3
as: what are the interactions of farmers and traders that allow them access to
resources for production and marketing and what is the nature of these links? In order
to investigate this, a theoretical approach was outlined that allows for an understanding
of the embeddedness of economic action in relations of trust and power.
The methodological challenge for the thesis was to find a means by which the
theoretical issues could be illuminated 'on the ground'. In view of the complexity of
the task, a multiple method approach was embraced that uses both qualitative and
quantitative approaches, individual and group meetings, and a range of methods
including interviews, focus groups, and other participatory methods. This allowed for
cross checking, increased reliability and greater depth and richness of explanation.
The research took place over 22 months, the first 18 months of which was during an
attachment to the Integrated Food Crop Systems Project in Brong Ahafo, managed by
the Natural Resources Institute in UK and funded by the Overseas Development
Administration (now the Department for International Development) 1 . During this
period I was working with Ghanaian counterparts from the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, Ghanaian universities and research institutes. Being attached to the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture had its advantages in that I had contacts in a w'de
range of rural places, but also had its disadvantages as it may have affected how I was
perceived. In cases where links to the Ministry would have been damaging, I distanced
myself from them and stressed links to the universities.
1 The methods used were also influenced by the context within which the research
took place. Initial studies were part of a research project and data collection relevant
to this thesis linked to other research activities. These activites included providing the
26
Following a brief survey using Rapid Rural Appraisal techniques in five settlements,
data was collected over 18 months in Brong Ahafo. I started the research by staying in
two villages (Susuanso and Dwomo) in the first few months and then made regular
visits to them during the rest of the fieldwork (see map 3.1 and 3.2). Eight other
villages (Abesim, Techimentia, Derma, Tuobodum, Manso, Offuman, Awisa and
Nchiraa) were also visited regularly, while the research on urban markets concentrated
on intensive studies in Kumasi Central Market and Sunyani market. The second phase
of the research was dedicated to the intensive collection of material for the thesis.
During this period, I lived in four settlements in Brong Ahafo (Derma, Tanoso,
Kokoago and Akete) and supervised surveys in Tano Boase, Pamdu and Techimentia.
Subsequent repeat visits have been made to the producing areas and urban markets
while on visits to Ghana for other consultancy research work. In this phase of the
research, I was linked to the University of Ghana, Legon.
3.2 The Research Strategy
The research questions have been set out in the introductory chapter and theoretical
approaches needed to explore the institutional context of the farmer-trader and trader -
trader relationships were presented in chapter two. The theoretical framework draws
on actor oriented approaches (Long, 1992b) that allow for a rich description of
diversity of actions that are situated within social structures. Such an approach
requires an inductive approach that is based on qualitative data and local conceptions
or interpretations of economic behaviour.
Pelto and Pelto (1978) refer to the 'inductive' approach as a process that:
"begins with the empirical observations, developing and testing concrete
hypotheses about them, and then linking those supportable hypotheses with
similar constructions or propositions in higher order, more abstracted systems"
(Pelto and Pelto, 1978: 253-4).
socio-economic input into a farmer participatory research programme with a plant
breeding project, and with an agro-processing technology development programme.
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Map 3.1 Ghana and its regions
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Map 3.2 The study area
Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduced the term 'grounded theory' as an approach to
inductive research where theory is developed from close observation of the empirical
world. In my research I am interested in exploring local interpretations of capitalism
and development that may challenge eurocentric models of economic behaviour. It
was therefore necessary to set research questions that did not exclude novel
interpretations. Strauss and Corbin write about the need for:
"a research question or questions that will give us the flexibility and freedom
to explore a phenomenon in depth. Also underlying this approach to qualitative
research is the assumption that all of the concepts pertaining to a given
phenomenon have not yet been identified, at least not in this population or
place.... This reasoning creates the need for asking the type of question that will
enable us to find answers to issues that seem important but remain
unanswered." (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 37).
The aim of the research was to explore local conceptions of economic behaviour and
strategies, as perceived by the various actors. The approach taken attempted to ensure
that the hypotheses, frameworks and theories that were developed, were based on the
farmers' concepts, rather than specified by outsiders. This allowed me to challenge
analytical categories and theoretical positions by the "elucidation of actors'
interpretations and strategies" and the "understanding of everyday life situations"
(Long, 1992a: 5-6).
Pelto and Pelto (1978) make the distinction between `emic' and 'etic' approaches. The
emic approach which is taken in this study, is seen as being based on 'their' concepts
and categories of meanings, with local definitions discovered through inductive
research. The etic analytical stand point takes a more externalist viewpoint whereby
the researcher "stands 'far enough away' to see it as a separate event, primarily in
relation to their similarities and their differences, as compared to other cultures, rather
than in reference to the sequences of classes of events within that one particular
culture" (Pike, 1954; 10, quoted in Pelto and Pelto, 1978).
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The ethnographic approach of this research relied on the collection of qualitative data,
although there was opportunity to collect quantitative data towards the end of the field
work when the key questions had been identified. Much of the research on marketing
has taken a quantitative approach by looking at the 'structure, conduct and
performance' through prices (Scarborough and Kydd, 1992), despite the low quality
of data available. In this study, as in Hollier (1985: 400) the price data used was
collected through micro scale studies of daily prices wherever possible. However, a
reliance on quantitative data would have restricted my explanations of the marketing
relationships that this thesis sets out to explore. Quantitative approaches, used to
examine issues of networks and social capital, rely on finding proxy indicators which
are measurable and quantifiable. This hides the nature of the social relations and their
methodological assumptions have wide-reaching policy implications as they
perpetuate the belief that the measurable aspects of trust and social capital are more
important that the qualitative aspects (Lyon, in press).
The exploratory and inductive approach to relationships, attitudes and beliefs also
necessitated a case study approach (Casey and Lury, 1987). The ability to draw wider
conclusions can be restricted by the use of a narrow subject, such as a single crop, as a
case study. However, attempts to have a broader subject would have meant sacrificing
the detailed study that is needed to explore the complexities of economic action
embedded in social relations. McDowell (1992) makes the distinction between
intensive and extensive research, with intensive methods involving in-depth
investigations being:
"essential to reveal the underlying causal mechanisms and structures that lie
behind observed behaviour. Whereas extensive research - of the type commonly
based on the identification of descriptive patterns through large scale data
analysis - has its place in the initial identification of empirical regularities, it
rarely meets the criteria of real explanatory power." (McDowell, 1992: 213).
The selection of the tomato production and marketing system for central and southern
Ghana as a case was determined by the direction of the wider research project within
which I worked. This case gave me the opportunity to explore local, regional and
national scales of the Ghanaian food system. The localised studies of villages and
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markets, combined with explorations of the interactions of traders and farmers, were
used to understand regional processes.
The desire to explore local conceptions and to understand social processes from the
• respondents point of view was facilitated by the use of participatory methodologies. In
recent years there have been a range of alternative research methods that have gained
popularity and acceptance. In the areas of rural development, the use of rapid rural
appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) have become increasingly
popularised (Binns et al, 1997; Chambers, 1992; Chambers, 1997; Kapila and Lyon,
1994; see also RRA/PLA Notes 1988-1998) and are now being used for market
studies (Kar and Datta, 1998). These approaches are based on informal research
approaches that have developed in response to the limitations of conventional
questionnaire surveys that failed to pay attention to the concepts and knowledge of
those participating in the research.
The type of participation varies in each case although much of the writing on the
subject has stressed the importance of rapid rural appraisal over participatory rural
appraisal as the latter is seen as being 'extractive' (Chambers 1993). However, this
ignores the uses of RRA for academic research that may not have long-term
participation as an objective of the research in itself, but rather wishes to use the
methods to complement conventional research approaches (Schreckenberg, 1995: 77).
Participatory approaches that stress the role of group research activities and
visualisation are limited as they under-play difference, allow certain group members
to dominate and may lose detail since it is not be possible to represent some
knowledge pictorially (Twyman, 1998; Mosse, 1994).
3.3 The dynamics of the research process and role of the researcher
An inductive approach cannot rely on claims of objectivity, and it should be explicitly
accepted that the role of the researcher is central to all parts of the research process. It
is therefore necessary to question how knowledge is produced, both at the stage of
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data collection (England, 1994) and in the analysis and writing (Clifford and Marcus,
1986).
England (1994) calls for a geography that accepts its inter-subjectivity and the need
for reflexivity:
"Reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork; it induces self-discovery and
can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions. A more
reflexive and flexible approach to fieldwork allows the researcher to be more
open to any challenges to their theoretical position that fieldwork almost
inevitably raises" (England, 1994: 82).
Much social science research has taken a detached scientific approach and claims a
degree of objectivity in order to legitimise the research to the 'scientific community'.
However, this ignores the role that the researcher plays in the outcome of the research
and the data collected. Giddens,(1984) refers to the concept of 'double hermeneutics'
where the actors interpret the social world around them and this can include the
researcher and the research process. Drinkwater (1992) criticises those researchers
who study human agency but do not apply the concept reflexively to the researcher;
"If one lauds the ability of the participant to make a difference to his or her
own world, then it is inconsistent not to acknowledge the equally active nature
of the researcher in shaping the field work encounter and hence the role the
researcher plays in the selection and interpretation of field material"
(Drinkwater, 1992: 367).
'Grounded theory' also fails to acknowledge adequately the role of researcher as the
data collection is considered to be value free and the analysis that emerges from the
empirical data is objective. Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that:
"The illustrative material [quotations from interview notes] are meant to give a
sense of what the real world is really like; while the researcher's interpretation
are meant to represent more detached conceptualisation of that reality"
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 22).
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When doing social research it is necessary to examine whose knowledge perception
and priorities are made known and taken seriously (Scoones and Thompson, 1992),
what data is taken down in notes, what comments are included in the text (Seur,
1992:142; England, 1994: 86) and what data is trivialised as it does not fit into the
theoretical framework (de Vries, 1992). Every researcher is affected by -their prior
assumptions and "cannot escape their cultural backgrounds and conceptual
frameworks" (Seur, 1992). Habermas writes that this must be recognised and
analysed:
"The social scientist has to draw on a competence and knowledge that he has
intuitively at his disposal as a layman. So long, however, as he does not identify
and thoroughly analyse this pre-theoretical knowledge, he cannot control the
extent to which, and the consequences with which, he also influences as a
participant - and thereby alters - the process of communication into which he
has entered only to understand" (Habermas, 1984: 111-112).
Drawing on feminist research methodologies, England (1994: 86) calls for greater
recognition of the inherently hierarchical nature of the research relationship and
Madge (1993: 295) sees the need for greater consideration of the role of the 'self',
showing how the researcher's positionality may influence the 'data' collected and thus
the information that becomes encoded as 'knowledge' ". Herod (1993) supports this
view, citing a range of research reports that show the impact of gender on the data
collected and even the ability to get an interview in the first place. Furthermore,
positions of the researcher are continually reinterpreted by the researched, especially
when working in the 'third world'. Sidaway (1992:403) discusses how class, cultural,
racial and gender contexts are altered and shifted as researchers from the "first world
move into the hierarchies of the 'third world' ".
Reflexivity in the research process, attention to the positionality of the researcher and
deconstmctivist post-modern writings can be taken to extremes where the research
becomes centred on the researcher and as Lancaster (1996: 161) states "other cultures
and other people" become the "backdrops for authorial self discovery". While I
support the attempts to make the role of the researcher transparent and visible, I reject
the view that cultural relativity means the 'outsider' has to abandon the concept of
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'facts' although there is a need to accept that "all facts are necessarily selected and
interpreted from the moment we decide to count one thing and ignore another"
(Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 23)2. The outsider is always an outsider but this does not
invalidate the issues of the research. There is an ethical and moral obligation to
present the concerns and strategies, as I have perceived and recorded them, of the
farmers and traders who were interviewed and the reader must take my positionality
into account when reading my interpretation.
3.4 The research experience
My perceived position was shaped by the initial impression I gave to the farmers and
traders, and by whom I was seen to be aligned to. These issues were constantly
shifting through the research process. In each interview, I was demanding time and
often confidential information. Cooperation from the farmers and traders, and the
outcome of the interview, was based on their trust in me, and the power relations
between us. The similarity between the research process and the subject of my
research was often referred to by the farmers and traders:
"I got 1.5 million Cedis [B75] from a customer trader .... I work with traders,
it depends on trust ... Like I came to you because I have trust in you. This is
because I got a message from my mother who knows you" (Kwabena, Derma,
Interview 12).
It is very hard to know how anyone perceives an outsider although, in my case, several
issues about my identity were referred to at various times; as white and British in an
ex-colonial country; as a younger man working at times among groups that are almost
all women who are older than me; and as re l atively rich, from a country with many job
opportunities once I have done my studies. This raises a series of important issues in
relation to my research experience.
2Janesick (1994) views credibility coming from asking yourself, what techniques are
used to ensure accuracy and validity, what is the experience and qualification of the
researcher, and what undergirds the study.
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Being an outsider restricted my understanding of the cultural context and the
experience of everyday life, although Ghanaian colleagues also saw my extreme
difference as a potential benefit in certain circumstances. This was especially apparent
with traders as I was perceived not to be a threat to their businesses being male, young
and foreign. I was therefore able to tackle issues, such as economic activities, that
others found difficult to broach. There were no cases of opposition to my working
with women, although my ability to discuss issues to do with women's home life was
limited. Gender relations shaped how the research relationship was built up with
people who were visited regularly. With men, I could draw on common gendered
roles and customs, while with women, I could distance myself from Ghanaian men
because of my ethnicity and at the same time joke about my interest as a man coming
to see them. The beginning of many interviews consisted of relaxed and informal
conversation and joking, often centred around questions of my marital status, whether
I was looking for a wife and whether I would take them ( or their daughter) back to
UK.
My race and ethnicity were constantly referred to and played a major role in how I was
perceived. I found that it opened many opportunities but often for reasons that I found
difficult to accept. Colonial attitudes and discourse about race continue to be
widespread with an uncritical respect for white people. This influence is a form of
ascribed power as discussed in the previous chapter, and is substantiated through the
discourse about race used in much of Ghana, the exception being largely among those
with university education. This discourse became evident in conversations that make
the distinction of 'you whites' against 'we black'. The labelling of European people,
especially British, as 'our colonial masters' also reflects this discourse, although it
was often used in an inverted ironic way by those who had studied the impact of
colonialism.
How I was perceived was also influenced by who I was seen to be aligned to and how
I explained my roles. I spent some time at the beginning of each interview explaining
to the interviewee, and the spectators that often gathered around, that my work was
part of a wider research project and I could not bring them anything immediately but
the project's aim was to raise their income through identifying bottlenecks in the
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marketing chain and looking for solutions. Despite our constant repetition of the
reasons for the work, a number of rumours spread around the villages that we were
gold miners, debt collectors, health visitors or crop exporters. This became less of a
problem when I was carrying out repeated visits and we could check that the
interviewees understood the research when they introduced me to other 'people
listening. Research also became easier once I and the research assistants were better
known in the village or market. Entry into the villages and markets for the first time
had to be done carefully, following the local customs of visiting the chief and his
elders (or the market queen) to present schnapps and explain our work. While living
in the village we were able to get to know people informally in the evenings and
through participating in large social events, such as funerals.
Respondents were never paid although I gave some, key informants gifts and
photographs. An important part of the process of becoming accepted in Kumasi and
Sunyani markets was the traders' involvement in participatory selection exercises for
new varieties of tomatoes that were being tested by the Overseas Development
Administration project. This raised much interest and changed the way I was
perceived. I was also able to show early drafts of work to some literate traders and
farmers: this was highly valued by the secretary to the traders' association in Kumasi
who refused to return the draft with his comments until I had convinced him he could
get it back later. Research that aims to question the existing power relations involves
working with all relevant groups. In this way, I had to 'enrol' people into my research
project, by trying to change the way in which I was perceived, in order to build up
cooperation (Latour, 1986). Some of the people who welcomed and trusted me may
feel betrayed by my writing; this raises ethical issues on the deception of people being
interviewed.
My position was complicated further by working closely with research assistants and
'interpreters'. On the one hand, these individuals are perceived in their own context
and this affects how the researcher is perceived. Therefore the issue of gender, race
and class of the research assistant can shape the research outcome. The research
assistants were all Ghanaian, although still 'outsiders' but to a different degree
(Twyman, 1998). The position and background of the research assistants was given as
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much importance, if not more, than my background, with most interviewees asking
them where they were from and their ethnic origin. I worked with nine assistants
during the research process as I decided to work with people who were already known
to the communities or markets in which we were working. Six of them were working
with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and three were attached to universities.
Only two of these were women, as it was difficult to find women with good English
and the appropriate interviewing style who would live away from the towns. I was
able to select assistants and I worked with them for some time to assess their ability to
take a participatory listening approach (Chambers, 1997). Some of the Ministry staff
were not able to put aside the 'lecturing' role that pervades many of those in official
government positions.
The role of research assistants as 'interpreters' is also problematic as the translation of
a conversation allows room for reinterpretation and the selection of what facts they
think the researcher wants to know. My proficiency in Twi, the language understood
by the farmers and traders, was adequate for introductions and small talk before and
after the interview that was important for building up a rapport. I was not able to
conduct in-depth interviews although I was able to understand much of the
questioning and replies to check that questions were understood and details of the
replies had not been left out.
3.5 Selection of research sites and respondents
3.5.1 Selecting villages and markets
Several case study villages were selected for data collection. The criteria for selecting
these included ecological zone, ethnicity, accessibility and proportion of tomato
farmers. Information on the area was gathered through preliminary surveys
(Warburton and Lyon, 1995) and from discussions with local officials from the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture. It was not possible to conduct a random sample and
so I followed Polly Hill (1977) in selecting ones that are "not obviously irregular",
although it is recognised that definitions of regularity are subjective. The villages
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medium
high
high
small
medium
high
high
high
medium
small
where the research took place are given in Table 3.1. Other villages were visited as
part of other surveys and for short visits. In each village care was given to reaching all
parts of the community, as there are usually people living in surrounding hamlets or
huts close to their land. Many of these people also have houses or rooms in the main
settlements.
Table 3.1 Details of villages covered in the surveys
Village	 District	 Ecological
	
Relative	 Main	 Location and
	
Proportion of
Zone	 size of	 Ethnic	 road type
	 farmers
village	 group	 growing
tomatoes
Dwomo	 Tano
	 Forest/
Transition
Techi-	 Tam	 Forest/
mentia	 Transition
Derma	 Tano	 Forest/
Transition
Susuanso	 Tano	 Forest/
Transition
Tanoso	 Techiman	 Forest/
Transition
Tano Boase Techiman	 Savannah/
Transition
Manso	 Nlcoranza/	 Savannah/
Techiman	 Transition
Pamdu	 Kintampo	 Savannah/
Transition
Akete	 Wenchi	 Savannah/
Transition
Kokoago	 Wenchi	 Savannah/
Transition
medium	 Brong	 40 km SE of
Sunyani.
Good
secondary road
large	 Brong	 45 km SE of
Sunyani.
Good
secondary road
large	 Brong	 60 km SE of
Sunyani.
Poor
secondary road
medium	 Brong	 15 km SE of
Sunyani. Good
secondary road
medium	 Brong/	 15 km S of
Ashanti	 Techiinan
Trunk road
medium	 Brong/	 10 km NE. of
Ashanti
	
Techiman
Trunk road
medium	 Brong	 15 km NE of
Techiman
Trunk road
medium Brong	 30 km NE of
Techiman
Trunk road
small	 Kulange	 5 km NE of
speakers	 Wenchi. Poor
secondary road
small	 Brong	 8 km SE of
Wenchi
Widened
footpath
Note: Relative size: small is <3000 people, medium is 3000 -6000, large is >6000
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The markets that were studied in detail were selected according to their relative
importance as a marketing centre for the producers interviewed in the villages. The
markets ranged in size from the small periodic village markets located in the villages
selected for the farmer survey, to the larger urban markets.
Table 3.2 Details of markets in the study
Location	 Administra-	 Estimated	 Relay	 Ethnicity of	 Access for Market
tive status of population	 function	 traders	 non-local	 infra-
settlement	 of towns	 for	 traders	 structure
tomatoes 
Village	 <10000	 small	 Varied	 Varied	 Wooden
markets	 framed
(small daily
	
shelters
/weekly)	 roofs of
palm frond
Wenchi	 District	 30,000	 small	 Brong	 Limited	 Traders
(small daily
	 capital	 /Northerners	 construct
/weekly) wooden
frames
with
roofing
sheets
Techiman	 District	 70,000	 large	 Brong /	 Open	 Traders
(small daily	 capital	 Ashanti/	 construct
/weekly)	 Northerners	 small
shelters
with
roofing
sheets
Sunyani	 Regional	 70,000	 small	 Brong /	 Limited	 Traders
(small daily	 capital	 Northerners	 construct
/weekly)	 small
shelters
with
roofing
sheets
Kumasi	 Regional	 700,000	 large	 Ashanti	 High	 None
Central and	 capital
Asafo
(Daily)
Accra	 National	 1,300,000	 large	 Ga	 Limited	 Purpose
31st Dec.	 capital	 built
Market,	 shelters
(Daily) and paved
roads (31st
Dec.)
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3.5.2 Selection of key informants
Research was carried with key informants who were selected for their particular
knowledge or position. The development of trust and rapport was important and was
•built up through living in the settlements and repeated visits that allowed me to
establish relationships. Many of these key informants became friends whom we might
visit in the evenings or, for the men, meet for drinks in the local bars. Key informants
were also 'gatekeepers' to new sites and areas of research and made introductions,
creating a 'snow balling' method of sampling. However, in several circumstances this
restricted my access to others as I was aligned to one party.I attempted to ensure that I
met a range of key informants that were representative of the differences among the
traders and farmers. The decision of 'representativeness' was mine, based on
categories emerging from earlier research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and experience
of living among the people I was selecting. Great care was taken to avoid the different
forms of bias (Chambers, 1983:13), especially according to gender, age, ethnicity and
wealth. Wealth ranking was carried out in order to establish the categories of wealth
as identified by those doing the ranking (Sharrock et al, 1993). This gave me a rough
indication of the main indicators of wealth and poverty.
3.5.3 Sampling for the semi structured interviews and questionnaires
There were difficulties in finding or creating a list of names of individuals as a
sampling frame. Farmers were selected by stratified sample with the stratifications
based on areas of the village and outlying settlements identified on sketch maps. A
straight line was taken, making sure to cover , all areas especially those of non
indigenous groups who reside on the edge of the main settlements in areas referred to
as zongos. Random numbers were used to select houses located along the line.
Interviews were always carried out in the evening and early morning when farmers
had not left for their farms or other business. The first person who was seen as we
entered the compound or house was interviewed, although in two of the settlements,
women appeared to be under-represented by this method so I decided to increase the
sample size and repeat the sampling method, but only interviewing women.
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In all cases, the individual was taken as the unit of research rather than the household,
as there are big differences within households based on gender and age which change
over time. Furthermore, the matrilineal household system in the study area is highly
flexible and complex, with individuals being members of more than one .kin group.
There is a diverse range of household types with some people able to eat and reside in
more than one house. There is no Twi word for 'household', the closest words being
house (fie), extended family (abusua), or their spouse and children. Each of these
forms have important implications for access to resources but are not useful as
defining a unit of analysis. Hill (1986: 80) criticises economic analyses for the poor
quality of data used and Leach (1994:37-38) states that:
" The household' has proved a particularly problematic concept to apply to
West Africa, where people commonly belong to numerous nested and/or
overlapping economic and social institutions. In as much as households can be
locally defined, they are invariably nested within groupings of other kinds".
This issue of defining households is discussed in more detail in section 4. 6, in the
context of understanding gender relations.
3.6 Methods used
3.6.1 Semi structured interviews
The main research tool was the semi structured interview that follows a check list of
questions while allowing opportunities for open ended questions and digressions into
areas of interest for myself and the interviewee. The checklists were constantly
adapted and modified as new areas of research were identified. When working with
key informants, repeated or serial interviews (Cook and Crang, 1995) allowed for trust
to be built up and issues could be further explored. Some of the most interesting
interviews occurred when the respondents were most relaxed. The discussions once I
had put my notebook away or while we were trapped in a house by a rainstorm were
very important for opening up new areas of enquiry that I had not thought to ask about
before.
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Interviews with farmers took place in their houses in the mornings before they went to
farm or in the evening when they had returned and rested. Farm visits were also made
at the beginning of the research to understand the production system. Each interview
would last between 20 and 40 minutes and would usually take place on benches
outside of houses. At times there were problems with large numbers of spectators
which may have affected what people said.
Itinerant trader interviews took place whenever I could meet them. Some were
conducted in villages while they were waiting for the farmers to harvest the produce,
although most took place in the markets. In Kumasi many of the interviews took place
in the Vegetable Sellers' Association hut where the market queen sits and itinerant
traders wait for their produce to be sold. These interviews could only be carried out in
the late morning and early afternoon when they were less busy. I brought small gifts
for the market queens such as biscuits or a souvenir from UK and tried to find a way
through the ethical dilemma of paying the traders (Robson, 1994) by avoiding gifts
but buying drinks for everyone in the hut, especially when the heat inside became
unbearable. The conditions in the market were terrible with oppressive heat, very little
shade, refuse and dust blowing around and stagnant water. I began to understand the
conditions under which the traders had to work during the periods of observation and
interviewing. I was only able to withstand working there for three to four hours at a
time before the heat and dust became too much and I had to retreat from the market to
recover.
Interviews with the sellers of agricultural inputs took place in their shops and
occasionally in their homes in the evenings. The interviews would be carried out
between customers and while this often broke the flow of the discussion, sitting in the
shop allowed opportunities for observation. The shops are usually corrugated iron
roofed huts in the markets, and cooler and more shaded than the food traders selling
areas. However, several interviews had to be shortened because of nausea from the
pesticides surrounding us. Again this gave an insight into the working conditions; one
man kindly advised us to eat lots before coming to the agro-chemical shops because
we would not eat later due to the nausea.
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Table 3.3 Number of interviews
SSI 1995-6 SSI 1997-9	 Questionnaires 1997
Farmers 185 148 159
Input sellers 10 45 42
Tomato traders 75 50 37
Other crop traders 40 40 50
Officials/others 20 20
Total 294 303 288
Note: SSTs are semi-structured interviews. Some of the interviewees in 1997 also
completed questionnaires.
Longitudinal studies were carried out that followed 60 farmers from two villages
through their harvesting period to monitor the changing prices they received and the
difference in price within the village on each day. Weekly monitoring was carried out
for three months by Ministry of Food and Agriculture staff. An example of a
completed form is included in the appendix. This price information research was
followed up with detailed questions on the reasons for price differences, the
bargaining procedure and the sources of information that allow farmers to bargain
effectively. Similar longitudinal studies were carried out in Kumasi and Sunyani
markets.
Group interviews and discussions were used to explore certain issues. The advantages
of group work are not only the overlapping range of knowledge, and "observable
mutual cross checking" (Chambers, 1997: 148) but also 'a means to set up a
negotiation of meanings through intra- and inter- personal debates" (Cook and Crang,
1995: 56) that may "bring forth material that would not come out in either the
participant's own casual conversations or in response to the researcher's preconceived
questions" (Morgan, 1988: 21). Morgan (1988: 11) found that the use of focus groups
was useful for "orienting oneself to a new field, generating hypotheses based on
informants insights, evaluating research sites, developing interview schedules and
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questionnaires and obtaining participants' interpretations of results from earlier
studies". In this way Morgan sees focus groups as a compromise between the
strengths and weakness of participant observation and individual interviews (p.22).
I used both formal and informal groups. Informal group interviews and discussions
were not planned but took place when there were a number of people together and
willing to discuss a certain issue. This may have been in peoples' houses or in public
spaces such as bus stops, drinking bars, or the traders association huts. Formal groups
were planned in advance and were found to be particularly useful for certain activities
such as wealth rat-Acing exercises, getting community level information (Twyman,
1998) and discussion of the meaning of key Twi words. Attention was paid to the
composition and the role of the research assistants as moderators (Cook and Crang,
1995: 57) as this affected the behaviour and hence the information given (Herod,
1993: 308; Mosse, 1993 and 1995). I felt that group work marginalised some groups,
especially the poor and women farmers who may not be so well organised (Burkey,
1993) or cannot afford the time (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993). The power
relations in the group meetings were problematic at times and, as Mosse (1995: 29)
found, this affects who is invited, who speaks, and who is excluded, although some
information on social relations within a group can be gained by observing the
interaction within groups. We faced problems with domineering individuals and elites
(Mascarenhas et al, 1991; Norman et al, 1989; Mosse, 1995:28) who put forward
opinions that limited discussions (Cook and Crang, 1995:61). However, this could be
avoided if such individuals were taken on one side and interviewed alone by myself or
one of the research assistants while the group discussions continued.
Data from interviews and group work were recorded in notebooks except for a small
number of tape-recorded interviews. Note taking was found to be preferable to
recording as it was more informal, people being interviewed were more comfortable
and less suspicious, and the large number of interviews would not have been possible
if time had to be spent transcribing and translating interviews. Recorded interviews
provided more detail and enabled me to analyse expressions and key words in context.
Notes and recordings were transcribed during the day when people had gone to the
farms or were too busy to be interviewed. This allowed me to identify issues that
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needed further exploration or cross checking, and was a vital part of the ongoing
analysis.
Analysis of the qualitative data took place continually with comparative analysis
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) where the researcher seeks negative examples in order to
constantly rework hypotheses. The reworking of hypotheses was done during the
interviews, in discussions between myself and research assistants after the interview,
during transcription, through writing up brief reports for supervisors, and talking to
anyone willing to listen to me. Much of the preliminary analysis was in the form of
writing notes on the side of transcripts, or noting ideas and memos whenever they
came to me (Burgess, 1984:174). Once transcribed, data were formally coded for
further analysis with the search for relationships and tension (what does not fit) in the
data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Janesick, 1994).
3.6.2 Questionnaires and structured interviews
Questionnaires were developed only towards the end of the research when the key
issues were identified. Details of the number completed are given in table 3.3. I aimed
to keep the number of questions to a minimum so that each one could be completed in
less than 30 minutes in order to avoid mistakes and 'non sampling error' due to
boredom on behalf of the respondent, myself and research assistants. I limited the
subject matter to those issues that could be accurately collected; I avoided questions
referring to income, expenditure, indebtedness and labour time as previous attempts
had shown that the people were unwilling to talk openly about these issues and may
not know the answers. Most interviewees were comfortable providing answers to
questions about credit provided and received. In cases where interviewees appeared to
be unwilling to answer, they often claimed that they did not know. Therefore some
tables in the later chapters have a combined category of 'don't know or unwilling to
answer' as it was not possible to separate the two responses.
The questionnaires were piloted thoroughly and revised. I carried out many of the
questionnaires with research assistants when they formed part of the semi structured
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interviews. For these interviews I did not use questionnaire sheets as this appeared too
formal. I was not able to administer all the questionnaires myself so I designed a short
questionnaire (shown in the appendix) and used the staff of the Policy Planning
Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to
carry out the work. I had worked with some of the staff before and so knew which
individuals were good interviewers.
3.6.3 Participatory methods
The potential benefits and limitations of participatory approaches such as Participatory
Rural Appraisal or Rapid Rural Appraisal were discussed earlier in the chapter. I
found that some of the tools were of particular use for academic research especially
those that rely on visualisation and diagramming. These tools can allow a broad cross-
section of people to participate in the research process and play a role in the collection
and analysis of the data as the participants have greater control over the research
process. Examples of tools and exercises used include mapping of communities to
prepare for further in-depth interview sampling, wealth ranking, seasonal calendars
and daily activity programmes. (Chambers, 1997; Kapila and Lyon, 1994; Theis and
Grady, 1991). These approaches have been popularised by PRA/RRA although many
have been part of the geographer's and anthropologist's repertoire for many years
(Binns et al, 1997; Chambers, 1983).
3.6.4 Observation
Observation played an important role throughout the fieldwork. This took place
continually while living in Ghana, both in the towns and in the villages, and especially
during interviews and while waiting for interviews. I cannot refer to this as
'participant observation' as I was not able to actually participate in the trading,
financing and building of contracts, although my experience of building research
relationships and participating in village events, such as funerals, was useful in
understanding how farmers and traders built up trust. In the markets, I followed the
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approach of Hollier (1986) who adopted a method of 'lurking' which he defines as the
"patient, unobtrusive observation of market transactions, recording the prices actually
agreed by buyers and sellers". This enabled me to collect much information by
observing negotiations or disputes and then discussing them later with both parties.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the methodologies and set of data collection tools required for
empirical studies of institutional economics and the embeddedness of economic action
in social structures. Building on the theoretical framework presented in chapter two,
the methodology was adapted in order to collect and analyse data that can give a rich
explanation of what is actually happening in the markets of rural Ghana. I have
attempted to develop a mixed methodology, that relies for the greater part on
qualitative data. The exploratory nature of the work required an inductive approach
that created the opportunity for me to explore new ideas and linkages as they became
apparent.
I have tried to present my role through the research experience in order for the reader
to understand the context of the data and analysis presented. This context is also
shaped by my previous research interests, academic background and how I entered the
subject; these issues are discussed in the introduction. I have limited the discussion of
my positionality to this chapter. I recognise the role my position has played in the data
collection, analysis and presentation. However, I feel there is validity in the
information presented and that the farmers' and traders' activities and coping
strategies are of more interest to the reader than my own.
Discussion of sensitive issues required an approach by myself and research assistants
that could build up trust and also recognise the power relations evident in the research
exercise. At times these issues were discussed with the interviewees, comparing our
relationship to economic relationships that were the subject of the interviews. In most
cases, the build up of trust and the power relations was less explicit but played an
important role in the research all the same. The analytical framework set out in
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chapter two can be used for understanding the relationships within the research
encounter as well as for understanding the fanner' and traders' relationships that I will
now explore in detail in the following four chapters.
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Chapter 4. Tomato production and marketing in Ghana: establishing the social,
political, historical and environmental context
4.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have laid out a theoretical framework for analysing the case study
material. This chapter explores the background to the case study by examining the
history of commercial agriculture in the study area, the environmental factors that
shape the location of tomato cropping, the tomato production and marketing system
and the differences between the groups of actors involved in the system, namely the
growers, input dealers and tomato traders.
Production and marketing of tomatoes differs from that of many other crops because of
the tomato's perishability and high input costs. These attributes pose unique problems
for tomato farmers (as compared to those growing other crops) and result in a wide
range of contractual forms and institutions. It is these institutional aspects that are at
the core of this thesis: through their analysis, lessons can be learnt about the wider
institutional context of rural economic change in Ghana.
This thesis takes the tomato system as a case study and concentrates on tomato farmers
and traders working in Brong Ahafo Region and in the markets that are supplied with
tomatoes from this area. The research areas in Brong Ahafo include Wenchi, Techiman
and Tano Districts (see maps 3.1 and 3.2). This area lies between latitudes 7.2 and 7.9
degrees north, and longitudes 1.8 and 2.7 degrees west.
4.2 Production context
4.2.1 The history of commercial agriculture in Ghana and the study area
The history of commercial agriculture in Ghana has been characterised by a peasant
mode of economic organisation or small commodity producers which has continued to
the present day (Hill, 1963; Hill, 1970). By commercial agriculture I refer to the
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production of crops mostly for sale, usually outside the community. Much of the
history of commercial agriculture in southern Ghana has been centred around the key
cash crops of kola nut, rubber, palm oil and, most importantly for the study area, cocoa.
The development of these cash crops has laid the foundations for vegetable production
in the study area.
There is little written material on the agricultural systems of Ghana in the pre-colonial
period (McCaskie, 1995). Subsistence agriculture, combined with the production of
gold, was the basis of the Asante society. There is contradictory evidence on the extent
to which this form of agriculture was egalitarian or feudal. Hymer (1970) suggests a
picture of equality and democracy as "land was distributed equally and most families
had full rights to the land they used, paying little or nothing in the way of rent or tax. A
fair share of available land was the right of every member of the community .... and
there was no leisure class deriving its income from rents" (ibid: 34). This simplified
view of land access ignores the hierarchical political structures that have emerged since
the seventeenth century. During this period wealthy individuals or birernpon moved
into new forest lands. There was frequent conflict, with the stronger birempon
emerging as overlords (Wilks, 1982). The inequality of rural life was exacerbated by
the growing use of slaves in many Akan' areas. The power of the feudal traditional
leaders was exercised in the collection of tributes (Mike11, 1989a) although during this
period the village retained much of its autonomy (Amanor, 1994). The absence of large
land owners continued until the growth of the cocoa industry in forest areas of Ghana
at the beginning of the twentieth century, as attempts by European powers to start
plantations had failed (Dickson, 1969).
The earliest large scale cash crop of the peasant farmers in southern Ghana was kola
nut. This crop, collected from the forests and forming part of the indigenous, pre-
colonial trade across much of West Africa, continued to be the biggest export from
Ghana until the beginning of the twentieth century (Dickson, 1969). Palm oil was also
an important crop in the south of Ghana, supplying the European markets, although
'The Akan areas refers to the Twi speaking people who live in southern Ghana. They
include the Ashantis, Brongs, Ahafos in the study area of this thesis as well as other
ethnic groups to the south and east of the country.
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this trade declined in the 1860s and 1870s because of competition from south east
Asian plantations and the increased use of mineral oils (Amanor, 1994: 44). In the
forest areas, including the study area, rubber production started in the 1880s (Dickson,
1969) although it did not take off as a major crop until 1898. Prior to that date, the cost
of head loading it was too expensive (Gould, 1960). Production increased- up to 1913
when the world price collapsed; production was low for the next 10 years (Busia, 1951:
122).
It was the dramatic rise of cocoa that has had the largest and most lasting impact on the
rural economy of southern Ghana. It was first exported in 1885 and in the next two
decades it became the largest export from Ghana (Dickson, 1969: 165), dramatically
changing the structure of the economy (Szereszewski, 1965). By 1900 the export of
cocoa stood at 179 (imperial) tons p.a.. This rose to 4,170 tons in 1911 and to 17,939
in 1915. By 1938 exports had risen to 90,000 tons (Busia, 1951: 121). The rapid
increase in cocoa production was possible in part because of the institutional systems
that evolved, most notably the company system of land purchases and the abusa
sharecropping systems (Hill, 1963).
Cocoa production led to some neglect of food farms which alarmed both the colonial
and traditional authorities (Busia, 1951) although most farmers practised both
(Dickson, 1969:312). Cocoa expansion was promoted through the establishment of
agricultural stations starting in 1906 that produced seedlings for the farmers. There was
no support in the form of institutional credit for peasant farmers; this form of support
did not appear until the late 1960s (Akoto, 1987). Government promotion of the
expansion was mainly in the form of improving the transport network. New areas for
cocoa production were opened up and farmers planted cocoa in the expectation that
roads would reach areas soon (Gould, 1960:40). The first lorries were operating in the
1900s (Szereszewski, 1965: 63), although motorised transport only took off after the
introduction of American Ford trucks around 1914 (Dickson, 1969: 229). Cocoa
farmers played a role in building feeder roads or moved to roadside areas (Gould,
1960: 66). The expansion of cocoa into the forest frontier area of what is now southern
Brong Ahafo started after 1925 when the road was built and tarred (Dickson, 1969).
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There was large scale migration into cocoa growing areas of south and central Brong
Ahafo, as Ashantis moved from Kumasi and Mampong areas and Brongs moved from
Wenchi (Hilton, 1960: 29-30). Dickson (1969: 279) reports on the wider depopulation
of the transitional zone of central Brong Ahafo because of the attractiveness of cocoa
and the decline of trading centres linking the south of Ghana with the north. There was
also considerable migration of people from the north of Ghana ('stranger' farmers)
who came to work on the cocoa farms, often in share cropping arrangements. These
groups set up settlements on the edge of existing villages and today each large village
or town has an area where the stranger population live, referred to as the zongo. The
road network, combined with better security, also resulted in localised movements as
farmers moved to more accessible villages and better land (Dickson, 1969: 282).
The agricultural policy for other crops in the first decades after independence was
characterised by a push towards experimenting with large scale mechanised agriculture
of export crops in the transition and savannah ecological zones (Hansen, 1989; Akoto,
1987: 243). This was part of attempts to move away from the peasant model of
production toward NIcrumah's vision of collective and cooperative farms and large
scale irrigation projects. The extent of the state farms was limited as the programme
suffered from mismanagement (Hansen, 1989) and, as Tonah (1994) found, "dissipated
national resources massively, and benefited mainly the commercial farmers and
bureaucrats who employed their privileged positions to obtain access to bank 1 ans,
credits, subsidised inputs and machinery" (ibid: 120). The farms made considerable
losses which led to the collapse of the Agricultural Development Company in 1962.
This was replaced by the State Farms Corporation which continued to take up much of
the agricultural public expenditure, despite the acknowledgement of the importance of
small scale production in the Seven-Year Plan of 1964 (Akoto, 1987: 247-8). The
change of government in 1966 to more market friendly policies resulted in a move
away from the nationalised State Farms but continued to support large scale agriculture
in the private sector through subsidised inputs (Hansen, 1989; Akoto, 1987:248-253).
Government agricultural policy neglected the needs of the small scale farmers until
attention to small scale production began in 1972 with 'Operation Feed Yourself'. This
policy was introduced as an attempt to reach self-sufficiency in food production as the
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economy went into decline. There was a rapid increase in government funding for
agriculture, although it had little effect as agriculture was entering a period of
contraction (Akoto, 1987: 250). The late 1970s and early 1980s were a period of
serious economic decline. The economic situation was exacerbated in 1983 when there
was a severe drought, extensive bush fires and the repatriation of one million
Ghanaians who had been working in Nigeria. Faced with such problems and with the
economy in decline, the goverment accepted International Monetary Fund and World
Bank structural adjustment policies.
The cocoa industry in Ghana dominated the post independence economy although it
declined dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1984 production was half
the level of 1974 (Mike11, 1989b). This was partly due to the severe forest fires of 1983
when many cocoa trees were destroyed. It was also due to the long term lack of price
incentives offered to farmers. Falling world prices and price fixing by the state run
marketing body (COCOBOD) resulted in farmers receiving as little as one quarter of
the world price (Sarris and Shams, 1989). The difference between world prices and that
received by the producers originated as a 'Stabilisation Fund' to maintain farmers'
incomes when world prices dropped, but over time this became a major source of
government revenue (Sarris and Shams, 1989:135). Farmers responded to the low
prices by smuggling the cocoa to COte d'Ivoire and Togo (Bates, 1981:86; Mike11,
1989b: 460).
Structural adjustment programmes have concentrated Government agricultural policy
on increasing export crops and import substitution, although policy documents also
state that it is concerned with food security, small holder productivity and balanced
regional development (Ministry of Agriculture, 1990). An important part of the policy
has been an increase in the price of cocoa to give incentives to farmers. There has been
an increase in cocoa production since 1984 although it is limited by the ageing of the
existing trees and environmental changes (deforestation and soil fertility decline) in
traditional cocoa growing areas such as Brong Ahafo (Amanor, 1993; 47). Therefore
most of the new plantations are in the Western Region. The late 1980s and early 1990s
saw a shift in policy emphasis to small scale food crop production although this was
partly due to the lack of funds for large scale projects since the implementation of the
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Economic Recovery Programme (Tonah, 1994: 120). The government has concentrated
on increasing the production of staple crops, especially maize. This has been limited by
the increasing costs of agricultural inputs as subsidies were removed as part of the
Economic Recovery Program. In the past four years agricultural policy has also
stressed the need to support rural incomes and to promote other crops such as
vegetables. However, there had been very little vegetable research and extension
advice to farmers before this shift occurred.
This brief history of agricultural trends in southern Ghana sets the context for the wider
discussion of the institutional forms of the vegetable production and marketing system.
Of particular interest is the continued importance of small scale agriculture and the
poor state of the rural economy.
Most of the Ghanaian cocoa industry has continued to follow a peasant model of rural
economic change, rather than that of plantations managed by Ghanaians or Europeans.
The peasant model has been found to be cheaper because it uses family labour and the
land can also be used for subsistence purposes (Konings, 1986). Hymer (1970: 46-8)
suggests that the plantation model did not take off because the colonial government did
not make available large tracts of perceived 'vacant lands' to foreign investors. This
was based on the policy of preserving indigenous institutions in West Africa and the
threat of political resistance following interference with land ownership.
The weak position of the non-cocoa agricultural sector has been blamed on a number
of factors. On the one hand, the dependence on the world economy because of the
focus on export crops has damaged the rural economy. This has been combined with
national government policies that have attempted to extract surpluses through the
marketing boards (Iliffe, 1983: 37) and concentrated on export crops that they can tax.
There has also been an urban bias in the policies that have been more concerned with
keeping urban prices low rather than improving rural livelihoods (Amanor, 1994: 48).
Inappropriate technology for food crop farmers (Amanor, 1994) and lack of funds for
the national agricultural research programme (Tripp, 1993) have contributed to the
poor state of agriculture and the rural economy.
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Finally there are arguments that link the poor state of agriculture with cultural
explanations. The land tenure situation and the lack of clear property rights are
continually criticised in policy documents and are based on a colonial eurocentric
discourse. The conclusions of the agriculturalist, La Anyane, sum up the thinking that
has been perpetuated into the present day:
"the social and family structure which dominates local agricultural organisation
was also largely responsible for the impervious surface offered to new ideas
about crops and methods. The Ghanaian land tenure system was the main draw
back to agricultural development and would still render futile the efforts of the
great transition if it remained unchanged" (La Anyane, 1963).
This view is also supported by those promoting neo-liberal approaches; they see this as
a severe constraint to development as it does not create the 'enabling environment' that
is required to lead to economic change. However, this viewpoint chooses to ignore the
amazing growth of the cocoa economy much of which has to be attributed to the social
organisation and land tenure system. The extent to which pre-capitalist and culturally
specific institutions support or hinder development is discussed in the final chapters.
4.2.2 Environmental factors and location of tomato cropping
The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of social factors in the development of the
tomato industry in Brong Ahafo Region but this must be seen in the context of the
opportunities and constraints posed by the natural environment. In this section I
examine the natural resource base that has shaped the cropping patterns of the past. I
also investigate the reports of environmental change, the impact of past cropping
patterns on the environment and the impact this has had back on tomato production
systems.
The local environmental factors and conditions required for tomato production
Tomato production requires long sunny periods with light evenly distributed rainfall
(Purseglove, 1968: 532). There can be problems with excessive rainfall as the plants
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are very susceptible to diseases (Phillips, 1977). The amount and patterns of rainfall
differ within the study area. In the south the average annual rainfall is 1200 mm and
there tends to be a bi-modal pattern with maximum rainfall in April to June (major
season) and a minor season from September to October. The northern part of the study
area has patterns closer to a savannah climate with less pronounced bi-modal peaks.
However, there is much variability especially in relation to the timing of the early rains
in March and April (Wills, 1962).
Temperature is an important factor in tomato production as high night time
temperatures can affect fruiting (Purseglove, 1968); ideally night temperatures should
be between 10°C and 20°C. The minimum temperatures, collected in Wenchi from
1961 to 1990, show mean monthly minimum temperatures ranging between 20°C and
22°C (Holland, 1995). The minimum temperatures in other parts of Ghana are higher
for all of the year except the dry season when it is not possible to grow tomatoes unless
there is irrigation.
The terrain in the study area is gently sloping and tomato production is found on a
range of slopes. It appears that relief is not important except where it affects soil
quality (Wills, 1962: 208). The drainage patterns and location of streams has a major
influence on dry season production as farmers will locate their farms next to sources of
water that will not dry up during the production period. Tomatoes will grow on a wide
range of soils although optimal conditions are light loamy soils with good water
holding capacity but also free drainage (Phillips, 1977:76; Purseglove, 1968: 532). The
soils in the study area are classified as Forest or Savannah Ochrosols (Holland, 199S).
These soils are well drained, porous, friable and loamy. Brammer (1962: 94 and 106)
states that the greater part of the nutrients are associated with the organic matter and
that there is higher organic content in the surface layers under forest environments. The
lack of organic matter in the Savannah Ochrosols result in the poor provision of
phosphorous and nitrogen (Nye and Stephens, 1962: 142-3). Micro-nutrients may be
deficient and cation exchange capacity low, limiting the ability of the soil to hold
nutrients in a form available for plant use (Holland, 1995:4).
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Many areas are underlain with compact concretions and impermeable iron pans. This is
a particular problem in the middle slopes in the undulating terrain and in places erosion
has brought these outcrops to the surface. The nature of these concretions range from
massive hard iron pans that reduce the soil available to plants, to less detrimental stony
beds (Holland, 1995:5). Concretions are also found in the valley bottoms in the
Savannah Ochrosols (Brammer, 1962: 105). The valley bottom soils, used intensively
for irrigated production in the dry season, remain waterlogged for much of the year and
have structureless soils with low organic content. They become slushy when wet and
solid clods when dry (Holland, 1995: 5).
Environmental changes and cropping patterns
The changing patterns of rainfall in the south of the study area in the past 20 years
include a reduction in the main rains from May to June and an increase in rain during
the short dry period of July to August. This could be seen as a benefit to cropping as it
increases the periods of cropping. However, the data shown in table 4.1 hides the
variations between years and this has affected agriculture dramatically by increasing
the uncertainty of planting time (Amanor, 1993: 11). Other important indicators of
change are the number of rain days. At Wenchi town, the number of recorded rain days
has dropped from 142 between 1961 and 1970, to 130 between 1971 and 1980, and to
110 between 1981 and 1990 (Afikorah-Danquah, 1998).
Table 4.1. Average monthly rainfall totals in Sunyani (mm)
Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total
1930- 0.3 2.5 168.7 149.1 199.4 268.5 106.4 13.0 211.8 189.7 30.5 0.0 1339.9
1975
1984- 5.4 38.3 118.2 118.6 144.7 178.9 111.4 79.2 184.6 162.9 31.7 22.9 1196.7
1994
Source: Holland (1995)
There are also reports of changing vegetation patterns. The 'natural' vegetation in the
study area consists of semi-deciduous forest but this ranges from denser forest in the
south to savannah transition in the north where there is a mosaic of grassland and forest
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areas. The boundary between forest and savannah is shaped by patterns of rainfall,
topography and geology. The boundary between forest and transition zones is not clear
and many farmers and local officials claim that the forest has become degraded and
savannah species are invading. The extent of this `savannisation' is not clear as there
were patches of savannah in forest areas before human interference- (Afikorah-
Danquah, 1998).
The reasons for the environmental change have not been established. Changing
patterns of rainfall may be a cause and also an effect. While the forests do appear
degraded, Fairhead and Leach (1998: 65) question the use of poorly stated definitions
of forest areas.. They suggest that unsubstantiated statistics have been used in the past
to make claims of considerable loss of forest area while historical reports claim that
large areas of forest had been destroyed by the turn of the century.
The human impact on the forest reserves has been brought about by farming, logging
and bush burning. The logging has been carried out by timber contractors from outside
the communities and by tobacco companies requiring fuel wood for curing. The bush
burning is a natural phenomenon but farmers reported that the frequericy ol .C1K,S had
increased as hunters use it as a way of flushing out game. The extent of farm
encroachment varies from area to area. There has been a considerable increase in
population density in Brong Ahafo, rising from 19 persons per km 2 in 1970 to 31 in
1984 and to an estimated 41 persons per km 2 in 1994 (Amanor, 1993). The impact of
this will not necessarily be encroachment on forest land as it may result in a reduction
of fallow periods.
This thesis is concerned with changing cropping patterns and environmental changes in
the previously cropped areas. Farmers report that, in response to environmental
changes, they have adapted their cropping patterns. Throughout the study area, there
has been an increase in the proportion of maize, covvpea and vegetables grown and a
decline in the production of cocoa, plantain and cassava (Marfo and Wiggins, 1999).
The favoured crops are better suited to the changing rainfall patterns. The decline of
cocoa is also related to the lack of forest cover needed because of logging of trees from
the farm land. The cocoa production has also declined because the trees were destroyed
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in the severe fires of 1983 and the farmers did not view replanting as a viable
alternative.
4.2.3 The tomato farming systems in Brong Ahafo
The tomato is an important part of the Ghanaian diet and one of the more widely grown
crops. It was introduced during the eighteenth or nineteenth century and now is an
established part of most traditional southern Ghanaian dishes. None of the farmers in
the study area were found to be growing tomatoes as a sole crop; it fits into a wider
farming system that includes crops such as maize, cassava, yam, plantain and other
vegetables such as garden egg, okra and chilli peppers. Vegetable production started on
a commercial basis in Brong Ahafo in the 1960s and it grew dramatically in the 1970s
and 1980s as there was increased demand from urban areas and improved transport
facilities. Similar changes have been reported by Guyer (1997: 78) in regard to the
areas supplying food to Ibadan, Nigeria. Furthermore, as a source of income, tomatoes
were a replacement for the cocoa crop after the cocoa trees had been destroyed in the
bush fires of 1983. Before tomato was grown commercially, roduction was carried. out
on a small scale for subsistence and then any surplus was sent to local markets.
Growing for consumption and local markets is still an important part of rural
livelihoods, especially for women. The tomato farmers of Brong Ahafo, who produce
on a more commercial scale, supply the main urban markets in southern Ghana and
account for a large proportion of the tomatoes produced in the country. There is a small
export trade to neighbouring countries.
Recent increases in urban demand have led to certain areas becoming specialised
tomato growing regions, Brong Ahafo in particular. A survey of 300 farmers in Brong
Ahafo in 1994 found that 60% were growing vegetables and, of these vegetable
growers, 41% were growing tomatoes. Eighty-five per cent of these vegetable growers
had vegetables as their main or second source of income (Sherrington and Suglo,
1994). The main tomato producing areas have benefited, with farmers being able to
obtain considerable sums of money to invest in other businesses and in local
infrastructure such as housing. Tomato production has also created much employment
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for labourers and farmers. The commercial production of tomatoes can give high
returns in a short space of time, but it requires significant capital investment, and there
are risks in terms of both production and market failure. Therefore farmers consider
vegetable production as part of their wider livelihood system that includes other crops
and non-agricultural income sources.
Seasonality
Vegetable production takes place throughout the year but certain villages are known by
traders to produce at certain times. Many of the farmers in one locality will start their
farms at the same time and harvest together so they can attract a large number of
traders who are guaranteed to fill their trucks in one location. The timing of tomato
production can be restricted by the need to grow other food crops in the main rainy
season. Farmers can produce in the dry season, but only with irrigation from streams
and rivers. Many farmers try to reduce the amount of irrigation needed by starting to
farm before the rains have finished or irrigate the land for the first month and then rely
on the rains. Production can also be carried out in the dry season in certain swampy
areas as crops rely on the residual moisture in the soil.
Farmers in the study area report that the weather has become more unpredictable and
so some are changing the timing of their production. Farmers in Derma reported that
they are planting the dry season crop several weeks earlier than they did 10 years ago,
as they use the last rains to water the crop and then irrigate later. The late rains have
become more uncertain and so farmers may have to irrigate for longer. There are two
Government-managed irrigation schemes in the study area, at Subinj a and at Tanoso,
but in neither of these were farmers growing tomatoes because of soil pest problems.
Most of the irrigation is done manually with buckets, although a small number of
wealthier farmers have petrol operated irrigation pumps.
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Table 4.2 Seasons for growing tomatoes
Season	 Timing
Sukan	 March-July
AdantEnil sukan kyire
	
May-September
Fupe	 June-October
Fupe kyire	 July-November
Petra kan
	 October-February
Petra paa	 December-March
Tomato farm operations
Farming in the rainy season is based on a rotating bush fallow system. The length or
density of the rotation varies, depending on the view of the farmer and the pressure on
land. In a study in Wenchi District, Afikorah-Danquah (1998) found that the average
length of fallow used by indigenous farmers was six years. Farmers have also been
reported to make deliberate efforts to leave certain regenerative tree species on the
farms (Amanor, 1996). The rotations will include a range of other crops and can use a
relay system whereby the tomatoes are planted with cassava that grows after the tomato
crop has been harvested. The dry season farms are more intensively used than the rain
fed land and are cultivated each year in areas where there is a shortage of land that can
be irrigated.
Land is cleared each year using cutlasses. The extent of clearing on tomato farms can
be greater than other crops because the crop is not shade tolerant. On some farms the
land is ridged using a hoe. This is more common amongst migrant farmers because of
their traditional farming practices that were developed in the savannah zone. The land
is weeded one or two more times during the growing season. Tractor services are used
for ploughing land on the few farms in the savannah and transition zones where the
tree stumps have been removed. Tractors are also used for carting produce. Only a
small number of farmers were found to be using the tractor ploughing services for their
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tomato farms. A survey in Wenchi District of 169 tractors, found that 90% were being
hired out, but only 20% were being used for cultivation, with the rest used for carting
water, fuel wood and farm produce (anon, n.d.). Each tractor owner employs a driver
who gets a monthly salary and who subtracts some money from each day's taking for
his food costs.
Ploughing is perceived to be expensive at C25,000-30,000 an acre and farmers can
only pay later with the agreement of the owner of the tractor, not the driver. The driver
can act as a guarantor for the farmer and pay the owner if the farmer cannot do so.
There is also a risk of delays to the onset of transplanting when there is much demand
for ploughing or the tractor breaks down. In those villages without tractor owners there
are greater constraints and farmers have to rely on tractors from neighbouring towns
and villages. The tractor drivers will not travel to villages to plough small areas so
small scale farmers have to coordinate with a number of other farmers intending to
plough on the same day.
Nurseries are made between 3 and 6 weeks before transplanting. Most farmers use seed
that they have extracted from a previous harvest. A survey of 33 tomato farmers in
1996 found that 85 % were using their own seed (Lyon, 1997b). There are a wide range
of criteria in deciding which of the many varieties to grow. For those growing for the
urban markets, the requirements of the traders are very important. The traders from
Ghanaian cities require varieties such as Power and Reno and, consequently, these are
the most common varieties grown in the study area. Farmers closer to the COte d'Ivoire
border export to Ivoirian markets which require Pectomech and Tropimech (Woiff,
1998). Farmers will also choose varieties that allow them to achieve a balance between
increasing income and reducing risk (Lyon, 1997b). They may, therefore, mix other
varieties that are higher yielding but with poor post harvest qualities; traders will allow
a certain proportion of these in the crates, although the extent of this changes through
the year according to the scarcity of the crop. Farmers prefer varieties that are early
maturing and have resistance to water stress, as a shortage of rain is one of the most
common causes of crop failure.
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Pesticides were introduced by agricultural extension workers for use on cocoa and
tobacco, and have been used for the past 20 years in the area. Agro-chemicals were not
used on tomatoes until they were grown on a commercial scale but now farmers are
reliant on applications of inorganic fertiliser (15:15:15, 23:15:5 and Sulphate of
Ammonia), insecticides, fungicides and foliar fertilisers. Farmers who do not have
enough money reduce the application rates and doses, or use alternative cheaper agro-
chemicals such as the subsidised cocoa and cotton pesticides.
The pesticides are usually mixed into a cocktail with foliar fertiliser. They are applied
using motorised blowers and knapsack sprayers. The motorised blowers have been
subsidised for the cocoa farmers for many years. They are preferred as it takes a shorter
time to spray the farm, although they are not the most appropriate method as they can
blow off the flowers. Owners of sprayers do not like to hire out their machines as they
are concerned about maintenance. Those without sprayers have to ask an owner to do
the spraying for them. In villages with many well established tomato farmers this is not
a problem. In two of the less well established tomato producing areas studied, Akete
and Kokoago, the farmers have to travel to Wenchi or neighbouring villages, up to 8
km away, to obtain sprayers. Those growing on a small scale and without the resources
to get access to a sprayer apply the chemicals using palm fronds (referred to as the
'hosanna' method). Farmers rarely protect themselves from the chemicals and many
reported feeling dizzy and sick after spraying.
Chemical fertiliser is used by almost all tomato farmers, despite the doubling of prices
(in nominal terms) in the two years after liberalisation in 1991 (Ashitey et al, 1994).
The fertilisers are mixed with water before application, or placed next to the plant by
hand. It was found that there was a very wide range of prices being paid by farmers in
the same area as well as differences between areas (table 4.3). Farmers in areas with
less tomato production have to travel to their nearest town to buy agro-chemicals.
Prices are lower in Techiman and Kumasi as there are wholesale stores.
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Table 4.3 Average prices paid for fertiliser (November 1997).
Tano	 Pamdu	 Techi-	 Tanoso	 Akete/
Boase
	 mentia	 Kokoago
NPK 15:15:15	 C32,140	 C33,250	 C32,500	 C34,000	 C37,000
50 kg
Ammonia	 C25,290	 C24,800	 C26,550	 C26,920
50 kg
Surveys of organic fertiliser use found that very few of the farmers had used manure as
livestock is not an important part of the livelihoods for most of the people (Chan et al,
1997). Livestock found in the area are predominantly goats, sheep, pigs and a range of
fowls. Chickens are kept by most families in small numbers and there are a growing
number of commercial chicken farms. Cattle are kept by a small number of farmers
who hire Fulani herdsmen.
Harvesting of tomatoes is done whenever the traders arrive, usually twice a week. The
urban market oriented farmers generally sell at the farm gate to traders taking the
produce directly to urban markets. Some farms that are far from the road require
tractors to transport the harvested produce, especially when the farm tracks are in poor
condition in the wet season. Details of the marketing system are discussed in detail in
chapter seven.
4.2.4 Disaggregation of tomato growers
There is a range of tomato farmers with differing characteristics. This section examines
the range of characteristics that shape each group of actors: issues of crop choice and
market orientation, gender, age, ethnicity and wealth.
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Cropping and market orientation
Two main categories of farmers can be distinguished according to market orientation
and these are shown in table 4.4. This study concentrates on those tomato farmers who
grow for the urban markets. These tomato farmers are not the very poorest in the
community as they have to have some capital, or the capability to get access to it, in
order to start producing on a commercial scale. The categorisation according to market
orientation differs from other studies on rural differentiation in Brong Ahafo that have
concentrated on maize and cocoa farmers (Konings, 1986; Mike11, 1989a; Milton,
1999). These studies have stressed the dominating role of older men in commercial
agriculture. The case of tomato producers is an example of younger men and older
women who are able to enter into commercial agriculture and this shows how the
relations of production in terms of gender, age and wealth are always shifting. An
explanation for these patterns is provided in the following sections.
Details of specific production and marketing issues for the consumption and local
market oriented farmers are given in Lyon (1997a; 1997b) and Warburton and Lyon
(1995). In this study the term 'tomato farmer' will refer to those farmers growing for
the urban markets. This is not to say that tomato production is less important for those
growing for consumption and local markets. These farmers may represent a majority of
tomato farmers in Ghana; they play an important role in providing vegetables for home
consumption which reduces their expenditure on food, increases their nutritional status
and improves food security. There are also women who grow for consumption and
local markets when their urban market oriented farm has finished.
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Table 4.4 Types of tomato producers in Brong Ahafo
Urban market-oriented Consumption and local market
oriented
People young men, older women most women in village
Disposal of
produce
farm gate sales to traders serving
long distance urban centres
home consumption & headload to
local market
Disposal of
income
invested back into farming and
other enterprises; women may use
it for household requirements
used for household requirements,
school fees etc.
Farm size up to 3 acres (1.2 ha.), often about
1 acre (0.4 ha.)
usually small (under 1/4 acre or
0.1 ha.) and scattered plots
Scale crates bowls and baskets
Inputs use of fungicide, insecticide &
inorganic fertiliser. Limited use of
tractors for ploughing and
irrigation pumps
little use of fertiliser & chemicals;
_no tractors or pumps
Labour own, hired, communal work
groups (nnoboa)
own, family members
Cropping mostly monocrop with some
intercrops;
more intercrops with other
vegetables or staple crops
Seasons all usually major & minor rainy
seasons
Land tenure family land, personal land, hired,
sharecropped
family land, personal land
(developed from Warburton and Lyon, 1995)
Gender
An understanding of gender differences is central to the explanation of differential
access to resources and participation in the range of contracts and institutions in the
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tomato production and marketing systems. The unit of analysis in this study is the
individual rather than the household for a number of reasons. Firstly, there are great
differences in wealth and access to resources, especially along gender lines, between
individuals living in the same house. In most Akan (Brong and Ashanti) marriages,
husbands and wives have separate budgets (Vallenga, 1983:147; Abu, 1983: 162).
Household structure is highly varied and there is no Twi word for it. An individual may
have their own house, stay in their matrilineal family house (abusua), stay in their
father's house or stay with relatives. It is relatively common to find duolocal residence
where husbands and wives live separately before they have their own house. Abu
(1983: 159) found that only 45% of women in an Ashanti town lived with their
husband, although the extent to which this pattern is found in rural parts of the survey
area is not known. It is difficult to define a household as 'eating from the same pot' as
food can be prepared in one house and carried to another; women may also cook and
eat in one house and then sleep in another. Mike11 (1989a) found that those women that
do move to their husbands' house maintain partial residence with their abusua.
There are more men than women growing tomatoes for urban markets. There tends to
be a larger proportion of urban market oriented women vegetable producers in the
villages with a reputation for growing tomatoes. This is because they are assured of a
better market and so can sell small quantities easily compared to those living in areas
that are not frequented by traders. They also find it is easier to obtain loans and finance
in these areas. It is not clear whether the participation of women in tomato production
is increasing or decreasing. In cocoa production, it is reported that women's
involvement is decreasing as the trees tend to be inherited by men and few women are
planting new cocoa farms (Mike11, 1989a; Okali, 1983; Milton, 1999).
Women who produce tomatoes tend to have smaller farms The average sized tomato
farm (based on farmers' estimations of their most recent farm) for men was found to be
1.1 acres (0.44 ha.) and the average size for women was 0.7 acres (0.28 ha.). Women
require more money than men in order to hire the labour to do the manual tasks that
women very rarely undertake, such as clearing the land and making the ridges. On the
one hand this is based on the traditional gender division of labour but most women and
men with whom I discussed this issue, claimed that it was also due to the differences in
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physical strength (ahoDden). The hiring of labour for these tasks is reduced if women
have access to labour through their husbands, children, other relatives and friends. The
poverty of individual women is linked to a lack of support from husbands who may
have died, left home or refuse to provide assistance.
Women may also find it difficult to get access to capital. To build up the capital
necessary for vegetable farming, they may have to work with their husbands for several
seasons, work on other people's vegetable farms for a share of the profit at the end of
the season, or use other non-agricultural income sources such as trading and selling
cooked food. Women are also restricted by social pressures that can limit their income
generation. This may come from husbands who do not want their wives to become too
independent, and also from other villagers who are envious of their wealth.
Women are restricted in tomato production to an even greater extent as the profit from
previous seasons has to be used for household expenditure or education of children,
rather than reinvesting in agriculture. Women have to devote more of their time to
domestic duties and subsistence food crop production. As women take on greater part
of the responsibility for growing crops for subsistence, the timing of tomato production
also has to fit around the timing of other farm activities for staple foods. Finally, many
men and women reported that women suffer more from illness (although this claim
was not followed up in detail in this research). This restricts the amount of work done
on the farms and reduces their ability to complete vital agricultural tasks on time.
Wealth
Access to resources for farmers is also shaped by their wealth. Details on wealth
differentials are based on wealth ranking exercises carried out with individuals, that
showed that non agricultural income and links to those with resources are the most
common sources and indicators of wealth. There are a wide range of non-agricultural
income generating activities that are used by a large proportion of the farmers. For men
these include: carpentry, owning a corn mill, tailoring, driving, charcoal making,
basket making, blacksmithing, chain-saw (dorma) operating, owning lottery booths or
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bars, managing a store, masonry, hunting, palm wine tapping, akpeteshi (local gin)
distilling and travelling out of the village to parts of Ghana and neighbouring countries
for mining and other employment. Women are restricted by lack of time, and their
domestic obligations mean that it is harder for them to travel. They rely on trading in
foodstuffs, second hand clothes and selling cooked food to other villagers. Women
from northern Ghanaian ethnic groups are restricted by cultural mores to a few
opportunities, the most important being the brewing of pito (sorghum beer).
Remittances from family members in cities and overseas can also be important.
However, almost all people living in the rural areas have farms as well as their non-
agricultural income generating activities.
The agricultural indicators or sources of wealth included ownership of palm, orange
and, most importantly, cocoa plantations. Ownership of livestock and poultry was also
mentioned. Maize is the major cash crop in the area, so most farmers will sell maize in
order to pay for labour and agro-chemicals for their tomato farms. Some farmers are
able to store maize over several months and realise large price increases, while others
will be forced into distress sales soon after harvest. For the latter, dry season
production of tomatoes is limited. Crops such as cassava and chilli pepper are popular
with vegetable farmers as they allow a continuous supply of harvested produce and
income over a length of time that can be invested into an on-going vegetable farm.
Other income sources include labouring on other people's farms. Access to land also
differentiates farmers as those without have to hire or do sharecropping. Wealth is also
closely linked to health and strength that allows people to farm larger areas.
Individuals in the villages who were participating in the formal economy tended to be
ranked in the richest categories. The formal economy refers to government employees
or pensioners, especially teachers, and those who have access to loans from the banks.
These two factors are closely linked, as most of those who obtain loans and credit are
those who draw a salary from a bank. Most of the women ranked in the highest
categories of wealth are teachers as well as having other income sources.
The extent of class formation in rural Ghana has been studied in detail (Mike11, 1989a;
Konings, 1986). There certainly was differentiation in the pre-colonial period with
70
divisions between the small number of Akan aristocracy and the peasants. There were
also large numbers of slaves working for the elites. There has been considerable
intermarrying and, while 40 years ago there was some discrimination in communities
against those originating from slave families, now there are very few people who can
remember the origins of families. The differentiation was altered with the development
of the cocoa industry and the resulting shortage of land in some areas. Divisions grew
between strangers and those who had access to land through being members of the
community. It also allowed a small number of the elites such as the chiefs to
accumulate large amounts of capital (Konings, 1986: 26; Dunn and Robertson, 1973:
50). However, it is not possible to identify the formation of a capital class based on
differential access to land as the process of obtaining land differs dramatically between
places and is also a matter of negotiation (Berry, 1993; 1997). Milton (1999) draws on
Berry's work and finds that social differentiation is fluid and depends on networks that
give access to resources and social institutions. He criticises the Marxist approaches for
their over-simplification of the concept of class and proposes that differentiation in
Brong Ahafo is based on the exclusion of certain groups from certain areas. Exclusion
is often based on ethnicity leading to Hill's (1986: 161) conclusion that "stangerhood,
not class, was the basis of differentiation".
Age and life-cycle
Age is a factor suggested by farmers to explain differences in vegetable production and
wealth more generally. There tend to be more young men growing tomatoes for urban
markets. This is partly due to the physical nature of the work involved. Young men are
attracted by the quick turn over of money and see it as a way of earning enough money
to have independence from elders, move into other employment or travel. The greater
number of younger men, as compared to older men, involved in commercial production
is relatively unique to vegetable farming as, in other sectors of the agricultural
economy, older men dominate the control of productive resources (Milton, 1999).
Older men concentrate on other crops because of the strenuous nature of the tomato
crop and the perception by the older generation that tomatoes are not a "man's" crop.
The main crops grown by older men are maize and cocoa. Older women are more
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common than younger women in tomato production as they have greater independence
and access to investment capital. They often have lower labour costs as they can rely
on their sons for some of the major tasks (c.f. Chayanov, 1966). Examining changes
through life-cycles demonstrates how the number of dependants changes over the years
as children grow up and support parents with labour and other resources. .
The tomato farms are usually managed by one person, although some young men have
joint farms with brothers and friends. Married couples may farm together in a variety
of arrangements. In the simplest form the men will provide the capital to hire labour
and buy inputs and the women contribute labour and are given a gift of cash or kind at
harvest. In more complex forms men clear land (either their own or their wife's) for
their wives who manage the farm and the income. These forms will change through an
individual's life-cycle. The decision by women to have their own farm usually follows
disputes with their husbands over the sharing of profit. Age is also linked to health and
wealth; many referred to the poor as those who became "too weak to weed a large
enough area".
Ethnicity
The important distinction concerning ethnicity is whether farmers are 'strangers'
('migrants') or whether they are descendants of the original Akan settlers. There is
difficulty in making this distinction as many have been resident for several generations
and have taken Akan names, and so the quantitative data was not disaggregated in this
way. The ethnic composition of tomato farmers is biased towards the Akan population,
who were the original settlers. While some areas have been settled for centuries, many
of the communities where the survey was carried out were only settled in the past 100
years. Most of the descendants of the original settlers are Brong, a politically
autonomous part of the Akan. The ethnic groups that make up the Akan speak mutually
intelligible dialects of Twi, and have common cultural institutions, such as a
matrilineal descent system (Warren, 1975). Christianity is more common amongst the
Akan and Islam amongst many of those originating from the north of Ghana.
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Traditional beliefs are common in all groups and coexist comfortably with the other
religions.
There are several villages in the study area with a mixed population of both Brong and
Ashanti (the dominant Akan ethnic group). The difference between these ethnic groups
residing in the same village can be hard to ascertain without exploring their history or
knowing which chief they pay allegiance to. There was a serious conflict between these
two Akan groups in villages around Techiman during the period of the research. There
were many deaths (officially six) and considerable damage following a chieftaincy
dispute over whether the Techimanhene (paramount chief of Techiman) should pay
allegiance to the Asantehene (leader of the Ashanti people). One village in which the
study took place was populated by Nkoran/Kulange speakers who have similar rights
as the Akan groups but moved to the village in the past century. A large proportion of
this group are now in COte d'Ivoire.
There are large numbers of 'strangers', mainly from the north of Ghana. These ethnic
groups include Mo Dagarti, Kusasi, Banda, Dagomba, Frafra, Wangara, Moshi,
Kanjagar, Sissala, Wala, Gonja, Kokomba, Mamprusi and Lobi. Many of them came to
Brong Ahafo in the cocoa growing era to do sharecropping and tend the farms. There
are early reports of large numbers of 'strangers' working in the study area in Tano
District dating from 1910. This led to some tension with riots breaking out in Bechcm
and Tepa in 1916 (Dunn and Robertson, 1973). They have settled, usually in sections
of villages or towns referred to as zongos. Individuals from these groups were usually
classified in the lower ranks of the wealth ranking exercises. A large proportion of their
income comes from labouring on other people's farms.
The migrant farmers are limited in their participation in vegetable farming as they are
in other agricultural enterprises. They rarely own any land and can only get land by
sharecropping (abusa), renting or intermarriage. Migrant women are at an even greater
disadvantage as they are restricted in entering into negotiations for land with owners
(Amanor, 1996: 32). Migrants are also limited as they tend to be the poorer members
of the farming community and cannot get funds for farming from their relations and
friends. However, the number of 'strangers' growing vegetables is increasing as they
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build up their own capital and learn from other farmers. Most stranger farmers
concentrate their resources on maize production and they allocate a larger proportion of
their labour to agriculture than other farmers. This may be due to their lack of non-
agricultural income generating opportunities.
4.3 The agricultural inputs supply context
4.3.1 The agro-chemical supply system
The tomato business involves a range of actors that support the producers. The most
important support services are provided by the traders and agro-chemical sellers. This
section will provide a background to the role of the agricultural input sellers and the
differences between the types of sellers. The interactions and institutional links
between agro-chemical sellers and farmers are discussed in detail in the following
chapter.
Agro-chemicals, such as fertiliser and pesticides, have been mainly sold in the private
sector since the input supply system was privatised in 1987. Most farmers buy from
small stores in the village or local town, although some of the larger farmers prefer to
buy in bulk in Kumasi or Techiman. There are a range of selling operations, the
smallest being small stores or table top sellers in settlements in the main producing
areas. In each of the larger tomato growing settlements there are between three and
nine selling outlets that are owned by local men, most of whom are tomato farmers
themselves.
Agro-chemical shops obtain their supplies from wholesalers who may also be retailers
at the same time. Shop keepers of the small stores in the villages may go to Techiman
to buy or to Kumasi. The bigger wholesale/retail shops in Techiman and Kumasi buy
their goods from the importing companies. The fertiliser trade is dominated by a few
companies especially Weinco and FASCOM. Pesticides tend to come from smaller
companies who import from Nigeria, COte d'Ivoire, and other countries or from the
major producers such as ICI that have offices in Accra or Tema. Some have also
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bought supplies from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Most retailers have built
up close business relationships with the wholesalers. This allows them to make orders
over the telephone or by sending someone with a message. They can also be assured of
quality as there are cases of imitation goods, changing the labels of bottles and dilution.
These customer relationships also bring access to credit; this will be discussed in
section 5.6.2.
Some retailers have received training from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture
through courses in Accra and talks from the staff of the Plant Protection and
Regulatory Services Department or the Agricultural Extension Agents. Training was
also given as part of the NGO supported Global 2000 programme on bookkeeping and
storing chemicals in shops. Training for sellers is very important, as farmers reported
that they are the main source of information on agro-chemical usage, although only one
seller referred to visiting farms. There is a more formal association of agro-chemical
sellers but it is not very active. Its establishment was encouraged by the Global 2000
programme and maize seed programmes. The association acts as a forum for giving
advice to members and was also set up for the purpose of obtaining a group loan. This
has not happened to date. Among the sellers there is often cooperation when one seller
is short of a certain chemical. They also give donations to other sellers when they are
bereaved.
4.3.2 Disaggregation of agro-chemical sellers
There is a higher turn over of businesses in villages compared to larger towns (table
4.5). The reasons given for the collapse of business are poor financial management,
over extending credit followed by a crop failure, and the owner moving out of the
village.
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Table 4.5 Number of years selling agro-chemicals
Years	 Village	 Small towns Sunyani 	 Kumasi	 Total
(12 sellers) (17 sellers)	 (5 sellers)	 (8 sellers)	 (42 Sellers)
Less than 1.5 41.7% 0 0 25.0% 16.7%
1.5-4	 33.3% 41.2% 40.0% 25.0% 3-5.7%
More than 4	 25.0% 58.8% 40.0% 50.0% 45.2%
Don't Know 0 0 20.0% 0 2.4%
Av. number	 3.6 years
of years
5.8 years 6.0 years 6.8 years 5.4 years
In the district capitals there are larger shops and some of these have warehouses. The
managers of these shops are mainly men, although there are several women entering
the business. They also sell certified maize seed, pesticides for maize storage and
fertiliser to maize farmers. The ability to expand is constrained by poor access to loans;
shop managers felt that it was necessary to have personal links to the bank staff as well
as collateral such as buildings. Administrative delays and costs were also cited as a
problem. Very few of the shops in the Brong Ahafo Region had access to loans. One
seller had received a loan of C200,000 from a rural bank using two salaried workers as
guarantors, and another had received a loan for C500,000 from the Ghana Commercial
Bank. The owner of one of the larger agro-chemical retailing enterprises had preferred
to obtain a loan from the Roman Catholic Credit Union as the interest rates are low.
Almost all were saving with the commercial or rural banks.
Those sellers who have more than one shop, or other work, will have staff to man the
store. The number of outlets is shown in table 4.6. The staff are often relatives who are
chosen because they are trusted and are literate. The owner is still responsible for
deciding who should be given credit. Four cases were found where shop owners left
the management of the shop to the person working there. These workers acted as
salesmen working on a commission basis, whereby the owner of the shop bought the
chemicals for the agent to sell. The agents also bought some of their own chemicals
and sold these as their own business.
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Table 4.6 Number of sales outlets for each business
Years Village
(12 sellers)
Small towns Sunyani
(17 sellers)	 (5 sellers)
Kumasi
(8 sellers)
Total
(42 Seller's)
1 83.3% 47.1% 60.0% 75.0% 64.3%
2 8.3% 17.6% 20.0% 25.0% 16.7%
3+ 8.3% 17.6% 0 0 9.5%
Don't 0 17.6% 20.0% 0 9.5%
Know
Average
number
1.3 outlets 2.0 outlets 1.3 outlets 1.3 outlets 1.5 outlets
The working conditions for the sellers are poor and several complained of feeling ill
while working with chemicals; many had not been trained in handling chemicals.
"I got some knowledge while working for my brother ... (I learnt that) you must
make sure you eat before you come to work ... the chemicals are powerful and
they make you go dizzy "(Philip, Tanoso, Interview 1).
4.4 The marketing context
To understand the present vegetable marketing system it is first necessary to have a
background to the historical processes of marketing and the development of trade. This
heritage now shapes the existing marketing system in Ghana. This section describes the
changing trading system of the pre-colonial era and relates that to recent changes and
the development of markets that are supplied by the tomato producers. I will then
describe the vegetable marketing chain and the different types of traders involved. The
types of traders will be disaggregated according to their position in the marketing chain
as well as according to gender, age, wealth and ethnicity. I will also draw comparisons
with other marketing systems described in the literature.
77
4.4.1 Historical context of agricultural marketing in Ghana
There has been evidence of trade in Ghana for the past 1000 years. This has led to
dramatic social changes over time and the development of economic activity that
involved long distance trade and the development of trading networks that stretched
throughout West and North Africa. The earliest trade in the region is reported in
ancient Mali in the first century AD (McIntosh and McIntosh, 1993: 638) and later
growth of trade followed the Arab conquests. Trade to the north of the study area
involved gold, slaves and pepper being exchanged for cotton and salt (Hymer, 1970:
39; Lovejoy, 1974). The Bono-Manso and Begho Kingdoms (in what is now central
Brong Ahafo) of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were established through the
trans-Saharan trade (Mike11, 1989a).
The arrival of Portuguese traders on the southern coast of Ghana in the fifteenth
century reduced the dependence on trade routes to the north and diverted many of the
traded goods to the south. Previously there had been some agricultural trade along the
coast but without the growth of trading settlements (Hymer, 1970: 39; Chamlee-
Wright, 1997: 14). Other European powers saw the commercial advantages of trade in
the region and began to establish trading centres on the coasts. The early trade to the
coast was dependent on head portering along small bush paths which were frequently
closed because of wars and coastal politics (Szereszewski, 1965: 11; Reynolds, 1974:
26). The early European coastal traders did not penetrate far inland and there
developed a system of brokers from the Fanti ethnic group who were the intermediaries
between the trading ships and those supplying gold, ivory and, in later periods, slaves
(Hymer, 1970: 42; Gould, 1960: 11). The major trade routes in 1702 are shown in map
4.1.
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Map 4.1 Major trade routes, c.1702 (from Dickson, 1969:110).
These brokers continued to play an important role and there developed credit systems
that started in the seventeenth century (Daaku, 1970: 42). These credit systems may
have been necessary to secure the goodwill of chiefs and important merchants in the
face of the intense rivalry between competing Europeans (Reynolds, 1974: 15). The
credit system was passed to traders going inland. In 1853 Cruikshank wrote of the
trading system that it had:
"become one of simple credit. ....TheThe natural result of this system of trust, was
the extensive diffusion of property throughout every class of society, to a degree
which can hardly be comprehended by one unacquainted with the peculiar
partiality of the natives "(Cruikshank, 1853: 35-36).
He goes on to describe debt repayments through pawning and selling relatives into
slavery. This practice was widely practised especially in the Ashanti areas (McCaskie,
1995:40). There was a range of currencies in the pre-colonial period that substituted for
barter. Initially gold dust was used although there were problems with weighing
(Reynolds, 1974: 155), while cowrie shells were established currency in areas near the
coast but not accepted in Ashanti areas.
The marketing system further inland was dominated by the Ashanti Confederacy, with
connected Akan states, which was established at the beginning of the seventeenth
century and lasted until the 1850s. Through its control of the trade routes, a large
majority of the trade was diverted through its capital, Kumasi (Dickson, 1969: 112).
This has had a lasting effect on the patterns of road development even to the present
day (see map 4.1). The trade of gold and ivory was controlled by the state merchants
and wealthy private traders (Mikell, 1989a; Iliffe, 1983: 14) and the slave trade
controlled by the chiefs (Daaku, 1971). Capital accumulation was further restricted by
high death duties and unpredictable exactions by the state (Iliffe, 1983: 14). However,
the Ashanti state encouraged Muslim traders as they had developed extensive trade
networks across West and North Africa (Wilks, 1971: 132-3).
The military ruling elite developed a form of state that was also a trading institution
with taxes raised to pay for armies that protected the trade routes (Hymer, 1970. 36,
42-3). The amount of taxes collected increased as the Ashanti developed a monopoly
on the trading routes to the coast. The expansion of the Ashanti state was made
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possible by the proliferation of guns in the second half of the seventeenth century
(Daaku, 1970). A by-product of the expansion was the slave trade which grew
dramatically with the increased demand from the New World. The end of the official
slave trade in the first decades of the nineteenth century resulted in a decline in the
powers of the Akan chiefs as they had lost their main source of wealth and the profits
required to buy firearms (Reynolds, 1974: 114). The control of trade by the Ashanti
came to an end in 1874 with the destruction of Kumasi by the British and the exile of
the Asantehene (Chief of the Ashantis).
Agricultural produce marketing has existed in a localised form since settlements began
to specialise in trade and which could not grow all their own food. However, exports
increased dramatically after the end of the slave trade as traders looked for alternatives
to complement the trade in ivory and gold (Reynolds, 1974: 51). This came in the form
of palm oil in southern Ghana and by 1853 this had replaced gold as the principle
export (Dickson, 1969: 143). The Ashanti traders replaced the slave trade with the
increased export of kola nut (Wilks, 1971: 129-130; Reynolds, 1974: 70). This
traditional export crop was collected in the forests of Ashanti and Brong Ahafo and
exported to North Africa or other West African areas. There had been a long history of
kola trade across the Sahara to Western Sudan before European traders arrived. The
extent of the overland trade reduced in the second half of the nineteenth century as kola
nuts were exported through the ports (Dickson, 1969: 151).
Food marketing started when towns emerged and there are reports by Pieter de Marees
in 1602 of men selling sugar cane and women selling their produce in the trading ports
along the coast, and buying fish;
"By the time these Peasants have sold their Sugar-cane, the Peasant Women are
beginning to come to Market with their goods, one bringing a Basket of Oranges
or Limes, another Bananas and Bachovens, [sweet] potatoes and Yams, a third
Millie, Maize, Rice, Manigette, a forth chickens, Eggs, bread and such
necessities as people in the Coastal towns need to buy 	  These women And
peasants' wives very often buy fish and carry it to towns in other Countries, in
order to make some profit: thus the fish caught in the sea is carried well over
100 or 200 miles into the Interior" (De Marees, 1987: 63).
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The letters of Bosman in 1702 quoted in Dickson (1969: 98) describe the marketing of
food to the mining towns of south western Ghana as well as trade along the coast and
fish marketing to the Ashanti areas. The reports of Kumasi in the 1880s show there to
be a large market place although much of the food came from the dependent
settlements in the suburbs (McCaskie, 1995: 35-6).
Food marketing increased in the colonial period with rapid urbanisation. There had
been a long history of food provision for Kumasi and the coastal towns (McCaskie,
1995, Clark, 1994, Dickson, 1969) but new markets appeared with the growth of small
mining towns such as Tarkwa and Obuasi. The urban populations in southern Ghana
grew at a much faster rate than rural areas due to large scale emigration by rural
duellers. Accra expanded because of its status as a capital city and centre of many
infrastructural projects, and other smaller towns grew as they became administrative
centres2 .
Kumasi has been an urban centre since pre colonial times with an ethnically varied
population because of the large numbers of traders sometimes residing there. It has
been the hub of commercial arteries since the nineteenth century when the Ashanti
Confederacy forced all trade to pass through the town. The population of the town
itself was estimated to be between 12,000 and 15,000 in 1817 although a figure of 100-
200,000 was given to include those living in the suburbs and outlying farming villages
(Dickson, 1969: 247). The city was destroyed by the British in 1874 although it was
able to regain its dominant trading position later (Gould, 1960). The population
dropped to an estimated 5,500 in 1899 and was reported at 6,250 in 1906. After this the
population grew rapidly to 18,853 in 1911 and has expanded rapidly since then. The
2 The towns in the study area have been important market and political centres for
centuries and developed under pre-colonial trade patterns and also as the seat of the
paramount chiefs. The exception to this is the regional capital, Sunyani, which became
established because of its role as a colonial administrative centre and a cocoa buying
centre. In the pre-colonial period a large proportion of population of these towns were
'strangers', living in areas of the towns called zongos although their number declined
between 1931 and 1948 because of declining trade (Hilton, 1960: 30). However, this
trend was reversed after the building of the Akosombo dam and creation of Lake Volta
as the major roads to the north of Ghana passed through central Brong Ahafo.
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building of the railway galvanised Kumasi's, and Accra's, central position in the
trading system especially for kola nut and cocoa (Chamlee-Wright, 1997: 115;
Dickson, 1969). The latter crop was a key factor in the rapid growth of Kumasi
between 1921 and 1948. The collapse of cocoa and the declining terms of trade for
rural producers has led to increasing urbanisation since the 1960s (Mike11, 1989a;
1989b).
Table 4.7 Population of Ghana and major towns
1921 1931 1948 1960 1970 1984 1993 (est.)
Sunyani 3,000 15,810 27,500 36,100 45,000
Wenchi 5,309 3,812 10,672 14,364 18,400 22,500
Techiman 8,755 12,463 25,200
Kumasi 23,694 35,829 70,705 180,642 260,286 399,300 475,000
Accra 38,000 60,000 135,000 388,000 - 956,000 1,264,000
Population
of Ghana
2,200,000 4,100,000 6,730,000 16,000,000
Percentage
urban
7.9% 13.0% 23.1% 31.0% 32.0%
Sources: IDC (1989), Ghana Statistical Service (1994), Benneh (1990), Population Impact Project
(1994), Hilton (1960), Chamlee-Wright (1997).
Note: The percentage of urban population refers to those living in settlements of more than 5000 people.
Head loading was the predominant transport mode until the 1920s. The railway system
was used for supplying certain towns, although road transport predominated after 1945
(Gould, 1960: 90). Much of the urban food supply continued to come from near the
towns, except for onions that were grown in Keta District, in the south of Volta region
and taken to much of southern Ghana. A large proportion of the local trade was carried
out by women who sold the produce of husbands or fathers (Robertson, 1984: 93),
Techiman has now become one of the largest trading centres in Ghana, acting as a
relay market. The population of the town has risen very dramatically because of this.
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although urban itinerant traders started to trade as the cities grew and supplies became
more distant.
The early British policies which related to marketing concerned the improvement of
the trading routes following British political control of the country and the
establishment of administrative posts (Gould, 1960: 13). McCaskie (1995: 10)
comments on the nkwantempon or 'great roads' radiating out of Kumasi and states that:
"on the one hand they were triumphs of muscle power, organisation and
ingenuity. On the other, they were a fragile, technologically underdeveloped
communications system, subject to recurrent disruption and to very rapid
deterioration if and when they were neglected"
These 'great roads' followed the traditional trading routes set by the previous policies
of the Ashanti Confederacy and there were smaller 'hammock tracks' used by officials
and traders to reach villages. Palm oil was transported by rolling barrels and all other
goods were transported by head loading as load-bearing animals were inappropriate
because of the prevalence of tsetse fly; this increased costs and only high value and low
weight goods were profitable (Gould, 1960: 15).
The railways were started in 1898 and dominated other forms of transport in the south
of Ghana until the 1920s. They were established to extract raw materials from mining
areas and were funded by some of the mining companies (Szereszewski, 1965: 41). By
1920 there were links from Sekondi to Kumasi and Kumasi to Accra: expenditure on
railways accounted for 24% of government expenditure and 88% of expenditure on
economic services (Kay, 1972: 41). The railways also played a key role in the
marketing of cocoa and other cash crops.
Motorable roads were also developed with the introduction of vehicles. These acted as
feeder roads to the railway although roads started to rival the railways after the 1920s
(Gould, 1960: 44). There were also roads built in the north of Ghana (Ormsby-Gore,
1926). Some of the old routes were lost but the patterns of roads still centred on
Kumasi, reflecting its historical trading importance. The main trade routes were under
the Public Works Departments and the bush roads under the District Commissioners.
There are also reports of chiefs organising the building of roads on their own initiative
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(Ormsby-Gore, 1926) and villagers building feeder roads, copying Public Works
Department roads elsewhere (Gould, 1960). The costs of road transport were halved
once the main roads had been improved as part of the Tarmet programme that started
in 1922 and provided a cheap and relatively durable road surface (Gould, 1960: 66).
Other colonial policies included the control of marketing in order to meet the demand
for export crops (Hansen, 1989). Cocoa prices were brought under state control in 1928
when the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board or COCOBOD was established. There were
local brokers involved as well who sold to the main European companies. The
discontent of the farmers led to the four cocoa hold ups or boycotts between 1921 and
1938, and laid the foundations for the political uprisings leading to independence.
There was also some Government support for the formation of cooperatives.
In the post independence period many of the same policies continued, although there
was increasing political interference with the cooperatives eventually leading to them
being dissolved by Nkrumah in 1961 (Mike11, 1989b: 458). The cocoa marketing
system was concentrated in the hands of state buying agencies and the marketing board
was used as a way of generating funds for investing in industrial growth. The state
played an increasing role in the marketing of staple food crops from the 1960s in the
belief that "inefficient distribution and marketing was the cause of the food problem"
(Hansen, 1989).
Growing constraints were placed on the informal marketing system as market traders
were seen as the cause of agricultural decline. There developed an antagonistic
relationship between the state and women traders. On the one hand this came in the
form of what Robertson (1983) refers to as 'malevolent neglect', although the
confrontation could be more explicit. This came to the fore in the early period of
Rawlings' regime (1979-1983) when traders came under continuing attack from the
army and civilian mobs (Clark, 1994; Robertson, 1983).
Investment in roads was reduced as the economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s
restricted government expenditure and eventually reached the level of 6% of
expenditure in 1979-80 after being at 24.7% in 1953-4 (Akoto, 1987: 249). Road
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building and maintenance has increased in the past 10 years with funding from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and bilateral donors. The marketing
policies of the past 15 years have been dominated by the need to follow the IMF and
World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme. This has led to massive privatisation
and liberalisation of marketing, although the impact in terms of increased .production,
higher producer prices for food crops and lower consumer costs has not been felt by the
majority of the population.
4.4.2 The present vegetable marketing system
The marketing system for vegetables, including tomatoes, is handled by the private
sector. Public sector institutions such as the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation have
never been involved in vegetable marketing. The system is characterised by a very
large number of small scale traders who are all women. The size of their marketing
enterprises is limited by capital and the hardships encountered in trading vegetables.
Traders who do well often move out of vegetable marketing when they have enough
capital to invest in other trading businesses that do not require travelling.
The marketing systems have similarities with other staple crops in Ghana although
there are differences due to the perishability of the vegetables. The main difference is
that a large proportion of the produce does not pass through any assembly market but is
sold to traders who take it straight to retailers. This can reduce the time taken to reach
the consumers and the risk of having losses.
The marketing system for vegetables today appears similar to the two level system
described by Jones (1972), in that traders link between their rural buying point and
their urban market. Therefore they tend to only have direct knowledge of the supply
conditions in any one area and demand conditions in any one town. This is in contrast
with the redistributive system (see figure 4.1) where the produce is collected and
bulked by assemblers in rural markets before being sold to urban wholesalers at relay
markets. At the nodes of this system - the relay markets - buyers and sellers from
several supply and consuming centres meet (Warburton and Lyon, 1995).
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S6
S7
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C3
-----g..-- C4
Figure 4.1 Redistributive and two-level system (after Jones, 1972)
Redistributive System
Two-Level System
S9	 C5
S10
Notes: S = centre of supply
C = centre of consumption
I, K --- relay markets
Source: Jones 1972, Chart 1, p112
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The advantage of the two level system for perishable products such as vegetables, is
that the produce can be taken directly to markets without delays associated with
passing through a hierarchy of markets. Thus marketing costs of intermediaries,
handling, inspecting, repackaging and physical losses are reduced. However, there is a
risk that the demand and supply information may be widely distributed and
fragmented, leading to poor spatial price adjustments and therefore an economically
inefficient marketing system. However, analysis of monthly market prices shows high
correlation coefficients between markets which Floyd, Warburton and Gray (1996)
suggest is due to some exchange of information among traders about country-wide
production conditions.
There are a range of market types and these are described in table 4.8. The household
and village markets3 are based around women who are growing for consumption and
local markets. They grow a small quantity and what they cannot consume or give away,
they sell locally. In each village there are some full time retailers of vegetables and they
may travel short distances to other villages or markets to buy produce that is not being
grown in the village at that time.
Rural towns have daily markets and weekly markets. The daily markets are often in
permanent buildings and there has been some limited investment in market buildings
over the past few years. There is some restriction on entry to these markets and farmers
often have to sell through, or sell to, a resident trader. Some retailers will buy their
produce direct from the farm gate. They often buy the lower quality produce that the
itinerant traders going to the urban markets do not want to buy.
3 The present rural settlement patterns are characterised by large villages, especially
on the main roads and small hamlets in the remoter rural areas. Some farmers have
houses in both and move depending on the agricultural work in progress. The Brong
and Ashanti population prefer to live in these large villages while 'stranger' farmers
from the north of Ghana dominate the hamlets. The villages in the cocoa growing
areas are characterised by the colonial style houses built at the peak of the cocoa
period and now becoming dilapidated - a sign of the changing fortunes of the rural
economy in the past 60 years.
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Table 4.8 Types of markets
Market type	 Description
Village household stalls Farmers or their relatives selling small quantities that they
and hawkers	 cannot consume themselves but not enough to take to the
market. Also sell lower quality.
Village markets Usually small daily retail sales, but may also have a weekly
market which can act as a first level assembly point for
produce from the surrounding area.
Roadside markets Daily retail markets which have developed along the main
trunk roads. Sell higher quality produce to travelling urban
consumers
Small town market -	 For retail sales. Located in the middle of the town with
daily
	
permanent structures
Small town market-	 For retail and also an assembly point with transport coming
weekly	 in from surrounding villages. Usually out of the centre of the
town with only a few permanent stalls
Large Urban Markets	 Large daily markets with both wholesale and retail sales.
Supplies retailers in the rest of the city
Neighbourhood urban	 Small retail markets
markets
The weekly village markets are open to any one to sell and attract farmers from a wide
area. They occasionally act as an assembly point where tomatoes are collected before
transfer to the large urban centres. These markets are especially important for okra and
pepper and for produce grown in areas where there is not enough supply to attract the
itinerant traders. Initial investigations showed that there was no difference in prices
between the daily and weekly markets. Periodic markets in the study are not important
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for the supply of tomatoes to urban markets. They have played a key role in local
supply systems throughout much of Africa (Hodder and Ukwu, 1969), although Siddle
and Swindell (1990: 97) claim that most periodic market systems are also part of a
"dendretic-mercantile system" similar to Jones' (1972) two level system.
The large urban markets are the selling points of the itinerant traders. The largest
market in Ghana is Kumasi Central Market with an estimated 9000 stalls and 250,000
customers a day in 1989 (IDC, 1989). The large urban markets have a big influence on
those farming areas that have a big enough supply of a certain crop to attract them.
They are also the supply point for a large proportion of the Ghanaian population and so
are politically very powerful.
The physical structures in the large urban markets are permanent although there has
been large scale unplanned expansion making them highly congested. This is
especially the case in Kumasi. These markets are also renowned for the complex
systems of market conduct based around powerful market traders' associations. There
is limited storage in all the markets due to lack of space. In addition, traders are keen to
sell the produce as soon as possible so that there is less risk of the produce declining in
quality and their capital is not tied up. Retailers may store goods for a few days as they
can put small quantities of produce under the stalls. For example, tomato retailers may
buy two boxes and not be able to sell them all in the same day. Most markets have
security guards, although traders also like to employ their own guards. Storage by those
who do not have a stall in the main market is limited to the quantity that they can carry
home, unless they are able to make an arrangement to leave produce in a secure place
such as a shop.
4.4.3 Disaggregation of traders
As with tomato production, gender, wealth, age and ethnicity shape the marketing
system and the position participants have within it. One of the most striking aspects of
the vegetable marketing system is the dominance of women, although this is reported
in other sectors in Ghana and many African countries (Attah et al, 1996; Clark, 1994;
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Handwerker, 1981; Harts-Broelchuis and Verkoren, 1987; Horn, 1994; Onyemelulcwe,
1970; Porter, 1988; Sudarkasa, 1973; Trager, 1981a; 1981b; 1985). Trager found that
the "market place is historically the domain of women in Yoruba society. Beliefs and
institutions recognise women's importance in the market" (Trager, 1985:280). Horn
(1994:46) argues that "in Zimbabwe, the link between women [traders] and 'specific
food commodities is rooted in traditional beliefs about the nature of women and their
roles as family food provisioners". Babb (1985:295) stresses the lack of alternatives
available to women in urban areas with trading preferable to domestic work because of
the degree of independence and flexibility it offers. Attah et al (1996:7) state that in
urban Ghana the large numbers of female headed households result in women being
highly economically active although they are often limited to trading.
The early reports of pre-colonial Ghana show that women played a major role in food
supply (De Marees, 1602). However, Clark (1994: 6) found that there had been
relatively recent shifts in the gender divisions in Kumasi market;
"scholarly accounts of West African market women had often portrayed the
markets as supposedly timeless, 'traditional' female occupational sector 	
[But] Asante men had moved out of market trading in many commodities now
considered stereotypical for women around 1910, shortly after colonial
conquest, and had moved into cocoa farming, which then brought them higher
incomes and better upward mobility prospects".
Women did not have access to the same land and resources and so could not participate
in cocoa production to the same extent as men (Clark, 1994: 95,115). The next section
examines the roles and positions of traders in different parts of the marketing chain.
Urban based itinerant traders
Almost all the itinerant tomato traders met were women, a trend that is found
throughout the long distance foodstuff trading system. The men involved are usually
from rural areas and can survive because they have close contacts with the producers
(Clark, 1994:42). There are limitations on women's trading opportunities in Islamic
areas where local gender ideals can restrict women's roles. Clark (1994:85) found that
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in the past, "male savannah long distance networks made it difficult for Asante women
to trade effectively to the north, so women went south to the coast more often".
Itinerant traders tend to start as retailers or take over from their mothers or aunts. Many
obtain start-up capital from their husbands. They learn by accompanying othei traders
and being given small amounts of money to trade with. Most of the itinerant traders
work on their own, although some work in groups, with one person taking the goods of
other traders to the market. These groups are made up of relations or long-term friends.
However, the dramatic price changes in the market mean that most traders prefer to go
themselves so that they can judge the price and bargain.
The urban based itinerant traders (nkwainsofo) come from the main cities in Ghana:
Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast, Takoradi, Tema, Koforidua, Obuasi, Sunyani, Techiman,
Tamale and Wa. At times they also come from Togo and COte d'Ivoire. The traders
take the produce back to their market, although some traders are registered as members
in several markets which allows them more selling outlets.
Urban based traders buy in bulk, assemble smaller quantities, or buy from local
assemblers. They only go to areas where they can be guaranteed to find an adequate
supply. They hire vehicles, either vans or small lorries, often getting together in groups,
although those going to nearby towns usually buy smaller quantities and may rely on
using passenger cars or taxis. They pay for the transport according to the number of
boxes or bags and so have to fill the vehicle to make a profit. They will drive overnight
or arrive in the village the night before and then wait for the farmers to harvest.
Rural-based itinerant traders
These traders live in villages or small towns in areas where the vegetables are produced
and buy from farmers to take to the urban markets. There are often restrictions on
selling in urban markets imposed by the traders' associations, with the strictest controls
in Accra markets. In other markets they may become part of the association after
paying the necessary fees, although many will still have to sell through commission
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agents. They have the advantage over urban based traders in that they know the farmers
well and so are often able to take farmers' produce to the market and pay them on the
return, thereby removing the restrictions placed by not having the necessary capital.
There tend to be more rural-based traders in the villages that have been growing
vegetables for a long time as they have been able to build up capital, they have
knowledge of the marketing systems and they are known in the main urban markets.
Traders from villages such as Abesim and Tuobodum were often reported to be buying
from the villages around them and then selling in the city. In many cases they are
vegetable growers themselves or wives of vegetable growers.
Rural local assemblers
In the villages there are assemblers: women who buy up small quantities and bulk them
before selling to itinerant traders or going to an urban market themselves if the price is
attractive. They buy in baskets rather than the usual crates and may also buy damaged
tomatoes and sell them locally. They also play a role in guiding the itinerant traders as
they know the farms that are ready for harvest. They can be paid a commission from
the itinerant traders or they will be given boxes to fill, even when there is a large
demand from other farmers. Many of the farmers who supply these assemblers are the
consumption and local market oriented farmers who do not have a farm big enough to
fill a whole box of tomatoes.
Rural retailers
Some women farmers who grow for home consumption and local markets may sell
their own produce locally. This can be done in the weekly village market, or the daily
market, if the settlement is big enough. Some retailers will put the produce on a table
outside their house or send a young girl to hawk it from house to house. In Techire and
Manso, there are special markets that cater for people passing along the main trunk
roads in cars and busses. There is a custom in Ghana of bringing gifts of high quality
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vegetables and other food when visiting family and friends in urban areas. The quality
of the produce is very high and the retailers buy it from farmers at a higher price on the
condition that they can harvest it themselves and be selective. The quantities sold each
day appear to be small.
Urban sedentary wholesalers and commission agents
Wholesalers and commission agents for tomatoes are not common, although they were
found in some of the larger markets. They buy from itinerant traders who do not sell
themselves as they are not members of the particular market association, or they do not
want to be delayed by waiting for retailers to buy from them. These women tend to be
older, wealthier and often have senior positions in the market associations which are
discussed in detail in chapter seven. Access to wealth shapes the options available to
traders, as some of the more lucrative business niches require access to capital and
credit. This is closely linked to age as older women may have built up capital and have
networks that allow them to expand their operations.
Retailers
The retailers tend to start with their mothers and will share the profit while working
together. A large majority of the traders operating in the urban markets are retailers.
These women make minimal profits but retailing is popular because of the small
amount of capital required to start They will buy from itinerant traders coming to the
market or the wholesale traders who sell on behalf of itinerant traders. They will
usually buy one box at a time and take between one and three days to sell the contents.
These women have much less working capital than the itinerant traders and many are
reliant on receiving the boxes of tomatoes on credit each time and paying the itinerant
traders after one or two days. The organisation of this system is discussed in chapter
seven. There are also hawkers who buy from the retailers, or work with their retailing
mother or aunt, and carry produce around the market on their heads. This is a way for
teenage girls to learn how to trade.
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There is much debate in the literature over whether traders are "petite bourgeoisie" or
"disguised proletariat" (Clark, 1994: 75-6). Class position depends on the control of
the means of production and the means of exchange; this is difficult to ascertain when
different actors are closely interlinked in credit agreements. The debates. around the
informal/formal and petty commodity sector have explored the reasons why there are
so many small scale traders in the food supply system. Studies have shown that links to
large firms in the formal sector support the large numbers of small distributors,
especially for consumer goods (Dannhaeuser, 1985: 181 for a study in the Philippines;
Sudarkasa, 1973:37 in Nigeria). Early studies on the subject have also shown that the
large numbers of traders is due to the lack of choice for employment in urban areas
where there is a shortage of capital and the only resource that traders have is their own
labour (Bauer, 1954;18; Mintz, 1964;266).
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the context within which the tomato farmers and traders
operate. I have attempted to integrate the historical, political, environmental and social
aspects that shape the patterns of production and marketing. There is diversity within
the system and a need to understand the different geographies of tomatoes. The history
of how the commercial agricultural sector of Brong Ahafo evolved is useful for
understanding how the present institutions operate, based on historical precedent or
what North (1990) refers to as 'path dependency'.
This history of cropping patterns in the study area is shaped by a range of economic,
social, political and environmental factors. The environmental conditions, such as the
suitability of the forest areas for cocoa production, have also been shifting over time
due to a range of factors both natural and human induced. The extent of recent
environmental degradation is not clear as the measurements of indicators of
environmental change are limited and many of the reports of degradation are
unsubstantiated (Fairhead and Leach, 1998). The environmental changes have
influenced the growth of tomato production in the case study area as farmers have
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reduced their reliance on alternative crops, notably cocoa. Past cropping patterns have
played a role in changing the local environment and the present cropping system - that
includes tomatoes as well as a wide range of other crops - also has environmental
impacts. This study has not been able to explore the environmental implications of an
expansion of tomato production in terms of pesticide pollution, soil degradation and
removal of vegetation along the river banks. However, the ability of farmers to invest
in environmentally sustainable farming practices is dependent on a range of factors
including a dynamic local economy and profitable agriculture.
The following three chapters explore the range of institutions that have evolved in the
tomato production and marketing system in the study area. This chapter has shed some
light on the historical precedents, environmental context, and the background to the
different actors involved in the system. Particular attention has been given to the
differences amongst the farmers, traders and input sellers. In chapter five I examine
the access to land, finance, labour and inputs. This involves a range of contracts
between farmers, traders and agricultural input sellers. Chapter six explores the
marketing system in the rural areas, looking at the roles of traders and farmers in
organising the transport system, buying and selling institutions, information systems
and finance for trade. Chapter seven follows the marketing chain to the urban areas to
examine the traders' associations and institutions of retailing.
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Chapter 5. Social relations, contracts and institutional aspects of the vegetable
production system
5.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have laid out the theoretical and methodological framework for
looking at the social relations that shape production and marketing. The historical
processes in the study area that are the basis of the present production and
marketing system have also been described. The next chapters will explore in detail
the range of contracts and marketing systems which have evolved in Ghana. These
show that the production system is not based on economic and environmental
attributes alone but is also shaped by social relations. A detailed description of the
range of contract types and access to land, finance, labour and agricultural inputs
allows subsequent exploration of the social relations that underpin these contracts in
greater detail in chapter eight. A rich description of existing systems provides the
foundation on which an understanding of the specific social relations can be formed.
5.2 Access to land
There is a wide range of tenure arrangements that allow farmers to obtain access to
the type of land they require. Those growing tomatoes for urban market traders need
land close to vehicle access and, in the dry season, near a good source of water.
Access to land depends on kinship ties and the history of the settlement. Rights to
particular plots are still negotiable within kinship groups and so depend on social
relations. The renting of land is more common for tomato production than other
crops. The study of land access and ownership provides an insight into the basic
family and kinship groups within which farmers (and traders) operate.
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5.2.1 Land ownership
Most farmers use their own or family land. Under customary law in Akan areas, the
land is 'vested' in the stool (chiefly offices) and held in trust for the community
who have claims to be the original settlers or the first to cultivate the land (Berry,
1997: 1233; Amanor, 1993:16; Afikorah-Danquah, 1998). Citizens in the past were
allocated land to clear but had an obligation to contribute to the local state (Amanor,
1993:16). Land can also be received from other stools as a gift or through
inheritance.
Citizens of the community do not have outright ownership but have usufructary
rights l if they cleared the land2
 and keep it within a long duration cycle of
cultivation (Amanor, 1993:16). Today much of the land is considered 'family land'
and farmers have the rights to the proceeds of their labour but this does not include
the trees, timber or minerals. The stools still have allodial 3 rights to this land
although, in practice, the chiefs do not have the power to take control without
threatening their position (Berry, 1997: 1233). This right to land can be inherited
and farmers can gain access by virtue of their membership of a kinship group. These
matrilineal kinship groups, or abusua, are based on matrilineal inheritance, with
men passing land to their sisters' sons and, to a lesser extent, daughters. Women
have smaller farms and tend to pass them onto their daughters or granddaughters.
The head of the lineage, or abusua panin, is the custodian of the family land and he
ensures all family members have a portion of land (Afikorah-Danquah, 1998). There
are also large tracts of land which go with the position of the stool and are not
Usufructory rights refer to the "right of enjoying the use and advantages of another's
property short of the destruction or waste of its substance" (OED). The right is held by
a member of the land holding group while a stranger can have the usufruct on a
contractual basis (Kasanga, 1996).
2 Amanor (1993: 16) reported that large tracts of land in Wenchi District were cleared
by tractors in the 1960s allowing a few citizens to have holdings of 100-300 acres
while only farming an insignificant portion of the land. Land along the river banks has
only been cultivated intensively in recent years. In Nchyera village, Wenchi District,
the claims on this land were gained by pegging an area of land and if no one removed
the pegs, the land could be cleared (Yvon, 1997: 48).
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allocated to lineages. This land is separate from the abusua land of the chiefs
lineage and it allows the chief to have a good income and, therefore, greater
independence in settling disputes.
The boundaries of land are not clear unless there is a stream or natural boundary and
there are many disputes within and between abusua. Berry (1997: 1233) shows that
access to land is based on negotiation and the historical precedent:
"In most cases individuals' claims stand or fall with the recollections and
reputations of their witnesses. In practice land rights are subject to
intermittent or on-going negotiation, and tenure security depends more on a
person's standing with his/her relatives and neighbors than on the way in
which the claim was originally acquired."
This information is used at all levels of dispute settlement from the family level to
the High Courts in Kumasi. Most disputes are settled at the abusua level or with the
stool (the chief assisted by a council of elders).
Today there are increasing amounts of land that are bequeathed directly to spouses
and children. This custom grew because cocoa farmers relied on the labour of
spouses and children to develop their cocoa assets. The expansion of cocoa had
wide implications for social structure; it accelerated changes towards private
ownership, reduced the power of lineages and the abusua panin, and gave precedent
to the male line (Mikell, 1989; Okali, 1983; Busia, 1951: 127). Bequeathing land to
spouses and children involves sending symbolic drinks to the abusua panin and
elders. These inheritance rights have been strengthened with legislation that gives
spouses and children the legal right to property and aims to stop the practice of
wives and children being driven from their homes by the nephews and nieces of the
deceased husband. However, this only applies to self acquired property written into
a will.
Farmers may also obtain land from their husband, wife or abusua member. Women
are often reliant on using their husband's land and this tends to be in less fertile
3 Allodial Title implies an ultimate authority in land matters. It is also known as the
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areas. When given land from someone in the abusua, the farmer is under some
moral obligation to give something to the 'owner' of the land, although this is not
necessarily fulfilled. 'Stranger farmers' or migrants4 have experienced increasingly
restricted access to land as it becomes more scarce. Some have been able to pay
chiefs for the usufruct right and this is referred to as a 'purchase' (Okali, 1983: 13).
Other strangers have built up close social relationships with indigenous families
from the time when they came to labour on the cocoa farms. These farmers now
have limited access to family lands which are granted to them as a gift (Amanor,
1993: 21). However, most migrant farmers have to rent or sharecrop, even if they
have been resident in the area for two generations.
5.2.2 Renting land
The pattern of land tenure for commercial tomato farmers differs from other crops
grown in the study area as there are certain requirements such as good access to
roads for marketing and access to water supplies for dry season production.
Therefore, there is a large amount of renting in certain villages (see table 5.1),
although this depends on the season. The high proportion of rented land is reported
in other areas of tomato production and other market-oriented agricultural
production systems (Amanor, 1996: 31; Berry, 1997: 1232). However, the high
costs and returns for tomato farms compared to other crops, means that the rent for
tomato farms is only a small proportion of the total costs involved and not perceived
as a restriction on farm size as is the case in maize production.
Non-indigenous farmers often have to rent land and this is one of the reasons for the
differences between villages, since some villages have a larger number of non-
indigenous settlers than others. The extent of renting also depends on the amount of
land in the village and the relative importance of vegetable production. The size of
Paramount, Absolute or Radical Title (Kasanga, 1996)
4 There are difficulties in defining a 'migrant', 'stranger' or 'northerner' which creates
problems when trying to disaggregate data. There are different types of strangers
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rented farms was found to be larger than the average tomato farms. This may be due
to the fact that those renting tend to be farmers concentrating on tomatoes rather
than other crops.
Table 5.1 Land tenure for present or most recent tomato farm in study villages
Tano
Boase
Pamdu Techi-
mentia
Tanoso Akete Kokoago Total
Number
interviewed
20 20 40 28 27 24 159
Percentage renting 20.0% 35.0% 50.0% 10.7% 3.7% 20.8% 25.8%
Average size of
rented farms
(acres)
1.1 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3
Average size of all
farms (acres)
1.2 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.9
Table 5.2 Land tenure for present or most recent tomato farms according to gender
Women Men Total
Number interviewed 46 113 159
Percentage renting 21.7% 27.4% 25.8%
Average size of rented farms (acres) 1.1 1.4 1.3
Average farm size (acres) 0.7 1.0 0.9
Average rent per acre per season (Cedis) 18233 25980 23841
Note: In November 1997 £1 was 3800 Cedis.
The rental period for vegetable farms is usually three months, but some farmers may
rent larger areas for rainy season production for up to three years, for all their crops,
with only a small part of the land being given over to vegetables. The rent is paid
depending on where they originated from. Those who come from ethnic groups close
to the Akan tend to have better access.
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before production starts and, for the more desirable land, farmers have to pay many
months in advance to reserve it. The cost depends on the agreement with the
landlord and varies dramatically with the terms of these contracts depending on both
the social relations built between parties and their relative bargaining power. Some
non-indigenous settlers, especially those from the north, claim that they have to pay
higher rents than indigenous people. Women appear to be paying lower rents but
this may be due to the lower rents in those villages where there are more women
farming tomatoes, or the lower quality of the land women farm.
In a very few cases, farmers were found to be entering into share cropping
agreements for the use of land. In these cases the farmer will take two thirds of crop
sales and the land owner will take one third. This is referred to as abusa. This
system evolved with, and was a central part of, the remarkable indigenous growth of
the cocoa industry in Ghana. The system has confounded many economists over the
years as the integration of farmers into the economy has not resulted in increased
landlessness and renting as might be expected in a change to capitalist production
relations (Hill, 1963; 1970; Robertson, 1982). Abusa is not as common amongst
tomato farmers as amongst producers of other crops, especially maize, as tomato
farmers prefer to rent the land. In an abusa arrangement, the value of the amount
shared with the land owner may be several times higher than the rent. However, this
will depend on the size of the harvest and the market price; the land owners will
also share the risk of crop failure. Farmers prefer abusa to labouring on other
people's farms as they can have a higher income if they are successful, there is less
employee control and they can combine it with being a labourer at other times.
Those doing the farming tend to be young men who do not have land or capital to
start themselves. There is also sharecropping with the additional provision of
capital, rather than just land. This is discussed in section 5.3.4.
5.3 Access to finance for production
There is a wide range of financial sources drawn on by farmers for financing tomato
farms. This is a sensitive issue about which it was difficult to collect information
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through questionnaires. Therefore, the questionnaire survey did not attempt to find
the extent and importance of each source. Finance is based on a range of ties, from
the very local to more distant sources such as traders. According to interviews with
farmers, their most important source of finance is from their own farming and non-
farming activities. Farmers will also plan their cropping calendar around the
financial needs of the more costly crops such as tomatoes. Those receiving loans
rely on non-bank sources. This study did not look at loans for non-agricultural
purposes, although these activities were found to be closely interlinked with
agricultural production and marketing in the farmers' livelihood strategies.
5.3.1 Loans from private individuals
Farmers can receive loans from other villagers. The most common source is from
husbands or wives who have savings from their own farming or other employment.
In such cases the farmer can give them some extra money after a successful harvest
or use the profit of the farm to finance their spouse's business. Loans often come
from uncles in the abusua (matrilineal kinship group) who are under obligation to
assist their 'children' (nephews and nieces) with soft loans. Money can -also come
from other individuals in or connected to the village. The survey of tomato farmers
found that 39% of farmers were giving loans (see table 5.3). It was not possible to
collect details of loans received from other people as there is a social stigma
•
attached to admitting this.
To get loans, the farmer must know the person giving the loan personally, so this
limits the ability of farmers in remoter, poorer areas to obtain loans. The people
giving loans tend to be richer fanners, salaried workers such as teachers, traders and
those who have received loans from the bank. These individuals have advantages
over formal lending institutions as they have the information on the borrowers and
can enforce repayment (Aryeetey, 1992:5). This can open up opportunities for
severe exploitation, although the extent of long-term indebtedness could not be
examined in detail in the study.
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Table 5.3 Farmers' loans to other farmers in the past year.
Size
(acres)
Number of	 Percentage of
farmers	 farmers
giving loans
Average amount
given in Cedis
<0.5 7 0% 0
0.5 28 43% 37667
0.6-1.4 25 44% 52909
1.5-2 10 40% 220000
>2 10 40% 145000
Total 80 39% 80452
Note: Tano Boase, Techimentia and Pamdu only.
The study found three cases of tomato farmers on-lending bank loans, and two of
these were loans given by banks for maize farming. Tomato farming can be much
more profitable than maize production when there are good production conditions
and market prices. This has been reported in other countries as well as in Ghana,
although in most cases those getting bank credit cannot admit to the bank that they
are on-lending (Aryeetey, 1992:21-22).
There is a long recorded history of lending in southern Ghana. Rural lending
increased with the expansion of cocoa and oil palm as farmers could mortgage their
plantations (La Anyane, 1963: 64; Dunn and Robertson, 1973: 49; Becket, 1944). In
such cases the owners became tenants to the money lenders for a fixed period of
time5 . There are no cases of mortgaging crops other than cocoa as they are not such
fixed assets and farmers cannot mortgage land as they may only have the usufruct
right to it, rather than clear ownership. Furthermore, for tomato farmers there is a
5 Opoku-Owusu (1971: 2-3) states that "the very strong antagonism by the state and
public against money lenders in Ghana currently derrives from the very sharp and
nearly always unkind practices adopted by the money lenders". (Debrunner (1959:69)
documents the indebtedness of cocoa farmers to brokers of European firms: "This
wretched advance system is an evil heritage from the slave trade". However, Hill
(1986: 84) questions the attitudes of the officials to debt and argues that credit is a
sign of a lively economy.
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high risk of production failure (pests, drought or excessive rainfall) or lack of a
market during gluts. The interest payments on the loans are variable and can be
renegotiated after a bad harvest. In such cases the interest can be reduced and the
repayment delayed until the next harvest or another crop is ready. Farmers giving
loans were not willing to give details on the interest payments they expected to
receive.
5.3.2 Loans from banks
The formal financial sector consists of commercial banks (such as Ghana
Commercial Bank, Standard Chartered, Barclays, Social Security Bank),
development banks (such as the Agricultural Development Bank) and rural banks
(locally managed banks that are guaranteed by the Bank of Ghana). The rural banks
were set up in 1976 and by 1995 there were 125 in Ghana. There are also semi-
formal financial institutions such as credit unions. The survey found that only 5% of
farmers were obtaining bank loans, which supports the finding of Amanor (1993)
that only 8 % of his sample of farmers in Wenchi District had loans from the bank.
This study found a range of cases where loans for maize production were being
diverted to tomato production, which was seen to be more profitable. Banks are
unwilling to lend to tomato producers because it is a high risk crop.
Banks are reducing the number of loans they give to small scale farmers as the
repayment rates are very low and, they claim, there is much diversion of money
away from the stated purpose. The low repayment rates occur because bank loans
are seen as gifts from the government due to previous programmes that concentrated
on reaching disbursement targets with little concern for collection. Despite a range
of government programmes to support the growth of rural banks, they have not
delivered the expected benefits to poorer farmers (Aryeetey et al, 1994: 29). Now
most of the banks' loans are given to non agricultural operations or to government
workers whose salary passes through the banks (Jones et al, 1997).
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The difficulties of lending to resource poor farmers with very little collateral has
been a problem experienced in all less developed countries (Hulme and Mosley,
1996). It was highlighted by Brown (1972: 67) in his discussion of the risks of
lending to those without tangible assets. Alternative models of credit delivery have
been successfully developed that use groups and the trust that exists .between
members to ensure repayment. These approaches model their structure and draw on
the success of cases in south Asia, most notably the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh.
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Smallholder Credit,
Infrastructure and Marketing Project (SCIMP) was modelled on such a micro-
finance institution and has been operating for several years. It has only helped a very
small number of tomato farmers since it concentrates on maize farmers.
The SCIMP project covers parts of Brong Ahafo, Ashanti and Volta Regions and is
channelled through 11 rural banks and branches of the Agricultural Development
Bank, with local NGOs responsible for group mobilisation and education. To date
30,000 farmers have received credit at least once, although there is low repayment.
These rates vary with poor repayment in Brong Ahafo, where it is only 62%, while
in Ashanti region it is 85% (details collected from SCIMP files, October 1997).
Further problems of this system relate to the ways in which groups make fellow
members repay their loans when in difficulty. Without the possibility of declaring
bankruptcy, the collapse of small enterprises has the potential to force people into
considerable debt as they are forced to sell key livelihood assets or owe large
amounts to other group members (Lyon, 1999a).
The restrictions on getting a bank loan include the time and cost of the application
procedures, the requirement to have saved there for some time and the need for two
guarantors who draw their salary from the bank. This restricts access for poorer
farmers, especially women and 'strangers'. For larger quantities they need collateral
such as a car or a house. The difficulty in assessing ownership of farm land restricts
many farmers from using land as collateral as banks do not recognise their
usufructary rights and cannot use the threat of repossession of land in case of
default.
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Compared to loans from other sources, there is less flexibility with bank loans and a
long procedure for getting loans that can delay the loan until it is no longer needed.
Farmers also complain about the high interest rates, although, at 42% per year (as of
October 1997), these are lower than many of the informal sources of finance and
have to be seen in the context of a high and varying rate of inflation. The ability of
the rural banks to give loans is further hampered by the mismanagement that has
been reported in a very large proportion of them, as this erodes the confidence of
savers and encourages them to save elsewhere.
5.3.3 Susu collectors
Susu collectors manage informal saving systems and they also give a limited
amount of credit in the form of advances. There is a range of systems in Ghana with
similarities to the rotating savings and credit organisations (ROSCOs) found
throughout the world (Ardener, 1995; Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey, 1995; Steel and
Aryeetey, 1994; Lyon, 1999). The rotating susus tend to be smaller with one
member responsible for organising the daily or weekly collections which are given
to a different member each week. The other form of susu involves an individual
who sets up the susu as an enterprise. They collect daily deposits from the work
place of the saver and then give a lump sum at the end of the month. The deposit is
the same each time and each month the collector takes one day's deposit as a fee.
No interest is given on these savings. This is the preferred form of saving as it is
very easy to deposit and withdraw.
The depositors are usually female traders, although many male and female farmers
also save with susu collectors. Collectors set themselves up as a business and print
savings cards. Individual collectors are well known in the communities where they
work and have to build a reputation so that they are trusted. The susu collectors
interviewed were all men which is a common finding throughout Ghana; Aryee ey
(1992: 26) found that only 16 of the 151 susu collectors interviewed in his survey
were women. Two of the collectors in my survey had shops in the town and two of
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them also held important positions in their village. One had also built a smart office
and a house to show that he was settled and would not run off with the money.
There have been many cases of susu collectors disappearing. The Ghana
Cooperative Susu Collectors Association has been established to register collectors
and reduce this risk, although none of the collectors interviewed referred to it. -
Susu collectors of the monthly rather than rotational system, give credit to increase
the amount saved and to attract new customers. One collector uses the credit as a
way of both keeping saving customers and building trust. The credit given is only a
small proportion of the money deposited with them as clients could withdraw their
money at any time and the collectors have to protect their reputation by always
being able to dispense savings. The susu collector in Derma village reported that he
does not use any of the contributions for lending, preferring to use his own money.
The loans will usually be up to one month's contribution and the money will be
repaid in daily contributions in the following month. Susu collectors only give loans
to those whom they trust to continue saving with them. There were no cases of susu
collectors acting as intermediaries of banks as the links between the informal and
formal financial sectors are limited (Aryeetey, 1992: 29; Sakyi-Dawson et al, 1997;
Steel et al, 1997)
Table 5.4 Details of susu collectors interviewed
Susu collectors Number Average daily Number of	 Total lent at
of savers	 contribution
(estimate)
contributors who	 one time
borrow money
Ricaman Susu Co. 306 C1500 50	 C2,250,000
Mensco Susu Co. 200 C2000 15+	 C900,000 est.
Manso Susu 80 C1500 10	 C450,000 est.
Note: These susus were monthly withdrawals rather than the rotational system.
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5.3.4 Sponsoring and share cropping
Those with no capital can enter into tomato farming by being 'sponsored' or doing
ye ma yenkye (let's do and share). One person provides the money for land and
chemicals while the other will do all the labouring. The crop at the end will be
shared. This system has evolved out of other share cropping systems that have
become established for other crops, most notably cocoa (Robertson, 1982; Hill,
1956; 1963). The management decisions tend to be made by the person doing the
labouring, so it is more a way of financing agriculture than a form of labouring and
being paid after harvest. Farmers use this as a way of getting finance for farming
while sharing the risk of failure. If the crop fails they will not be in debt. However,
if the crop is successful they will end up sharing a far greater amount of money with
the sponsor than if they had borrowed the money.
The financiers like this form of contract as it requires less monitoring of labourers
and allows them to have income while reducing the risk of having one farm. Only
one farmer considered this as a form of exploitation, as there are no other sources of
capital available to these farmers and they cannot afford to take the risk of failure.
Two of the input sellers had large numbers of share croppers, one having 12. Some
financiers start farms at different times with different share croppers in order to
reduce the risk further.
Those providing finance are the richer members of the community such as salaried
workers, traders, input suppliers and rich farmers. Some farmers were found to be
using the loans from the bank that were given for maize production. Farmers with
irrigation pumps can enter these agreements with people who cannot afford to hire
the pump during the production period. It is also popular with farmers who do not
have the money to hire labour and cannot do the work themselves:
"I spent a lot of money on my sukan (early rainy season) farm and lost almost
everything. So I wasn't having much money to do adantsm (late rainy season)
on my own. I asked a Dargarti man to do a farm with me and share the
proceeds" (Faustina Brenya, Dwomo farmer, Interview 25)
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Other share cropping agreements were found when farmers had cleared and
prepared a large area to farm but could not use it all:
"Jr was my own farm but after all the tasks had been completed I gave about
half to my good friend to be managed by him. The proceeds were shared into
two" (Charles Opoku, Tanoso farmer, Interview 28).
The farmers providing the labour are all young men who are well known to the
sponsor. They are often family members or someone who lives in the same house.
The sponsor knows them to be hard working either by having used them as
labourers in the past or by asking others:
"Farmers come to ask me and I get more requests than I can sponsor. I tell
them to wait a week and I do investigations without the farmer knowing. I go
to the family house and I ask others about the farmer" (Addae Boakye, Agro-
chemical seller, Bechem, Interview 4).
The sponsor and farmer will agree on the contract before production starts and fix
how they will share the harvest. The sponsor will provide all the chemicals and can
also provide money for other aspects such as hiring land, clearing the land, buying
cutlasses and boots, hiring spraying machines and even some money for food for the
farmer. The extra spending usually happens when the farmer is a family member.
Several forms of contract were found. They follow similar contracts that exist for
the share cropping of land for cultivation of maize, cocoa and cassava. Maize is
often sharecropped using abusa where the owner gets two thirds and the caretaker
farmer gets one third. Cassava is sharecropped using abunu where the proceeds are
shared equally. In each case the land owner only provides the land. The range of
contracts for tomato production are given in table 5.5.
The amount of money taken by the sponsor depends on the harvest, with some
willing to reduce the amount they take if there is a bad harvest, especially if they are
working with a family member. Some sponsors also allow the farmer to take the
first harvest without sharing it.
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Table 5.5 Contract form in sponsoring
Contract form	 Description 
Abunu after subtracting	 Sponsor subtracts chemical costs from
costs.	 harvest proceeds and then divides
remaining proceeds into two. Sponsor
provides land, boots and cutlasses.. 	 -
Abunu without subtracting
costs.
Abunu after subtracting
half of costs.
Abusa after subtracting costs.
Abusa before subtracting costs.
Sponsor buys chemicals and hires land.
Harvest shared between two and sold
separately.
Sponsor will deduct half of costs from
proceeds and then divide the rest of the
money into two.
Sponsor pays for labour for clearing and
ridging, and buys chemicals. Farmer weeds
it and tends it. After deducting sponsor's
costs from the harvest proceeds, divide
into three and sponsor takes one third.
Sponsor provides land and buys chemicals.
Harvest proceeds divided into three and
farmer pays sponsor for chemical costs out
of his two thirds.
Abusa for two farmers and a Sponsor pays for chemicals and has a
sponsor with an irrigation pumping pumping machine. Subtracts cost of
machine, machine and chemicals from proceeds and
divides the remainder into three. One part
to the sponsor and one part to each of the
farmers.
The sponsors have little involvement except when applying agro-chemicals, as the
farmer can sell the agro-chemicals and claim that the farm has been damaged by sun
or rain, and at harvest time when there is a risk that the farmer will harvest without
the sponsor knowing and not share the proceeds.. Therefore the sponsors need to
monitor the work and know about growing tomatoes themselves. Farmers are
required to tell the sponsor when they will be harvesting and the sponsor may send a
family member to harvest with them to check that none of the harvest is diverted.
Sponsors also rely on farmers in the surrounding areas to inform them when the
farmer is harvesting and report to the sponsor. One chemical dealer who is
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sponsoring several farms collects the boxes with the farmer so that he knows how
much has been harvested.
When the farmer breaks the agreement there is little that can be done:
"I harvested once without informing them and was sent to some elde-rs. I had
to apologise and give some drink as compensation" (MaIlam Muniru, Dagarti
farmer, Tanoso, Interview 38)
"My farmer harvested and did not tell me, but others saw him ... I did not get
him arrested because I did not want to get a bad name" (Agya Yeboah,
Derma farmer, Interview 22)
However, the farmer may suffer because of the damage to their reputation and the
difficulty in obtaining sponsorship in the future.
5.4 Access to trader credit
The marketing system plays an important role in shaping tomato production patterns
and activities. A central part of marketing activities for both farmers and traders is
the creation of customer relationships. These will be discussed in greater detail in
the next chapter, but one aspect of these relations is the provision of credit to
farmers.
5.4.1 The extent of trader credit
The number of survey farmers benefiting from credit from traders is shown in the
tables 5.6 and 5.7. There has been a long history of trader credit in Ghana's major
cash cropping areas. The cocoa middlemen were particularly active in the colonial
period and Becket (1944: 35) found that 32% of farmers received credit and this
accounted for 19% of the total cocoa output of the area. Nyangteng and van
Apeldoorn (1971: 104) also recognise the extent of trader credit and its advantages
over banking institutions in terms of ease of administration and timeliness.
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Table 5.6 Credit from traders
Number interviewed Percentage of farmers receiving credit
Men	 113	 13.3%
Women	 46	 4.3%
Size of farm
estimate in acres
<0.5 23 13.0%
0.5 52 13.5%
0.6-1 42 9.5%
1.1-2 18 0.0%
>2 8 12.5%
Don't know 16 12.5%
Total 159 10.7%
Table 5.7 Farmers receiving credit from each village
Number interviewed Percentage of farmers rece:iNing cresNit
Tano Boase 20 15.0%
Pamdu 20 15.0%
Techimentia 40 0.0%
Tanoso 28 7.1%
Akete 27 29.6%
Kokoago 24 4.2%
Total 159 10.7%
The farmers have to be able to build up close working relations with the traders and
so this restricts farmers who have only been growing for a short time. A larger
proportion of men were found to be receiving credit. The traders perceive men to
have a lower risk of having a poor harvest. They claimed this was due fewer labour
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shortages as men can do more of the tasks themselves and have fewer obligations to
farm other crops.
There are more customer relationships in some villages than others. The average
proportion of farmers receiving credit from traders was found to be 11%,.altliough
in the village of Akete in Wenchi District 22% received loans from buyers. A
survey in Domasua near Sunyani also found that 22% of tomato farmers obtained
loans from the tomato traders (Asomah, 1990). Amanor (1993) found that only 4%
of farmers of all crops in his survey in Wenchi obtained loans from traders, which
suggests that these forms of contracts are more common for tomato farmers.
The number of farmers receiving credit from traders in Akete village is higher than
elsewhere, due to the lack of any alternative finance there. Traders are less keen to
give credit in those villages with many traders coming to buy because there is more
competition and a greater chance of the farmers selling to other traders. This is more
of a problem when there are Accra traders buying in the village at the same time,
since they tend to offer the farmers higher prices. The lack of competition in less
well known villages also allows the traders to have greater bargaining power. There
is only a small number of farmers receiving trader credit in Kokuago because they
do not have close links to the traders.
Larger scale farmers appear less likely to receive trader credit. This may be due to
the fact that there is less trader credit in Tanoso and Techimentia where the size of
tomato farms is double that of Pamdu, Akete and Kokoago. However, Tano-Boase
has a high average farm size (1.2 acres) and high proportion of farmers receiving
credit.
Sixty-five percent of traders interviewed reported that they extend credit to farmers,
but the number of customers, and the amount given at one time, differs between
markets. This can be seen in tables 5.8 and table 5.9. The small number of Accra
traders interviewed reported an average of 9.3 customers in the past year and an
average total amount given at one time of C1,770,000. The traders in the district
capitals give to an average of 5 farmers, which is much more than those in Kumasi
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markets. However, the average amount of money given to all farmer customers by
traders in district capitals is smaller than the amount given by traders in bigger cities
because the traders do business on a smaller scale. Smaller traders are restricted in
giving credit by the shortage of capital (dwetire) and the high costs of trading
operations:
"At first I used to help some farmers but now the transport costs are so high
so there is not enough profit to help them. I also have 8 children so no money
for other things" (Ama Mama, Brong Trader, Tanoso, Interview 4).
Using a rough estimate of the number of different types of traders buying in Brong
Ahafo and selling in the different markets, it can be estimated that the total credit
from traders to tomato farmers at one time is perhaps C162,000,000. The Accra
traders also reported that they give large amounts of credit to tomato farmers in Ada
(Greater Accra Region) and in Tono, Bolgatanga (Upper East Region).
Table 5.8 Number of farmer customers receiving credit from traders in the past year
Number of customers Small towns 	 Kumasi	 Asafo market, Accra: 31st
	
Total
Central	 Kumasi	 December/
Market	 Agbogbloshi
16 interviewed 12 interviewed 4 interviewed 	 5 interviewed 37 interviewed
0 31.3% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 29.7%
1-5 43.8% 50.0% 75.0% 0 43.2%
6-10 12.5% 16.7% 0 40.0% 16.2%
11+ 6.3% 0 0 20.0% 5.4%
Don't know/ 6.3% 0 0 20.0% 5.4%
Unwilling to answer6
Average number of
customers per trader
5.0 2.7 3 9.3 4.6
6 Some traders were not willing to discuss details and claimed that they did not know
the answer. Therefore the category of don't know and unwilling to answer are
combined. This issue is discussed in chapter three.
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Table 5.9 Average amount each trader gives to all customers at one time
Amount given	 Small towns	 Kumasi	 Asafo	 Accra: 31st	 Total
(Cedis)	 Central	 market,	 December/
Market	 Kumasi	 Agbogbloshi
16 interviewed 12 interviewed 4 interviewed 5 interviewed
	 3.7 interviewed
o 31.3% 33.3% 25.0% 20.0% 29.7%
C1-200,000 31.3% 25.0% 50.0% o 27.0%
C201 -500,000 18.8% 16.7% 25.0% o 16.2°0
C501-1,000,000 12.5% 0 o o 5.400
C1,001-1,500,000 0 8.3% o 40.0% 8.10o
More than C1500,000 0 0 o 40.0% 5.4%
Don't know/ 6.3% 16.7% 0 0 8.1%
Unwilling to answer
Average C224,000 C239,000 C163,000 C1,770,000 C449,000
5.4.2 Lending and repayment procedures
Traders do not always give cash directly to farmers. Some Accra and Kumasi
traders will lend to farmers or traders who lend on to other farmers whom they
know in the village:
"I have three farmer customers at three villages. They assist me in purchasing
tomatoes from other farmers in the village. I gave C800,000 to one customer
to be given to five other farmers" (Akosua Boatemma, Ashanti trader,
Kumasi, Interview 44).
Some traders prefer to give inputs to farmers or will act as the guarantor for when
farmers receive goods on credit from the agro-chemical dealers. In the latter case,
both farmer and trader go to the ago-chemical seller when the inputs are purchased
and both go when the farmer repays. Traders also help many of the farmers with
seed. Traders are an important route for the dissemination of new varieties and they
will give seed to farmers in order to improve the quality of the crop (Lyon, 1997b).
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Traders will be repaid after the start of the tomato harvests. The trader knows when
the harvest should start so will come at that time. Some farmers send messages to
the traders telling them to come. Tomatoes are harvested between one and three
times a week over several weeks. Therefore there is a number of forms of
repayment as shown in table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Forms of repayment
Form	 Description
Near the beginning of harvest Farmer pays off loan after first few harvests.
In instalments	 Farmer pays part of the loan back each harvest.
At end Trader pays the farmer for each harvest and then the
farmer repays the loan with cash when all the
harvests are finished.
At end after selling on credit Farmer gives harvested tomatoes to the trader and
collects money when they have settled the balance
after the last harvest.
Traders can fail to obtain their money if the farmer sells the produce to another
trader or 'runs away'. This is the reason given by those traders who choose not to
have customers. However, the most common reason for failure to pay on time is
crop failure. In such circumstances, the traders may give again so that the fanner
can make another farm:
"I gave C3 million to farmers in four villages ... they are yet to complete
paying due to poor yields last year. When the harvest is poor you have to give
an additional amount before you can be paid back" (Comfort Ouao, Ga
Trader, Accra, Interview 42)
The flexibility of these loans and the ease with which they are renegotiable in times
of trouble are the main reasons for the preference many farmers have for trader
credit. This was also observed by Becket (1944: 36) who reported that interest was
reduced by half and new loans given when a cocoa fanner was in difficulties.
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These contracts are not backed by any formal documentation. This section examines
how the traders know that the farmers will repay them and how they select those
farmers they are going to lend to. Traders can use their existing networks in
deciding who to lend to. The best established network is the community in which
they live, and their relatives. The traders living near the producing areas often had
more of these links:
"We have lived in the same house for one year. He [the borrower] later
moved to Nkansia to farm there ... each time he harvested he came for our
boxes and a year later he came for a loan" (Yaayaa Mame, Mo trader,
Wenchi, Interview 18).
As existing networks are restricted to kinship links and knowing people in the same
community, most traders develop customer relations built on long term trading
links. These links will allow the trader to build up information about farmers and
their capacity to produce tomatoes:
"Before I give a loan to a farmer, I look at how often and regular he produces
and sells to me, how trustful he is and the quantity he can harvest at a time as
a measure of his ability to repay" (Cecilia Asamoah, Ashanti trader, Kumasi,
Interview 37).
They may also learn where the farmer's house is so that they know where to go to
get the money. Many traders visit the farm to see the size and to check that they are
really going to start a farm and not divert the money. However, this will give them
confidence in the farmer's ability rather than trust in their actions:
"I do not help anyone I do not trust. Some traders go to look at other people's
farms and help them if they find the farm to be good but I do not do that"
(Afua Adisa, Ashanti trader, Kumasi, Interview 25).
Through long term interaction with the farmers, they decide who can be trusted:
"Before I help a farmer, I know he is a customer who will not hide his tomato
from me and sell to others when it is scarce and prices are high. I study the
farmers for a long time and know those who sell to me throughout the year"
(Nana Adwoa, Brong trader, Wenchi, Interview 16)
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"Before you give a farmer money, you have to know his work his life. Some
speak the truth and others do not. So you have to work with him for some
time" (Yaayaa Mame, Mo Trader, Wenchi, Interview 18)
Traders can also test farmers with small amounts to start with and then reduce the
numbers when they know whom they can trust :
"You know who is bad as you give to them first time and they do not repay
you" (Lydia Beyaa, Dagarti trader, Wenchi, Interview 11).
"At first I used to give to most customers but now I give to the very few who
are truthful" (Stella Konadu, Ashanti trader, Kumasi, Interview 38).
Trust can be built out of long term relationships with each side reciprocating.
Traders will therefore lend to farmers who have given to them on credit or who
have asked the traders to keep some of their money from sales before collecting it at
a later date.
"I first gave to him three years ago. When he came before (to sell tomatoes to
her) he would leave money with me before he came to collect it so I detected
that he was good" (Nukumu Adua, Brong Trader, Techiman, Interview 24).
In many cases the trader-farmer relationship goes beyond that of business into
further social ties. Farmers and traders may send gifts of food stuffs to each other
and visit each other when one of them is sick or when a close relative is sick. In one
case a farmer had sent his daughter to stay with his trader customer:
"My customer (a trader in Accra) has been so good to me that for the past 5
years, my daughter, born in 1982, has been staying with her as a house help
and she pays for her education" (Agya Yeboah, Derma farmer, Interview 22).
"In the fupe (season) I got a loan from my customer ... I work with the traders
but it depends on trust. They (the customers) know me and they have trusted
me. They know my mother and have friendship. Any time they come to
Techimentia to buy they will pass here to say hello even if they are not buying
here. They bring food and bread to my mother when they come. When I am
less busy I go to stay with them for 2-3 days in Accra" (Kwabena Twum,
Derma farmer, Interview 12).
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A final way of building trust is through the use of guarantors and witnesses. When a
farmer who is not well known to the trader asks for a loan, the trader may ask them
to find an `agyinamu' or intermediary known to both of them. They can also play a
role as guarantor in case of default, witness to a person's character or simply
witness to the deal. This allows the trader to lend money in areas where she. does not
know the farmers:
"When I give money, I go to the chief and I have an agyinamu - he knows the
farmers well ... he is my sisters' husband" (Effia Afiefie, Brong trader,
Techiman, Interview 23).
5.4.3 Costs, interest payments and the extent of 'exploitation'
Many of the traders charged an implicit rate of interest by offering a lower tomato
price to the farmer than the farmers could get from other traders. However, the wide
variation in prices in one village each day means it is difficult to calculate how
much less the farmers are paid.
Once a farmer has taken credit from the trader, they are in a much weaker
bargaining position. The traders will request a lower price and the farmer will have
to agree :
"I got C350,000 from a Derma trader settled in Kumasi. When helped, the
trader will base the price she gives me on her starting price rather than the
village price" (Kwabena Amankwa, Derma farmer, Interview 10).
"I got a loan of C25000 and paid at harvest. The price was the same as
other traders but my customer (a trader) came to beg me to reduce the price
for her by C5000 per box each time". In this case the farmer lost C55,000
through selling to this trader rather than others (Obour Johnson, Tanoso
fanner, Interview 9).
The traders justified the reduced price by claiming it is a sign of appreciation from
the farmers receiving assistance in starting the farm:
120
"Some farmers try to be nice and offer C1000 less for the boxes. When Accra
traders come with a higher price, some farmers who are customers will let me
buy half of that harvest at the lower price. Farmers recognise that I have
helped them so they have to help me" (Ama Boahema, Brong trader, Tanoso,
Interview 1).
"We do not take extra money from the farmers when we give them loans
because they sell their produce to us. They try to reduce the price for each box
by say C2000 because we have helped them" (Yaayaa Mame, Mo trader
Wenchi, Interview 18).
"After harvesting, she deducts the money she gave me from the total sales and
then give the rest to me. I then give her something from my heart in
appreciation for the good done to me" (Ayenim Boateng, Akete farmer,
Interview 3).
While the amount to be given to the traders is at the discretion of the farmers, they
may be forced to give in order to secure credit for the following year. Some farmers
also reported that they reduced the price when the traders claimed they had made a
loss on the previous trip.
Traders selling in the smaller markets always pay lower prices than the traders
coming from larger urban centres, especially Accra. When farmers have obtained
loans from these traders they are committed to sell at these lower prices, although
the option of selling to other traders may not always be there. These traders give the
loans to ensure that they can keep customers who will sell at a price that allows
them to sell in the smaller markets. Many farmers are forced to take these loans if
they want to go into tomato production as they have no other sources of money.
This was found in the village of Akete where the number of farmers obtaining loans
from traders is higher than elsewhere and they sell a larger proportion of their
harvests in the nearby market of Wenchi than neighbouring villages do:
"Other villages make arrangements by going to Accra and Kumasi. .... Here
they can do it but each farmer has a different customer in Wenchi who gives
money. If they stop selling in Wenchi then the traders will not give money"
(Musa Yaya, Akete farmer, Interview 11).
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This shows that obtaining a loan does not necessarily mean less bargaining power
because the traders lend to individuals with low bargaining power already. This
supports the hypothesis of Poulton et al (1997), that interlocking is more likely to
occur when there is more market control, few marketing channels and no alternative
credit sources.
The actual cost associated with selling to customers at a lower price depends on
how much of the harvest the farmer has agreed to sell at the lower prices. In most
cases of traders giving credit, the farmer is supposed to give all the produce to the
trader or as much as the trader can buy:
"The farmers give me all that I have the strength (ahoDden) to buy. If there is
more I will tell other traders to buy" (Akosua Kromo, Brong trader, Wenchi,
Interview 12)
The customer relationships are not completely binding and the farmer is not always
tied to accepting the traders' price irrespective of other offers. Under many
agreements, if a better price is offered then the farmer can accept it while reserving
some of their produce for their regular customer. Some traders allow the farmer to
sell to other traders once the farmer has asked for permission:
"Some long distant traders come and pay more. The farmer sends a message
to me (in Techiman market) and I can say that I will buy for the same price or
they can sell it to the Accra traders" (Madam 'Ernest Senior', Brong trader,
Techiman, Interview 15).
"When Accra people come with higher prices, I inform her (the trader) but if
she does not offer me this higher price, I divert a portion to the buyers from
Accra and give her a small portion" (Agyemin Boateng, Akete farmer,
Interview 3).
Farmers may try to sell secretly, especially if the trader who gave credit is not from
the same village.
As well as selling at a lower price some traders demand some boxes of tomato in
addition:
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"Each time they harvested, the traders want to buy at a lower price ... 2-3000
below the village price ... and for every 10 boxes they take 2 as interest"
(Samuel Adjei, Tuobodum farmer, Interview 2)
There are a wide range of costs of getting credit from traders, as some traders use
credit to guarantee supplies while others use it as a way of reducing the price and
increasing their profit. Clough (1981: 277) and Watts (1987:89) describe similar
systems of advances in northern Nigeria for obtaining cheaper grain. As mentioned
earlier, the number of farmers having to repay extra and the amount the farmer loses
is hard to calculate because there is a range of prices in the village. Many traders
stated that they give to farmers to assure themselves of a good supply and did not
mention the lower prices. The survey identified 13 cases where actual figures of
interest rates could be calculated. These are still estimates as there may have been
other costs and gifts involved that were not reported. For the three month period,
the implicit rates of interest range from 6% to 220% while half of the figures
reported are in the range of 20-25% for three month§ which gives a rate of 107-
144% for one year. The range of costs for farmers and the contracts they enter into
depends on their bargaining power vis-à-vis the traders.
The extent to which this is exploitation depends on the actual cost of providing
credit to farmers and the ability of the farmers to move into other less capital
intensive crops if they want to. Calculating the cost of providing credit could not be
done in this survey. Banks reported that they were not willing to lend to small scale
agriculture because of the costs in collecting money and the risk of crop failure,
which indicates that the official rates of interest did not cover their costs.
Studies elsewhere have found that traders can trap farmers into servitude. Elmeklci
and Barker (1993:70) quote surveys in Sudan that show that 75 per cent of peasants
were indebted to shail lenders. Vercruissje (1984) refers to the Ghanaian fish traders
who keep fishermen in long term dependency by extending credit and Ouedraogo
(1983, quoted in Saul, 1987:86) gives evidence of the advanced grain sales that trap
farmers. Bhaduri (1986) refers to the term "forced commerce" when producers in
eastern India are indebted and tied to one trader, and Janakarajan (1993) gives
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similar examples from South India. The lack of resources can lead to a mechanism
where producers have to increase their wage labour and debt:
"the longer the period of wage labour, the less the possibility of working on
their own land, the lower the yield on self cultivated fields, the greater the
deficit, the greater the need to sell at harvest and buy preharvest, the greater
the need to work as wage labour, migrating seasonally if necessary" (Harriss,
1982:44, drawing on the work of Clough in northern Nigeria).
The extent of exploitation depends on how the repayment system is organised,
whether farmers are forced to take out loans, and the competition amongst buyers.
In the study area there were no cases of the quantity of tomatoes being set in
advance. This is too risky for the traders as the prices fluctuate. It is common
amongst farmers in Ghana receiving loans for maize and, as Elmeldci and Barker
(1993: 70) found in Sudan, it opens up the opportunity for exploitation:
"borrowers mortgage their cash crops to lenders in advance of harvest time.
The crop is valued at a price as low as 20 percent of the market price of the
crop at harvest time".
Farmers selling staple crops can also be forced by traders into distress sales when
the price is low rather than storing the crops until the price. However, farmers
selling perishable crops have very little choice of when they sell.
Richards (1990:275) in his comparison of coping strategies in Sierra Leone and
Nigeria questions whether hungry season loans-in-kind result in usurious interest
rates or production benefits. Taking a 'production' perspective, as opposed to the
'distribution' perspective followed by Clough (1981) and Watts (1983), he
concludes that the input-output ratio of crop production means that the producers
are better off taking the loan and it is not considered as usurious. This conclusion
may relate more to his case study area and assumes that the producers have a choice
of lenders and are not tied to one merchant.
Clark (1994:243-5) found there was little evidence of farmers becoming dependent
on distress sales and pre-harvest food purchases in Ghana. This is linked to the large
number of trader channels in the market system and the inability of the Kumasi
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market traders to manipulate relations and set up an oligopolistic system. She states
that:
"for dependency to become exploitation, asymmetries in the relation would
have to give the dominant customer the ability to control the terms of the
transaction, establishing a patron/client relationship" (Clark, 1994:239).-
However, patron-client relationships need not be exploitative. In many cases, there
are seasonal reversals in credit as farmers who had received credit from traders
earlier in the season were later giving produce on credit to their customer traders.
This is discussed in section 6.5.
5.5 Access to labour
Tomato production is a very labour intensive activity with only minimal
mechanisation: the main activities are listed in table 5.11. Most farmers rely on their
own or family labour except for the harder tasks such as clearing, ridging and
weeding. However the difficulty of the tasks means that, as some farmers grow
older, they move to other crops that need less work. Other farmers try to reduce the
labour bottlenecks by spreading the planting and have several crops in relay. Those
with physical strength can therefore reduce their costs and farm a bigger area. This
is another factor that reportedly limits the size of women's tomato farms.
Family labour is usually used for transplanting and harvesting, and those who can
call on family members to work on their land are at an advantage. The farmer will
pay something, or give a gift at the end of the season, if labourers are not part of the
immediate family. Wives and children may work on a husband's farm. The husband
usually controls the income and the wife is given a gift in kind or money. This often
leads to friction and wives setting up their own farms if they have the resources.
However, this is not possible for women from ethnic groups originating in the north
of Ghana because of cultural restrictions. In villages where there are few traders
visiting and very poor roads, such as Kokoago, the family members (especially the
women) carry the produce six kilometres to the nearest market. Older women can
rely on labour from adult sons for more demanding tasks like clearing and ridging.
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Married women can often rely on their husbands for clearing the land, especially if
some of the crop or proceeds of the sales will used for home consumption.
Table 5.11 Labour activities
Task	 Twi	 Type of . labour
word	 commonly used
burning and clearing	 acin	 hired/own
collecting debris after burning 	 apam	 hired/own
stumping/uprooting grasses 	 hired/own
making ridges
	 nknfie	 hired/own
transplanting	 own/family
watering after transplanting and in dry season 	 own/family
applying fertiliser	 own/family
re-mounding/re-ridging around each plant 	 mmongho hired/own
weeding (not necessary if re-mounding done) 	 adD	 own/family
applying chemicals	 men use own and
women use sons
harvesting	 own/family/hired
carrying harvest	 own/family, hired
when full crates
Cooperative nnoboa labour arrangements are still very common amongst both male
and female vegetable farmers and have been widely reported in the anthropological
literature covering West Africa (Arhin, 1983:472; Saul, 1983; Richards, 1986:70).
Some studies found it to be declining as farming becomes more commercialised and
farmers rely more on wage labour (Dei, 1992:110; Patten and Nukunya, 1982:72;
Swindell, 1985:145).
In these arrangements, a group of two to ten farmers work on each others' farms in
rotation. It is mainly used for the more demanding tasks such as clearing and
ridging. When these groups function well more work gets done, people work harder
and they enjoy the company. The owner of the farm is often responsible for
providing drinks and, occasionally, food. Many farmers do not use nnoboa as there
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is a risk that members will leave the group or not work so hard once the work is
done on their own farm. This is avoided by selecting members of the group who are
known and trusted already:
"Before we form a group, we look at how best you can work and how best
you can be with the group; we know who cheats" (Ibrahim Mallam, Akete
farmer, Interview 25).
It is easy to monitor each others' cooperation and put pressure on those who are not
willing to turn up for work. There is also a risk that some may not work as hard as
others although other members can monitor them at work and such individuals
would be forced out of the group. Groups are single sex and made up of people with
the same ability although there was one report of a mixed ability group with those
who were not so strong included in a group as a form of assistance to them.
The 'strangers' from the north of Ghana will work together with people from their
own tribe or other Muslims, and commonly refer to the bonds of "brotherly love"
(nnuadD). Other nnoboa were found among members of the same church. These
groups work as they are flexible and they are preferred to joint farms as one farmer
commented:
"Though we are a nnoboa group, we can't use that to make a group farm
because we have different financial strength, different needs and different agendas"
(Kofi Mensah, Tanoso farmer, Interview 23).
Hired labour is used for the more demanding tasks and when the farmer has other
farms needing attention at the same time. The labourers are usually men and many
are migrants from the north of Ghana. There is a long history of hiring migrant
labour in the study area. It was present in the pre-colonial period although closely
linked to slavery. It increased rapidly with the expansion of cocoa in the 1920s
(Berry, 1993: 139). Some of the migrant labourers are permanently resident, while
others come for a short period and do not have any farms of their own. Local people
will also do labouring, especially when they are in need of money to buy chemicals
for their tomato farms. In smaller settlements away from the main villages, the
tomato farmers find it harder to get labourers as all the residents in the settlement
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are farmers themselves. There are also reports of scarcity in other areas with prices
of labour rising (Afikorah-Danquah, 1998; Amanor, 1993).
Two forms of hiring contract are found. Firstly there is the "by-day" system where
labourers are taken on for a day's work, either a "single" or "double" day depending
on the length of time. The farmer will have to provide some food or give money for
them to buy food themselves. The labourers are paid in cash although, at harvest
time, this may be replaced or supplemented with tomatoes that the harvesters can
sell. The second form of hiring is the "contract", where the farmer and labourers
will negotiate a price for the work to be done. This was found to be more common
for clearing and ridging in the bigger farms. This is popular with farmers as it
requires less supervision. Some of the money can be paid in advance and the rest on
completion. The work is done by groups of young migrant men, often working in
cooperative groups that are a continuation of nnoboa.
Farmers can delay payment to the labourers if they do not have money. The length
of the delay ranges from a few days to the end of harvest. Although this is not
widespread, it is an important way that farmers can reduce the need for capital
during the farming season. Most labourers will not accept this since they are usually
the poorer members of the community and need the money for immediate
investment or consumption. However, they are able to charge extra when accepting
late payment:
"I hired labourers who worked on contract for clearing and ridges. The
ridges cost C150,000 but I was not having much money to settle everything so I
paid C20,000 and the rest paid at the beginning of harvest 	  i f I had paid ready
cash they would have charged less, about C110,000" (David Nsiah, Derma farmer,
Interview 23).
The extra amount charged by the labourers in this case amounts to 36% over three
months. (This has to be considered in the context of annual inflation of over 40%
p.a.). There were no cases of farmers writing down what is owed, so the repayment
of the debt is based on trust. In the case cited above the farmer stated that the
labourers were well known and "close to me". In other cases the farmers can get
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help from labourers when the labourers live in the same house. Other forms of
payment after harvest occur when young women or men work on one farm for a
season and are paid a fixed amount or a share of the harvest at the end. This can be
done with family members or well known people.
5.6 Access to inputs
A large proportion of the costs in tomato production come from inputs such as
agro-chemicals, seeds, tractor services, agro-chemical spray machines and water
pumps. Estimations from farmers' budgets put these at approximately 55% of
variable costs. This section looks in detail at the financing of agro-chemical
purchases by dealers. With the large amount of competition between sellers of
inputs, the building of customer relations with farmers is a vital part of a successful
business. Farmers also spend time building up these relations so that they can use
them in the future to get credit, if they need it, and also to get better advice and the
best quality chemicals.
5.6.1 Agro-chemical supplies to farmers on credit
The number of farmers in the survey that receive agricultural inputs on credit, and
the total amount given is shown in tables 5.12 and 5.13. The average agro-chemical
seller is giving goods on credit totalling C1,236,000 at one time. With an estimated
92 sellers in the 4 study districts, this makes a total amount of credit from chemical
dealers at approximately C113,700,000 million at any one time. As one of the only
sources of finance for the farmers, this is very important for the production of
tomatoes in the area.
129
01-6.7%
19.0%
28.6%
9.5%
14.3%
4.8%
7.1%
60.0%
40.0%
0
23.5%
23.5%
23.5%
17.6%
11.8%
37.5%
25.0%
o
o
o
o
37.5%
8.3%
o
66.7%
0
25.0%
o
o
o
1-10
11-30
31-50
51-100
100+
Don't
Know
Table 5.12 Number of farmers receiving credit from each chemical dealer.
Number of Village	 Small towns Sunyani	 Kumasi
	
Total
farmer
customers
	 12 interviews 17 interviews 5 interviews 8 interviews 42 interviews
per dealer
Average	 14.7
	
62.3	 1.4
	
2.8
	
32.2
number of
farmer
customers
Table 5. 13 Amount of credit given by chemical dealers selling to farmers
Amount	 Village	 Small town Sunyani
	
Kumasi
	
Total
given -`000's dealers	 dealers	 dealers	 dealers
of Cedis	 12 interviews 17 interviews 5 interviews 8 interviews 42 interviews
0 8.3% 0 60.0% 37.5% 16.7%
1-200 16.7% 11.8% 0 0 9.5%
201-500 8.3% 35.3% 20.0% 0 19.0%
501-1,000 25.0% 17.6% 20.0% 12.5% 19.0%
1,001-1,500 8.3% 5.9% 0 0 4.8%
1,5001+ 25.0% 11.8% 0 0 11.9%
Don't know/ 8.3% 17.6% 0 50.0% 19.0%
Unwilling to
answer
Average C977,000 C2,104,000 C250,000 C150,000 C1,236,000
When credit is given, the amount, date and the name of farmer is recorded in a note
book by the seller. For this reason the shop owners make sure that their workers are
literate. No cases of signed contracts were found and there were cases of conflict
with both sellers and farmers claiming the other party were cheating.
Not all input dealers are keen to give credit as it comes with risks of default,
especially given the nature of tomato production. The risks come from the
dramatically changing prices, the uncertain market and the possibility of crop failure
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because of pest damage, shortage or excess of rainfall and too much sun. When
credit has been given, the ago-chemical dealers have to accept that farmers may not
be able to pay back if there is a crop or market failure and they cannot force
payment in such circumstances:
"I no more do it like I used to do it at first because it sent me into a hard
situation. They did tomatoes on a very large scale but they could not get a
market. So every farmers' tomatoes got rotten in the bush and as a result all
my money got stuck" (Mallam Abu, Agro-chemical dealer, Tanoso and
Techiman, Interview 3).
To give credit to farmers also requires a certain amount of trading capital (dwetire)
so that the business is not restricted by shortages of capital to buy chemicals. Those
enterprises that are not able to get credit from their suppliers tend to have greater
restrictions. Even those who have credit are put under pressure from their suppliers
not to give credit to farmers as it may delay repayment. This can become a problem,
as credit to farmers is usually for the farming season of up to three months, while
credit from their suppliers is for a few days or up to 2 weeks and rarely any more.
Some of the larger suppliers will examine the stock of the sellers to check that they
have not given too much out on credit and the sellers will try to ensure that they can
repay the "deposit" to the supplier.
As input sellers are part of the community in which they sell, they often have a
moral obligation to help other farmers, especially if they are close friends or family
and those farmers that are referred to as 'real customers':
"All trade in the village is based on credit. You have to have the same mercy
on others .... I was getting inputs on credit before I had my shop ... so it is
good not to keep too much in the shop or else it is very hard not to give on
credit" (Adusi Mensa, Susu collector and previously an agro-chemical dealer,
Derma, Interview 30)
"When my customer comes and says he is in hardship then I have to help him.
If I don't help him he will force me, beg me - other than that his yield will fail.
He is a customer so he comes to you with money or without" (Opoku Barnie,
Bansco Trading Ent., Wenchi, Interview 12)
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Friends and family demand credit and often the sellers are unable to refuse.
Therefore, those farmers with no chemical shop in their village are at a
disadvantage. The migrant farmers are also at a disadvantage:
"Chemical sellers usually give credit to people who have something .and also
to regular customers and others near them or siblings. If I also had a
northerner with a chemical shop, he could give credit to me because it is
between brothers" (Seidu Kotoko, Derma farmer, Interview 38).
The ability to give credit depends on the ability to ensure that you are repaid and a
knowledge of which farmers are creditworthy. It therefore helps if the dealer lives
in the producing village or nearby and knows the farmers in the area.
The proportion of farmers obtaining credit from agro-chemical dealers is shown in
the table 5.14. The survey of fanners found that 27% were taking goods on credit
and this covered an average of 55% of their total agro-chemical costs. The number
of farmers benefiting was found to be lower in certain villages where there is less
production and fewer chemical shops. Equal numbers of men and women are
benefiting. The data is for tomato producers, but agro-chemical dealers also provide
some credit for garden egg and okra farmers as well as maize and cowpea sued
growers, although the number of these farmers benefiting from these is very small.
They avoid giving credit for maize production as it takes longer to get their money
back.
Before giving credit, the agro-chemical dealers have to be confident that they will
get their money back. They prefer those who have been tomato farming for a long
time as they are known to be good farmers and are likely to continue growing, even
if they fail one season. Sellers prefer to give to those with other crops to sell, or
other income sources, so that they can be paid if the tomato crop fails. Government
workers who are also part-time farmers have better access to credit as they have a
guaranteed income at the end of the month, so there is less risk for the input seller
and the repayment period is shorter.
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Table 5.14 Farmers obtaining agro-chemicals on credit
Number
interviewed
Percentage of
farmers receiving
agro-chemicals on
credit
Proportion of agro-
chemical costs met
by credit	 .
(Data only from those
farmers obtaining inputs
on credit)
Men 113 26.5% 54.1%
Women 46 28.3% 56.4%
Total 159 27.0% 54.8%
Estimated size of farm
in acres
Below 0.5 23 8.7% 71.8%
0.5 52 19.2% 54.1%
0.6-1.4 42 33.3% 46.0%
1.5-2 18 38.9% 81.2%
More than 2 8 12.5% 17.6%
Don't know 16 56.3% 62.1%
Total 159 27.0% 54.8%
Total amount spent on
chemicals (000s Cedis)
0-50 38 28.9% 68.1%
51-100 55 27.3% 49.7%
101-250 37 35.1% 46.2%
251+ 12 33.3% 62.8%
Don't know/
unwilling to answer
17 0% 0%
Total 159 27.0% 54.8%
Tano Boase 20 40.0% 75.6%
Pamdu 20 15.0% 59.7%
Techimentia 40 30.0% 46.1%
Tanoso 28 39.3% 60.9%
Akete 27 14.8% 38.2%
Kokoago 24 20.8% 35.3%
Total 159 27.0% 54.8%
Some farmers do not want to build up customer relations. They prefer to shop
around for the cheapest price and do not ask for credit. They also complain that the
sellers keep changing or they are not in the shop when they visit, so there is no point
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investing in building up customer relations. Finally, there are some farmers,
especially non-indigenous ones, who do not want to be in debt.
" I don't take a loan or buy any chemicals on credit because I am a stranger
and afraid of owing someone" (Akua Mawa, Derma woman farmer originally
from the Volta Region, Interview 33).
" I
 don't get credit .... Strangers fear to be in debt and do not want to get
themselves in court cases" (Sumaila Isiak, Kusasi farmer in Derma, Interview
28).
The length of time that the goods are given on credit is agreed at the start of the
arrangement. There is some flexibility regarding at what point in the harvest the
money is paid, with many waiting until the third harvest, and others paying after the
final harvest. Farmers can pay in instalments with a small part of each harvest's
sales. Government workers are expected to pay at the end of the month when
salaries arrive. If sellers need money, they can ask the farmer to repay sooner by
selling other crops or doing other work.
If the crop fails, the seller will usually give some more time to pay. They will ask
the farmer to repay using other income or give the farmer more inputs to farm the
next season and pay for both lots of chemicals from that harvest. Details of the
default rate are not available. The sellers can give details of unpaid bills for the past
few years but these are a small fraction of the credit they give out at one time.
However, some sellers have suffered much more than others and the quantities lost
can be a large proportion of their capital. These enterprises have reduced the amount
that they give on credit or caused them to stop giving credit completely. However,
the survival of these enterprises over many years indicates that the customer
relationships allow for successful businesses.
The main purpose of customer relations and credit is to get more business rather
than make money through charging higher prices:
"At the beginning of the season most chemical shops are empty because they
have given on credit. But those are the same customers who come when they
have money .... If you don't give credit you will loose customers because there
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are so many sellers" (Adusi Mensa, Susu collector and previously an agro-
chemical dealer, Derma, Interview 30).
Through charging higher prices, the agro-chemical sellers have less chance of being
repaid as the farmers will move to another customer. They are also constrained by
knowing their customers as friends and have moral obligations to help fellow
villagers. The wide range of prices found in each village shows that there are few
fixed prices, so evidence of being charged extra is hard to ascertain. Furthermore, in
many cases farmers reported that the input sellers reduce the price, even when
selling on credit, as they are 'customers'. When there is an extra amount charged, it
can be negotiated and may depend on the length of time for which the credit is
given and the relationship of the seller and their customer:
"Whenever I give credit to new customers, I add an extra amount to it so that
if he is unable to pay all, I would not loose much. I add because I don't know
how best he can pay. For old customers I do not add any extra for they even
direct others to come and buy from me. "(Kofi Kyei, Agro-chemical dealer,
Techiman, Interview 16).
During the survey 11 cases of sellers charging extra for periods between two and
four months were documented. The annual interest rates can be calculated and these
range between 11% and 85%.
Agro-chemical dealers need to build up knowledge of their customers in order to be
confident of payment of goods given on credit. By living in the same community as
the farmers, they are able to build up the customer links and they already have
knowledge of the individuals asking for credit:
"We all live in the same town and he (the seller) knows my character. He will
be monitoring you as you move up and down" (Paul Fosu, Tanoso fanner,
Interview 6).
They will also know where the farmers stay which is vital information when they
want to collect any late payments. Some sellers make a point of going to the
farmer's house before giving goods on credit. By staying in the village they can also
see that the farmer works hard at the farm and can even visit the farm. Many
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farmers also save money with sellers until they need to buy the necessary inputs for
their farms. This also allows trust to build up between seller and farmer.
The sellers like to study the farmers for some time. The farmers are tested with
credit to see if they keep to the agreement and then the amount given on- credit is
increased over time. When sellers start their business, they have to take more risks
as they do not know who will repay:
"In the beginning I started with 20 then I selected 10. The others did not co-
operate so I left them alone" (Adu Sarfo, "Farmers' Clinic", Wenchi,
Interview 11).
"I try them with a small amount of credit to see how they are. If they bring
money back, then I know for such people when given a bigger amount of
credit, they will repay. The more a customer repays credit, the more I
increase the amount of credit" (Samuel Yeboah, Agro-chemical dealer,
Techiman, Interview 20).
As in cases of receiving credit from traders, farmers can also use certain people as
agyinamu. This can be translated literally as someone who stands in, but it refers to
witnesses, guarantors or intermediaries. These are people known to both parties and
can be other farmers, traders, agricultural officers or other villagers. Firstly, they can
they play the role of guaranteeing or testifying (di adanses) about the character of
the new customer:
"I know they will pay because they come with friends who are already my
customers. So once I trust my customer, I help his friend too. Some bring
someone I respect to speak on their behalf and so I help them also" (Sam
Bawah, Agro-chemical dealer, Techiman, Interview 13).
Secondly, the agreement can be set up so that the intermediary takes responsibility
for ensuring the goods are paid for later. As shown in section 5.4.2, two tomato
traders reported that they had taken farmers to the agro-chemical sellers for credit
and offered to pay if the farmer defaulted. In return, the farmers promised to sell the
tomatoes to them. Witnesses are also used to back up verbal agreements. The
witnesses will be called on in case there is any dispute at a later stage.
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Some sellers demand a form of collateral such as a bicycle, tape player, fan,
television or a piece of cloth. However, such goods are hard to sell for a good price
when the farmer defaults and the agro-chemical seller can be accused by the farmer
of damaging the items while storing them.
A further financial service that sellers offer to farmers is a saving facility. The
extent of this is shown in tables 5.15 and 5.16. Farmers are restricted in where they
can save as the formal banking sector may not be easily accessible, it can be
difficult to withdraw money when it is needed, and there is a lack of confidence in
some of the rural banks.
Those saving tend to be mainly younger men and they deposit money from a
previous harvest, farm labouring or from other non-agricultural income sources so
that the money is not used for other purposes. One agro-chemical dealer explained:
"The reason is that we, the men, are not able to keep money in our pockets for
long and it may happen that the tomato he is going to cultivate that particular
year is very big. So he will bring me the money so that when the time reaches,
he will use it for his work. That is why the youth save more than the elderly."
(Philip Osei Bonso, Onyame Tumiso (God is Great) Tomato Chemicals,
Tanoso, Interview 1).
Table 5.15 Number of farmers saving with agro-chemical dealers.
Number of farmers Village dealers Small town
dealers
Sunyani
dealers
Kumasi
dealers
Total
12 interviews 17 interviews 5 interviews 8 interviews 42 interviews
0 8.3% 11.8% 0 37.5% 14.3%
1-5 33.3% 41.2% 0 0 23.8%
6-20 25.0% 11.8% 60.0% 0 21.4%
21+ 8.3% 0 0 0 2.4%
Don't Know/
unwilling to answer
25.0% 35.3% 40.0% 62.5% 38.1%
Average number of
farmers per dealer
13.8 5.5 11.0 6.0
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Table 5.16 Amount saved with agro-chemical dealers
Amount
saved
'000's of
Cedis
Village dealers
12 interviews
Small town
dealers
17 interviews
Sunyani
dealers
5 interviews
Kumasi dealers
8 interviews
Total
42 interviews
0 8.3% 11.8% 0 37.5% 14.3%
1-100 8.3% 11.8% 40.0% 0 11.9%
101-200 0 17.6% 20.0% 0 7.1%
201-300 16.7% 11.8% 0 0 9.5%
301+ 41.7% 5.9% 0 0 14.3%
Don't know/
unwilling	 to
answer
25.0% 41.2% 40.0% 62.5% 40.5%
Average 461,000 168,000 133,000 249,000
Furthermore, through saving with agro-chemical sellers, farmers can build up a
better relationship and may get more on credit in the future:
"About 10 to 20 customers could deposit a total of C100,000 to C200,000 for
one month or even less. When they come they take [on credit] goods worth
C500,000" (Samuel Yeboah, Agro-chemical dealer, Techiman, Interview
20).
"During the harvest, a farmer can say 'I do not want to chop this money',
and so a farmer can come and deposit about C300,000 	 For such a person
when he works along the season and runs out, I help him. This money helps
me a lot and so I think about such people especially when they run .short."
(1.K., Agrochemical dealer, Tanoso, Interview 2)
Saving also allows the farmers to have a guaranteed supply of specific chemicals if
there is a shortage. This is seen as a form of deposit or as part payment for the
chemicals to be received later. If the prices rise between depositing and the
collection date, then the seller can decide to give to the farmer at the earlier price, if
they have deposited a large enough amount. Most of the sellers used the money
deposited for their own trading, often without the farmers' knowledge. However
one seller had an agreement whereby she gave goods on credit worth C300,000 to
four farmers and they give her a loan of C500,000 after paying her back for the
credit.
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Money is usually deposited for about one month, although it can be left for longer.
Deposits are made in lump sums after a harvest, weekly or daily. It is possible for
farmers to withdraw the money if they have a sudden need. The amount loaned is
recorded by the sellers in a small notebook and the farmers have trust in them as
they are well known and they have the built shops so they are unlikely to run away.
The number of farmers saving, and the amount saved, is higher in village stores than
town shops. This suggests that physical proximity of farmers to the agro-chemical
shops is important.
5.6.2 Agro-chemical sellers buying on credit
The ability of the agro-chemical retailers to finance agriculture and build up their
own businesses is based on their ability to obtain goods on credit from the
wholesalers. The length of time allowed for repayment ranges from a few days to
two weeks. The goods received on credit are not passed onto the farmers on credit
as the retailers would not be able to collect payment until the end of the harvest.
However, it allows retailers to use their own capital to give on credit to farmers,
while relying on credit from wholesalers to keep the business going. The proportion
of sellers getting credit and the total amount given at one time is shown in tabh,
5.17. The proportion of sellers receiving credit is higher in the towns than the
villages because of the larger scale of operations and their closer links with
wholesalers.
Table 5.17 Retailers obtaining credit from agro-chemical wholesalers
Village	 Small town	 Sunyani	 Kumasi	 Total
dealers	 dealers	 dealers	 dealers
17 interviews	 5 interviews	 42 interviews
12 interviews	 8 interviews 
Yes	 58.3%	 76.4%	 80.0%	 62.5%	 69.0%
No	 41.7%	 17.6%	 20.0%	 37.5%	 28.6%
Don't Know/	 0	 5.9%	 0	 0	 2.4%
unwilling to
answer
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Table 5.18 Amount bought on credit
Millions of Cedis Village
dealers
12 interviews
Small town
dealers
17 interviews
Sunyani
dealers
5 interviews
Kumasi
dealers
8 interviews
Total
42 interviews
0 41.7% 17.6% 20.0% 37.5% 28.6%
Less than 0.2 8.3% 17.6% 0 0 9.5%
0.21-0.5 0 11.8% 20.0% 0 7.1%-
0.51-1.0 8.3% 0 40.0% 12.5% 9.5%
1.01-2.0 16.7% 0 0 0 2.4%
2.01-5.0 8.3% 0 0 12.5% 2.4%
5.01+ 8.3% 23.5% 0 37.5% 19.0%
Don't	 know/
unwilling	 to
answer
8.3% 29.4% 20.0% 0 16.7%
Average 1,200,000 10,600,000 4,800,000 3,200,000 4,500,000
The retailers will usually pay part of the cost in cash and take the rest on credit.
Repayments are made when the goods are sold or on the next visit to the market.
The period of time depends on the season and the demand for chemicals in the
locality of the retailing shop. Wholesalers reported that they were unwilling to lend
to smaller enterprises as they could be slow to pay. When a retailer has failed to pay
on time, the wholesaler can come and claim back the unsold goods. Therefore, the
wholesalers giving credit to retailers try to insist that the goods given are not passed
onto the farmers on credit. The bigger wholesale companies send 'auditors' around
to their customers to check their stocks to ensure this does not happen.
The prices of agro-chemicals purchased on credit were reported to be the same as
paying cash, as the wholesalers wished to keep their customers. There were only
two cases where the retailers said they had to pay extra. In one case the buyer had
to pay an extra C500 on each bag of fertiliser when getting credit for 3 weeks (3%
extra); in the other case, the retailer had credit for a week and had to pay 4% extra.
However, prices vary between wholesalers, so a retailer may buy from a more
expensive wholesaler because of the credit. Data on the extra costs from customers
giving credit is not easily available.
The ability of the retailer to obtain credit depends on their links to the wholesaler.
They will, therefore, invest time in getting to know the store keeper and the staff so
that they can collect goods on credit any time. The wholesalers often visit the
retailers to see how they manage their shop and to know where they live and work.
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Knowing the location of a customer's house is important for the collection of
money and to reduce the risk of default. The wholesalers also test the retailers, in a
similar way to the retailers testing the farmers, to see who is trustworthy. In two
cases the retailers referred to the people who supply them on credit as their
"manager" or "boss" although the businesses were entirely separate. This reflects
the power that wholesalers can exert over the retailers in such situations.
Friendships with key people are also important in getting access to credit and some
will go to great lengths to build up these links. In one case a small agro-chemical
seller in a village found out that he was from the same church as his supplier in
Kumasi and so invited him to the village to attend church, and meet the church and
family elders so that they would "know everything between us". This was a way of
ensuring the contract would not be broken.
Three of the larger companies, Wienco, FASCOM and Chemico, were found to be
making more formal contracts. The agro-chemical sellers in this case become agents
for them. This requires retailers to sign legal documents and auditors will visit
regularly. Some demand that retailers provide a building as collateral.
5.6.3 Seed supplies
A survey of 33 tomato farmers 7 found that 15% of tomato growers had obtained
seed from off-farm sources for the present or most recent season (see table 5.19).
None of the farmers interviewed replaced seed on a regular basis. Farmers may have
to get seed from sources other than their own when starting a crop or variety for the
first time or after a short break in farming. Other reasons for not using their own
seed include varietal deterioration, the failure of the last season's harvest, or a failed
nursery.
7 This survey was carried out in 1996 and the data used here is part of a larger survey
that also looked at garden eggs and tomato farmers growing for consumption and local
markets (Lyon, 1997b).
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Table 5.19 Use of own seed for present or most recent farm
Men	 Women	 Tano	 Wenchi	 Total
District	 District
22 interviewed 11 interviewed 13 interviewed 20 interviewed 33 interviewed
% of farmers
obtaining seed
off farm
% of farmers
extracting
their own seed
9.1% 27.3% 7.7% 20.0% 152%
90.9% 72.7% 92.3% 80.0% 84.8%
There are also many farmers who prefer to have seedlings that have been nursed by
others. This can save them time and effort, and allows them to start their rainy
season farms by using seedlings that have been irrigated during the period of
uncertain early rains. Many farmers find that irrigated nurseries are time consuming,
especially if the water source is far from their house. Some farmers, usually older
women, can specialise in growing seedlings to be bought by tomato farmers. These
women have developed the knowledge and reputation through growing tomatoes
themselves, but do not have the strength to do large scale farming in their old age.
The extent of buying seedlings from specialists, and the importance of this as a
source of income, is not known.
Other farmers mentioned that they get some new seed when they see another farm
with good quality crops. In such cases they are taking a more pro-active approach to
improving their seed stock, rather than a reactive approach to an immediate
problem. In many cases they mix the newly acquired seed with the seed from the
previous year's crop, as they do not want to loose the genetic stock that they have
developed over several years.
Farmers prefer to source seed locally, so that they have some guarantee that they
obtain the variety they want (see table 5.20 and 5.21). The most common source is
local farmers, although women are more reliant than men on family members. To
obtain quality seed, farmers may rely on 'neighbour certification', where farmers
know the person providing the seed or visit their farm. However, this needs to be
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seen in the context of the access farmers have to other farms, which can be limited
amongst those who do not farm near other vegetable farmers. Irrigated farms are
grouped around water sources and are more accessible to other farmers.
Table 5.20 Sources of seed of new varieties
Source Men
22 interviewed
Women
11 interviewed
Tano
District
13 interviewed
Wenchi
District
20 interviewed
Total
33 interviewed
Family 18.2% 36.4% 23.1% 25.0% 24.2%
Local farmer-
not family
40.9% 27.3% 30.8% 40.0% 36.4%
Farmer out-
side village
18.2% 9.1% 23.1% 10.0% 15.2%
Vegetable
trader
4.5% 18.2% 0 15.0% 9.1%
Chemical
dealer
4.5% 0 7.7% 0 3.0%
Agricultural
extensionist
9.1% 9.1% 7.7% 10.0% 9.1%
Other 4.5% 0 7.7% 0 3.0%
Table 5.21 Distance to seed source
Men
22
interviewed
Women
11
interviewed
Tano
District
13
interviewed
Wenchi
District
20
interviewed
Total
33
interviewed
Same Village 59.1% 54.5% 61.5% 55.0% 57.6%
0-5 km 9.1% 9.1% 7.7% 10.0% 9.1%
6-20 km 22.7% 36.4% 30.8% 25.0% 27.3%
More than 21Icm 9.1% 0 0 10.0% 6.1%
Average Km 9.4 km 4.4 km 4.2 km 10.0 km 7.7 km
In some areas there is a reluctance to visit other farmers' farms as future crop
failures on that farm can be attributed to 'juju' or a curse left by the visitor.
Interviewees were unwilling to say whether or not they believed this, but were
clearly concerned about the effect that an accusation could have on their reputation
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within the village. There were reported cases of successful farmers who actually
gave up vegetable cultivation because they had experienced a series of failures
attributed to 'juju' or a curse placed on them by someone who was jealous of their
success.
Labouring on other people's farms allows farmers access to new seed and several
farmers reported that they got new varieties after taking left-over seedlings or
unsold harvested fruit from farmers who had hired them as labour. There is more
openness among the younger men, many of whom join together into co-operative
work groups (nnoboa).
In each village there appear to be certain individuals who are renowned for their
vegetable production. These individuals are usually middle aged, male farmers who
have been growing the crop for longer periods and have bigger farms. They are
often referred to as 'chief farmer' or a subject specialist for a certain crop. They also
appear to be those with the best links to the urban based traders, as they develop
customer relationships using the large quantity harvested to increase their
bargaining power. This means that they are the first farmers to try new varieties
bought by the traders. There are certain villages, such as Techire and Akumadan,
that are renowned for the quality of the crop and farmers will travel long distances
to get seed from there. However, seed production was not reported to represent an
important form of income generation by any respondent.
More men than women obtained seed from farmers outside the village. The seed
that comes from further away is often in the form of gifts from visiting relatives or
from friends or family who travel to a distant place. Teachers and other government
workers, who are also farmers, play a key role as they may have links with more
distant towns. Links are also developed with distant areas through marriage or
migration to those areas. Several cases were reported of seed being brought back
after attending a funeral of a relative or a friends' family member.
As mentioned above, traders play a key role in the provision of seed and were cited
by three of the respondents as the original source of seed. Traders are important
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actors in the dissemination of new varieties as they provide new preferred varieties
to farmers. They rely on farmers to distribute the seed to other farmers in the
locality.
Agro-chemical dealers are the main outlet for the distribution of 'commercial
produced' vegetable seed, although this was cited by only one of the respondents as
their original source of seed. Most vegetable seed sold by agro-chemical dealers is
of non-certified origin imported from Denmark, Netherlands or the United States.
Three farmers said that they had got seed from `agric'. This refers to agricultural
extensionists, or front line staff, as well as anyone else working for the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture or research institutes. This is not part of the extensionists'
function but they can sell seed to farmers as a way of making some money. The
extensionists usually buy seed from a seed dealer when they visit the main towns
and so provide a useful service to farmers who are not able to go there themselves.
They mainly buy imported tomato seed. One farmer who used this source stated that
he wanted a new variety and asked the extension agent as he would be sure to get
the right variety.
In the Wenchi area, several farmers reported getting seed from the Tomocan tomato
processing factory before its closure in 1989. People who were employed there and
who are now farmers themselves, are still known to be good sources of seed. There
are also vegetable seed traders who do not sell other inputs and do not have a shop
to sell from. These traders may sell seeds of all crops that are grown widely. An
example of this is Mame Fridge who sells tomato, garden egg and okra seed in
Kumasi Central Market at the main tomato wholesale yard. She grows pure 'power'
and mixed `yokohama' tomato seed on her own farm, where she carefully selects
the good fruit for seed. She pays attention to quality as she wants to • build up a
reputation.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there is a wide range of contracts and institutional forms
that allow farmers to get access to land, finance, labour and inputs. Very few of these
are based on any written agreement. They are based on varying social relations,
including the nuclear family, abusua or extended family, village level networks and
long distant networks with traders, input sellers or bank managers. It is interesting to
note the lack of cooperative activities involving more than bilateral agreements,
except for the small amount of cooperative nnoboa labour systems. An understanding
of the nature of the existing contracts requires an exploration into concepts of trust
and into how these agreements are shaped by bargaining power. These issues are
explored in later chapters.
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Chapter 6 Social relations and institutional aspects of the vegetable marketing
system in rural areas
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the institutional aspects of the production system and
described the range of contracts that are used by farmers. This chapter will continue
the analysis by describing the wide range of contracts and institutional forms between
farmers and traders and among traders. Three key resources are selected for detailed
study: transport, credit and information. In addition, this chapter explores the
institutions of buying and selling including the customer relationships, bargaining
processes by individuals and groups and shifting bargaining power. As shown in the
discussion of the production system, there are a range of networks that the farmers
and traders can draw on. These vary from the strong and close networks based on
kinship to the weaker long distant networks between farmers and traders in urban
markets. An analysis of these institutions and different actors' behaviour in the
market can be understood in terms of the social relations that underpin the marketing
system as well as reactions to price changes and transaction costs.
6.2 Institutional aspects of the transport system
Farmers and traders can transport tomatoes by teadloading', local taxis or larger
trucks from urban areas. Tomatoes harvested in the morning or afternoon one day
will be in the market by the next morning and most will have been sold to consumers
by that evening. An efficient transport system has developed around the perishability
constraints and allows the traders to travel over very long distances. For farmers, the
decision to produce perishable crops, such as tomatoes, on a commercial scale for
urban markets is closely linked to guaranteed access to transport.
The areas that can guarantee a steady stream of traders with transport are those with a
reputation for growing produce. These areas have more production and so the traders
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have some guarantee that they can fill their trucks in a short time. Farmers from less
well known villages have to convince traders that there is enough to buy in that
locality. This supports the findings of previous surveys on transport costs and
agricultural development, that accessibility (seen in terms of transport cost) cannot
explain the proportion of farmers selling food crops in rural areas of Ashanti Region
(Hine et al, 1983). The importance of access tracks was noted in the 1930s with the
expansion of cocoa to areas that were linked by tracks officially regarded as not
motorable (Dickson, 1969: 329).
Farmers are responsible for `headloading' produce to the roadside, if the trucks
cannot get access to the farms. In one of the survey villages, Kokuago, the traders
often refuse to visit because of the very poor quality of the tracks. The path to the
village is simply a clearing made through the bush by the villagers and in the rainy
season it becomes impassable. Farmers wanting to sell in the town of Wenchi, seven
to eight km away, rely on women to carry the produce there. In a few cases farmers
reported that they used tractors to transport produce from the farms to the road head.
This was more common for vegetable other than tomatoes such as garden eggs (small
aubergines).
Brong men, the largest group of growers, are rarely seen carrying any produce
because of the customary gender division of labour. Farmers rely on female family
members or hire male 'strangers' who have come to the area from the north of Ghana
for labouring. The women will put the tomatoes into bowls (estimated weight 15 kg)
while hired men will carry the crates of tomatoes weighing 75-85 kg, although for
shorter distances than the women. The hired men are paid according how many crates
they carry. It is possible for them to make a sizeable sum of money compared to other
tasks as they are paid approximately one quarter of a daily salary for each crate
carried.
In a large majority of cases, the female traders are responsible for supplying the
transport to urban markets. Traders will hire transport from the producing area or
from the markets. Farmers rarely hire trucks. This is partly due to the restrictions on
farmers selling in markets, and also due to the small scale of enterprises and the lack
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of cooperation between farmers. The rented vehicles tend to be small trucks, usually
'Benz buses' that can carry 60 crates or a total weight of tomatoes of 4.2 tonnes.
Smaller trucks are replacing the older '7 ton' trucks that could carry 100 boxes.
Larger hired vehicles are usually shared between traders.
None of the traders interviewed had their own transport and, as in other areas of
Ghana, trade and transport are separated (Gore, 1978: 169). Vehicles are owned by
individuals, usually based in urban areas, who may hire drivers or drive themselves.
Drivers are responsible for finding business and pay the owner the profit on a daily or
weekly basis. As Guyer (1997: 90) found in Ibadan, Nigeria, drivers have an
incentive to overload and work long hours. Those who travel long distances to the
producing areas, drive through the night and return the next night. There was no
reported use of railways as they are too slow and unreliable. Traders going to local
markets will use any vehicle available, including passenger cars and minibuses. They
tend to buy smaller quantities and so may not hire a whole vehicle for the trip.
Access to vehicles has improved dramatically over the last 10 years. In the early
1980s obtaining access to transport was a major constraint for traders and success in
marketing depended on having connections and influence over vehicle drivers and
owners (Clark, 1994). Similarly, Davis (1973: 202) found that "the commercial
position of the Chinese wholesale grocers in Baguio City is enhanced by factions in
the local transport network. Local Chinese wholesale grocers share, with other
Chinese, access to superior specialised transport". Saul (1987:79) in his study of
grain markets in Burkina Faso writes that one trader who owned the means of
transportation had additional power over the other traders as he could threaten to
withdraw this service. Guyer (1987: 46) also refers to the traditional control of
transport in Cote d'Ivoire.
Access to vehicles was not reported to be a major problem for itinerant traders in the
survey areas although, in August 1996, the itinerant traders in Kumasi stated that
there was a shortage of vehicles as the drivers preferred to work with the yam traders
who were bringing in the newly harvested yams. Traders buying from areas with very
poor roads may find it difficult to get urban based trucks to go there especially in the
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rainy season. The drivers may charge higher prices because of the potential damage to
their vehicle and because they have greater bargaining power. The traders will pass
the costs onto farmers by reducing the price they pay for the produce.
The quality of the vehicles and roads is often very poor which is an added .risk . to the
traders in terms of accidents and delays. A delay of a few hours can mean selling later
in the market and getting a lower price. In the worst instance the produce may not
reach the market and the trader can loose all her capital. If the vehicle breaks down
then the driver is paid up to that point and traders have to get another vehicle for the
rest of the trip. The driver is obliged to help them find transport locally, although they
often have to go back to Kumasi.
Drivers and transport owners do not bear the cost of any losses and most drivers will
charge the full amount per crate, even if the trader has to return to the market with
empty boxes as the farmgate price was too high. Some traders have built up close
working relationships with certain drivers and use the same truck each time. Drivers
can be more lenient when the trader makes a loss by only charging the fuel costs or
reducing the price he charges for each crate. They can also act as guarantors when
traders have to buy on credit and can assist traders by buying from the farmers, taking
the crates to wholesalers in other markets, and collecting the money. However, this is
rare as there are large risks because of the perishable nature of the produce and the
dramatically changing prices. Other support for the traders' activities include
agreeing to be paid after the goods are sold, therefore reducing the amount of capital
the trader requires.
The transportation system in Ghana is centred around the lorry park system. A vast
majority of vehicles are operated by members of the Ghana Private Road-users Trade
Union (GPRTU) which claims to control 80% of the Ghanaian transport industry
(Delaquis, 1993). Vehicles are registered for certain routes and are placed in a queue.
The GPRTU has a Tomato Cargo Branch in Kumasi and in Accra. They play a role in
organising the transport for the tomato traders, especially when there is a shortage of
transport. Traders in Kumasi can get transport on their own if it is available. If they
cannot find any they can go to the branch office and be allocated a vehicle. The office
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is in Awanaga where the boxes are made, and its position here makes it a central
point from which information is gathered and distributed, and where traders can
meet.
There is a fixed price per crate from each supply area, set by the GPRTU. To become
a member of the branch, each truck has to be registered and a fee is paid. The
GPRTU levies a user charge in addition to the registration fee. This charge is
officially 5% of the value of transport, although Delaquis (1993) reports that the
figure can be as high as 10% according to survey responses. The Union also collects a
daily fee for upkeep of the park from the municipal or district authority, and collects
3 % income tax on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (Delaquis, 1993). The
Union also assists when trucks break down by sending another vehicle and plays an
active role in settling disputes between drivers and traders or farmers.
In Kumasi traders are allowed to obtain transport from the supply areas, although it
was reported that in Accra the traders have to go through the GPRTU or else they are
not allowed entry into the market. The power to exclude non members comes from
their control over the key spaces such as unloading stations and is sanctioned by the
local authorities and central government (Lyon, 1999a). Vehicles bringing tomatoes
to Kumasi Central Market have to go to the tomato wholesale yard (ntoose bole) early
in the morning to unload before the yam lorries arrive. The organisation of the
vehicles is done by GPRTU. The unloading of crates is done by the Gao porters: their
role in the marketing system is discussed in section 7.5.1.
6.3 Institutions of buying, selling and bargaining at the farm level
The studies of daily price changes at the farm level showed that there were dramatic
changes in prices from day to day, during the day and between individual farmers.
This was contrary to the expectation of relatively standard prices that change through
the seasons. The dramatic changes in prices are partly due to the perishable nature of
the tomato crop and the lack of any processing or storage opportunities. To know
151
how farmers and traders cope with the system, it is therefore necessary to understand
the institutions of marketing at the farm level. A brief outline of the actors and
marketing channels was given in chapter four. This section builds on this, describing
in detail, the institutions used by both farmers and traders. These institutions shape
the ability of farmers and traders to increase their incomes through manipulating the
balance of bargaining power, accessing the market and obtaining credit.
6.3.1 Customer relations
Customer relations affect all areas including access to markets, supplies, information
and credit. They also act as security and a form of capital accumulation (Gore, 1978:
185; Trager, 1981b). Farmers who have been growing a certain crop for several years
will develop close trading relationships with some traders, preferring to sell to them
rather than other traders. Both the farmers and traders refer to each other as
'customers' and this reflects the two way flow of benefits. Traders value their
customers as an important resource in their marketing. Older traders were observed
bringing their daughters with them on buying trips so that they could meet the
farmers and would be able to inherit certain customers.
The farmers benefit as the system of customer relations ensures that traders will buy
their produce when there is a glut and it will help them obtain credit from the trader.
Farmers may be forced to take a lower price because they received a loan for
production; the extent to which this opens up opportunities for exploitation was
discussed in section 5.4.3. Farmers may also receive a lower price as they have to sell
when the trader customer arrives and this may be at the beginning of the day when
the price is often lower. There may be times when a trader offers a higher price than
the going rate, on the condition that the farmer does not tell others.
Benefits for traders come in times of scarcity, when farmers will guarantee to sell
some produce to their customers, even if the price offered by other traders is higher.
The farmer will ensure that the quality is good and can introduce the trader to other
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farmers who are known for good quality produce. Farmers may also assist traders by
giving them produce on credit. This is discussed later in section 6.5.
6.3.2 Shifting bargaining power and changing power relations
Tomato farmers have little choice over when they sell their crop. Farmers selling
other crops have greater control over supply as they can store produce and therefore
increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the traders. Tomatoes are highly perishable
so the farmer may not have the option of turning a trader away, unless he or she
knows that there are others coming. When there is a large supply the traders can
dictate price and the farmers have to accept it. In extreme periods, it was reported that
the price offered by the traders would not even pay for the labour needed for
harvesting.
At certain times farmers are forced to go to the urban markets to get traders to come
to the village. In Kumasi they go to the Central Market or to Awanaga where traders
from other areas can be found. In such cases the bargaining is done in the urban
centre and farmers have a very weak bargaining position. The farmers in Dwomo had
to do this over several days during which the prices fell dramatically:
"Farmers had to go to Kumasi Awanaga to arrange for buyers. That is why
there is a very low price. We were only able to get one lorry so the traders took
advantage to cheat us" [they got C30,000 and the day before it was C40,000]
(Kofi Gyansa, Dwomo farmer, Interview 15)
The farmers who have contributed to the travel costs of the person sent to find traders
will receive all the boxes that they need and others will get some if there are any left
over.
When there is scarcity of tomatoes in the markets, farmers have greater bargaining
power because there is competition amongst the traders. The price is pushed up as
new traders need to attract more farmers to sell to them:
"Buyers usually bring the price but in the lean season, buyers struggle. So one
comes (to buy) at C40,000, the next at C50,000 and then the next at C70,000.
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So the farmers have no problem setting the price as the traders push it up. ...
But when there is lots of tomato then the farmers take any price" (Torro,
Tanoso farmer, Interview 37).
"If traders have come late and they see other trucks and see that there will not
be enough tomato, they will raise the price -farmers can ask earlier, traders to
raise the price or take their boxes back" (Salifu, Kokoago farmer, Interview 1).
Short periods of scarcity can occur throughout the year but there is greatest shortage
at the end of the dry season and at the beginning of the wet season. This is shown by
the higher market prices during this period. Figure 6.1 gives the seasonal price
indices although the analysis used monthly data that cannot show the dramatic price
changes from day to day. Tomato production during the period of scarcity is limited
to those with ability to irrigate. These farmers have access to land near a guaranteed
water source combined with the strength to carry water or with capital pay for the
irrigation.
6.3.3 The bargaining process
Producers have different bargaining processes to full time traders as they have an
opportunity cost of their time and cannot afford to let the haggling go on for too long.
The price is fixed before the farmers harvest as the traders bring the boxes that are
used and farmers do not want to harvest until they can guarantee that they can sell.
There can also be bargaining later over issues of quality and quantity. The price
setting procedure depends on the bargaining positions of the farmers and traders and
this will depend on the supply of vegetables and the quantities that traders want to
buy. The power balance between farmers and traders moves over the year. In periods
of scarcity, the fanners can set the price and the traders will have to buy as there may
not be other places to go to. In periods of glut, the farmers cannot afford to bargain as
the trader can go elsewhere.
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Figure 6.1 Seasonal wholesale tomato price indices in Kumasi, Sunyani and Accra
markets
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The bargaining can go on for some time with each side making concessions. Both
sides draw on various bargaining skills, claiming poverty and the right that they have
to earn enough money to feed their children. The traders from Accra may also try to
confuse the farmers by talking amongst themselves in Ga language which the farmers
cannot understand. If the traders are not happy with the price then they can leave and
try to find produce elsewhere. On one occasion, the tomato traders would not accept
the price that the Dwomo farmers felt was acceptable and so went off The farmers
realised that they might not find any other traders that day:
"There were three cars and one offered C40,000 but the other offer C38,000.
The farmers refused the C38,000 so the traders went to Techimentia ... The
farmers had to go to Techirnentia to call them back" (Kwame Adjei, Dwomo
farmer, Interview 26).
The bargaining process can be very different if the producer has taken a loan from the
trader for production. In such cases the trader has much more bargaining power.
However, there were no cases reported of prices for tomatoes being set at the time of
receipt of the loan. This can happen for other crops (Lyon, 1998) but the tomato
prices fluctuate too much to make this realistic.
The prices in the village often change through the day. Traders who come later are
offered higher prices as the farmers know that there is a shortage of ripe tomatoes:
"I sold for C25,000 to the traders who came among the second group. The first
batch offered 20,000 but the second could not get enough to buy so we
increased the price" (Yaw Appiah, Dwomo farmer, Interview 8).
"I was lucky to meet the last batch of traders who could not have sufficient
tomatoes to buy so we increased the price" [from C55,000 to C60,000] (Kofi
Acheampong, Dwomo farmer, Interview 3).
It is a risk that fanners take in deciding whether to take the price offered by the first
vehicle as it may be low, but there may not be any others coming:
"The trader who comes first gives any price she wants. This day I accepted 25
and when I returned from the farm I heard that another car had come and
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offered 38	 I had to go for the early traders because my farm is far away and
other traders may prefer those who are nearer" (Charles Amponsah, Manso
farmer, Interview 8).
The price can go down through the day if there have been very few traders arriving
that day and the traders know there is a large supply of ripe tomatoes. The farm gate
price can also drop if the price in the market has dropped and the early traders do not
know this, or if the traders have come from another market with a lower price.
"My customer came from Bolga and gave me 33 because the price was good in
Bolga. Later the traders came from Accra and offered 20 because the price was
lower there" (Charles Amponsah, Manso farmer, Interview 8)
The Accra traders often offer a higher price than the other traders, as the prices in the
market there are higher. It was also said that many traders from Togo buy from Accra
and this increased the demand and the price. Some farmers claimed that the higher
prices were due to restrictive practices in the market. The extent of this is examined
in chapter seven. The Accra traders may also be more rushed than the other traders as
they have further to travel and have fixed days they can enter the market so cannot
afford to be delayed.
6.3.4 Units of sale and supply of boxes
The traders supply the wooden boxes which are a relatively uniform size of between
70 and 80 kg'. There are 'half boxes' that weigh approximately 50 kg which are used
only occasionally. There are also some smaller boxes sold in one part of Kumasi
Central Market but these are not used much in Brong Ahafo. Some farmers near
Wenchi complained of traders changing the size of the boxes with the seasons:
1 Official prices quoted by the Minsitry of Food and Agriculture refer to boxes of 52
kg. However, those collecting prices were found to be asking the traders the prices of
the 70 -80 kg boxes. This issue is discussed in relation to radio broadcasts of market
prices in section 6.4.1.
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"Wenchi traders cheat more because the boxes are vety big and the size
increases ... they used the mango boxes. In the lean season they bring smaller
boxes otherwise no one will harvest" (Kwaku Adjei, Kokoago farmer,
Interview 16).
At times there is a shortage of boxes and farmers rush to get as many boxes as
possible from the traders. When there is such demand, the traders may allocate boxes
to certain farmers who are their 'customers'. Occasionally the fights for boxes occur
before the bargaining has started and those who are doing the bargaining may not get
enough for themselves.. There can be fights over boxes and women farmers stated
that they have to get a young man to climb on the truck and throw down boxes on
their behalf. There are also cases where farmers take those boxes that have been
thrown down by other farmers. Disputes of this nature may be settled with the elders
or leaders in the village if they are not resolved immediately.
Having control of boxes gives the traders greater bargaining power. When the traders
see the farmers rushing for the boxes, they know that the farmers are desperate to
harvest and so stick on a low price. One farmer was not able to get boxes from the
trader so used some left by a trader before:
"I had not harvested for four days and when the traders came I could not get
any [boxes]... so I had to use my own ... I had collected these boxes from
former traders when I could not fill all the boxes I was given... Then the traders
refused to buy them saying there was no room on the truck so I was forced to
reduce the price by C4000 ... the price for that Sunday was C20,000" (Atta
Kwasi, Dwomo farmer, Interview 17).
The traders buying smaller quantities from small scale farmers or those at the tail end
of their harvest, may buy in baskets. These come in a range of sizes so the price of
each basket has to be negotiated separately. Farmers can join with another farmer in
order to fill one box and share the price received.
158
6.3.5 Cooperative marketing institutions
There is usually group bargaining when more than one farmer in a community is
selling, as this reduces the time and cost of marketing. The farmers may select two to
six farmers to represent them. The representatives are chosen for their knowledge of
marketing, bargaining ability, public speaking skills and because they have the
confidence of the other farmers. There are occasionally accusations that these farmers
may bargain for a lower price and get a pay off from the traders. Therefore, the
representatives chosen tend to be men harvesting larger amounts that day, in order to
reduce the risk of collusion with traders. The risk of this is reduced as they have more
at stake2 and it is not worth their while settling for a lower price.
The need for respect of representatives is very important as it is up to these
individuals to stop those farmers who are desperate to harvest from accepting a lower
price. The farmers also have to believe that the negotiator is trying to maximise the
price for the farmer. In cases where these groups are strong, the main negotiators are
well known and trusted:
"We have a spokesman who speaks on our behalf Gyedi Boateng .... he is an
elder of the Gyedi church. He has been doing this for a long time ... People
trust him as he has 'human rights' and people have studied him" (Cephus
Addae, Derma farmer, Interview 7).
Most bargaining groups have a rule that the farmers cannot take boxes to fill before
the price is set by the leaders of the group. Once the price is set it is broadcast around
the community. Some villages use an individual who 'beats the gong-gong' to
announce the price. This is the traditional method by which messages are spread
within any village. The price setting by cooperation can only work in periods of
scarcity when the farmers have more bargaining power. When there is a glut, the
perishable nature of the tomato crop means that some farmers will be forced to sell at
2 Similar selection procedures were reported by Uphoff (1996: 354) at the Gal Oya
irrigation project in Sri-Lanka. Farmer representatives for the irrigation maintenance
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any price or else risk losing the ripe produce if traders decide to buy from another
village. These institutions are also restricted as some farmers have entered into
'customer' relationships with traders and are forced to sell at a lower price against the
wishes of the farmer group.
The strength of the associations depends on the level of cooperation among farmers
and the ability of the association leaders to persuade farmers to stick to the agreed
price. The power of the committees differs dramatically between villages and
depends on the unity of the tomato farmers and the strength of the chief and elders.
Strong committees were found in the villages of Awisa, Derma and Akumadan.
Those who break the rules can be fined and taken to the chief In other villages, the
associations are weak as the leaders cannot enforce their own decisions even when
there are a large number of traders wanting to buy.
In villages with disputes over the chieftaincy, the powers of the committees are even
weaker. This has been a long term issue in several of the villages around Techiman,
leading to violence in some of the main tomato growing areas in February 1996. The
problems in Tuobodum were expressed by one farmer there:
"There is unrest here because of the recent crisis so it is often difficult to have
one mouth piece. In Akumadan they are well disciplined and when the chief
says one thing the people listen. Here it would be best to get the leaders of both
factions to negotiate but they have different interests and support different
chiefs. .... If there are divisions then the leaders will do what their farmers
want	 some boys from the other faction will say 'we made the farm' and then
jump on the trucks before the price has been set. In Akumadan they are strong
and people stay inside while others set the prices. They are 'disciplined'. Here
all 500 farmers are outside and shouting" (Samuel, Tuobodum farmer,
Interview 2).
management were selected from the tail-end farmers who had more to lose from poor
maintenance.
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There have also been many attempts to establish organisations that can allow farmers
to benefit from collective action in acquiring inputs for agriculture. Villages such as
Awisa, Nchira and Offuman have vegetable growers associations with the objectives
of obtaining agro-chemicals, chemical sprayers and tractor services at lower prices,
although they have had limited success so far. Many of these types of organisatfon are
specifically established to benefit from external funding, as donors prefer to give to
groups. This is found in many other cases of producer and agro-processor groups and
very few of the successful associations survive after the funding (Aryeetey and
Appiah, 1995; Coulter et al, 1996; Lyon, 1999a).
6.3.6 Adjusting contracts after price negotiation
Both farmers and traders reported that farmers may decide to sell to other traders who
come later with a higher prices. In such circumstances the farmer can empty the
boxes belonging to the trader who gave the lower price, into the boxes of the new
trader. This can cause considerable delays to traders.
"If cars come a lot and a trader comes later, she sees that she will not get a
load so she offers a higher price. When this happens, the brothers and sisters of
those harvesting rush to the farms to tell the farmers and then take new boxes
to them and empty from the old boxes. They will tell the old traders they cannot
harvest for them. 	  The first traders then have to buy from other traders or
farmers so that she can fill a lorry" (Ama Boahemma, Tanoso trader, Interview
2)
"Sometimes I offer a price, give boxes out to farmers and new traders come
and offer higher prices. Farmers then divert tomato to the new traders and
bring me empty boxes. In some cases the boxes get lost. ... The driver still
charges me based on the initial number of boxes he bought here." (Aso,
Tanoso trader, Interview 5).
The farmer can request the trader to increase the price before they dump the boxes
and, if she is not willing, then they harvest for the trader with the higher price. If the
first trader is a customer then the farmer may act differently:
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"I took her (customer trader from Wenchi) boxes for harvest at an agreed price
but the Accra people later came with higher prices. I wanted to harvest for the
Accra people and so I approached her to increase her price but she begged and
explained that she can't increase it because it sells cheap in Wenchi. I
understood and harvested for her at the lower price because she is a customer
and I knew she would continue to buy from me when the tomato is abundant"
(Stephen Asare, Kokoago farmer, Interview 6).
"They (the farmers) do this to local traders as well. That is why I help farmers.
If traders come late and offer a better price then farmers can get new boxes but
they will still fill mine and instead empty the boxes of the Kumasi traders"
(Ama Boahemma, Tanoso trader, interview 2).
Once the harvest has been done the traders can bargain with the farmers over the
quantity and quality. At this time the farmer is in a weak bargaining position as the
produce has been harvested and it may be difficult to store. Farmers often give gifts
or extra produce to traders in order to build up a customer relationship. This is
referred to as a 'dash' and at times it can be demanded by the trader. In this way the
bargaining process is carried out after the sale and is based on quantity rather than
price. The concept of 'dashing' is found throughout all the marketing systems for
almost all commodities in Ghana and all of west Africa. It has its roots in the earliest
trade and De Marees refers to it in his account of trading in 1602 (De Marees, 1987).
Van Dantzig and Jones (1987:47) suggest the term originates from Portuguese, or
from Akan words meaning gift or thanks.
6.3.7 Grading of produce
The acceptance of poor quality depends on the relationship with the trader. If the
trader is a regular customer, then they might be more lenient when there is scarcity,
although they would expect the quality to be better when there is a glut. On the farms
the harvesters separate the soft varieties, rotten, insect damaged, unripe and over ripe
tomatoes from the acceptable produce. Farmers like to be present at the harvest to
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ensure that the quality is good enough and, if they need extra labour, they prefer to
hire other vegetable farmers as they know what to discard.
Farmers were observed to be grading tomatoes within each box. Unripe ones are
placed at the bottom and it is commonly stated that the lack of ventilation, will make
them ripen sooner. Bigger ripe ones are placed along the gaps in the boxes and nice
looking fruit of the preferred varieties are placed on the top. This is also a way of
hiding poor quality produce. The traders prefer the riper ones, despite the risk of
damage, as the produce will reach the market the next day and be sold that day. By
having to store green tomatoes until they ripen, their capital will be tied up which will
limit their business. However, some retailers like to have some less ripe ones which
they can sell over a longer period.
The amount of lower quality produce in the bag or box can also depend on the
amount of produce that is ready for harvest. If a farmer needs to fill a box but does
not have enough of the best quality, he or she will be forced to fill up the crate with
lower quality produce or risk the price being cut due to the smaller quantity.
"The price was low [C55,000 instead of C60,000] because the harvest was not
too ripe and I could not fill one box with ripe ones" (Kofi Gyansa, Dwomo
farmer, Interview 24).
One trader complained that she made a loss as she had to check the produce in the
evening when it was dark and ended up buying a variety that was not popular with the
retailers. The lack of standardised grading means that the quality is subjectively
determined and so the trader, or someone she trusts, has to inspect the produce herself
as it is being loaded into the vehicle. This may explain why the itinerant traders prefer
to travel to the producing areas themselves, rather than relying on buying agents to
send the produce to them. Some traders even go to the farm to insist on good quality,
although farmers try to avoid this happening.
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6.4 Access to market information
Access to information on prices, supply and demand allows the buyers and sellers to
bargain more effectively as they know what the other party will accept. However,
there is often inequality in access to information in marketing due to. the poor
communication systems. Alexander and Alexander (1991: 505-6) assert that in Java,
it is during the short periods it takes for information to become widely known that
traders can make the windfall profits on which their income depends. This was also
found in this study as shown by the different margins that the traders can obtain. (See
table 6.1 and 6.2). The changes in market prices from day to day are shown in figure
6.2 . This shows the need for up to date information and the dramatic changes in
prices reflect the changes in supply to markets creating gluts. The short term gluts
and over-supply could be avoided with better information, although the gluts from
over production are much harder to avoid. When looking at monthly prices, the
differences between markets is much smaller and the market prices appear to be
reasonably well correlated (see table 6.3). This indicates that there is some
information flowing between markets although the monthly average prices hide the
short term differences. Tables 6.1 and 6.2, and figure 6.2 demonstrate the importance
of looking at daily prices as monthly averages hide much of the variation.
6.4.1 Traders' information sources
The traders will know the prevailing price of produce on the previous day in the
market where they intend to sell and will start bargaining with this in mind. The price
in the market is usually based on the supply on the previous days. As tomatoes are
highly perishable, all produce has to be sold in a short time and when there is over
supply in the market the price drops dramatically.
Traders can also find out about supplies by talking to traders who bring produce to
the market and to farmers who have brought their own produce. Traders in Kumasi
watch for rural itinerant traders coming from the producing areas. By assessing the
amount and quality of the produce, the urban based traders can judge whether the
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main harvest season has started and whether it would be worth their while visiting the
area.
Table 6.1 Marketing margins between Brong Ahafo and Kumasi Central Market
('000s of Cedis for 75 kg crates)
Date
1996
Where
bought
Price
bought
Price
sold
Transport, tax,
fees
Maximum
margins
possible
17-18 June Manso 45 47 4.5 -2.5
2-3 July Dwomo 25 22 4.5 -7.5
21-22 July Manso 28 35 4.5 2.5
22-23 July Dwomo 22 40 4.5 13.5
22-23 July Manso 30 40 4.5 5.5
28-29 July Manso 24 30 4.5 1.5
29-30 July Dwomo 20 30 4.5 5.5
28-30 Sept. Dwomo 14 13 4.5 -5.5
13-14 Oct. Dwomo 14 20 4.5 2.5
24-25 Nov. Dwomo 6 8 4.5 -2.5
25-26 Nov. Manso 3.5 9 4.5 1.0
26-27 Nov. Dwomo 6 11 4.5 0.5
Table 6.2 Marketing margins between Brong Ahafo and Accra (Makola) market
(000s of Cedis for 75 kg crates)
Date Where
bought
Price
bought
Price
sold
Transport, tax,
fees
Maximum
margin
1996 possible
9-10 June Dwomo 48 65 8.5 8.5
10-11 June Dwomo 50 60 8.5 1.5
12-13 June Dwomo 60 62 8.5 -6.5
16-17 June Dwomo 55 80 8.5 16.5
17-18 June Dwomo 50 80 8.5 21.5
23-24 June Dwomo 60 65 8.5 -3.5
24-25 June Dwomo 60 65 8.5 -3.5
26-27 June Dwomo 40 68 8.5 19.5
1-2 July Dwomo 30 55 8.5 16.5
3-4 July Dwomo 35 60 8.5 16.5
8-9 July Dwomo 52 75 8.5 14.5
10-11 July Dwomo 60 80 8.5 11.5
14-15 July Dwomo 40 85 8.5 36.5
15-16 July Dwomo 30 80 8.5 41.5
17-18 July Dwomo 20 82 8.5 53.5
21-22 July Dwomo 20 50 8.5 21.5
22-23 July Dwomo 20 45 8.5 16.5
23-24 July Dwomo 25 40 8.5 6.5
29-30 July Dwomo 20 38 8.5 9.5
165
—N.
—
Figure 6.2 Daily tomato prices in Kumasi Central Market
— 01
—
— 141
—
Cc)
Sa(U13 64gL Jed woo o spuesnota
166
Table 6.3 Correlation coefficients of main markets in Ghana using prices of tomatoes
averaged over the month (1983-1994)
Kumasi Sunyani Tamale Tema
Accra	 0.67	 0.67	 0.60	 0.87
Kumasi	 0.70	 0.55	 0.80
Sunyani	 0.68	 0.87
Tamale	 0.67
Source: Floyd, Warburton and Gray (1996)
There appears to be a fairly free flow of information within Kumasi Central Market
vegetable sellers association and this is supported by Clark's (1994) study on Kumasi
traders. The supply of such information is a way of building up reciprocal ties with
fellow traders. Traders in the same market usually refer to each other as colleagues,
rather than competitors.
If a Kumasi trader buys from an area with a low price she may take other traders back
with her on the following journey. This will certainly raise the price but the farmers
will recognise the benefit and ensure that the original trader gets adequate supplies of
tomato first. This will also be important in building up 'customer' relationships with
the farmers.
-
Outside the market, the traders can share information when they meet on the way,
either on the road or when passing through villages. For traders from coastal towns
and the Western Region, Kumasi plays a key role in the spread of information as
traders from all over the south of Ghana may pass through there to buy crates, arrange
transport and gather information from other traders and drivers on the supply and
price situation in the producing areas.
The Awanaga area is the main meeting point. This is named after the Ga carpenters
who are based there and produce boxes for traders. Also there is the GPRTU (Ghana
Private Road-users Trade Union) Tomato Cargo Branch that arranges transport for
traders. Vehicle drivers can be useful sources of information on areas of cheaper and
more abundant supplies.
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Farmers themselves may be an important source of information for traders. At the
beginning of the season farmers with good relationships with buyers send a message
to the traders telling them the harvesting has started in an area. This is done in person
or by sending a letter. Some groups of farmers in villages will put out a message on
national radio to announce that the vegetables are ready to buy. This is more common
among the garden egg producers but has also been done by the tomato farmers in
Awisa.
When fanners find that there are no traders coming to the village during a main
harvesting period, a group will select a representative to go to the market to bring
traders. This is done as a last resort because the farmers put themselves in a very
weak bargaining position as they have to set the price before they leave with the
trader. The farmers will share the cost of transport and they will receive all the boxes
that they require when the traders arrive. Other farmers can get boxes if there is any
room left in the vehicle. The farmers go to the market itself, or in Kumasi they may
go to Awanaga where the vehicles used in transporting tomatoes are based. At other
times the farmers go to the trader's house, especially if she lives locally or in a nearby
town. If the traders are not willing to come to buy then the farmer representative will
go to other smaller markets.
Traders can also get information from farmers as they pass through a village and
some traders may drive around several villages before returning to the one with the
lower price. A young farmer in Dwomo stated that:
"The traders came here and we offered them 30 [C30,000], the traders then
went on to Techimentia to check the price and came back and offered 25 .... I
managed to get 27 from the Tepa traders" ('S.K.', Dwomo farmer, Interview 1)
The national radio is also used to make announcements about the weekly price of
commodities in various markets in Ghana. None of the traders used this as a source of
information as they claimed the details are not accurate and it is broadcast when they
are at work. The price that is quoted is an average price collected by Ministry of Food
and Agriculture staff over a week and broadcast on the following Wednesday. There
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are major daily price fluctuations and the price may have changed by the time the
price is broadcast. There were reported cases of traders who had used this price
information and arrived in Kumasi with an empty lorry, only to find that the price had
risen steeply and they had to return having made a considerable loss.
Traders also complained that the units used in measuring the prices were not the same
as those that they used. The tomato traders use crates ranging from 70- 80 kg with a
small number using smaller crates. The price data collectors document the price for
70-80 kg crates but claim in the broadcasts that the prices are for 52 kg crates. In one
case during the data collection for this thesis, a data collector was found to be
collecting the prices of large and small crates and then taking an average.
6.4.2 Farmers' information on prices
Farmers have more restricted access to information as they are based in rural areas.
Price information is especially limited for those farmers who were off the main roads
as they have less contact with other people. In this study, it was not possible to
ascertain whether there were any gender differences in access to price information
Farmers may send a representative to the market to find out the price. They will not
bargain with traders in the market as this reduces their bargaining power, but will find
out the price that the traders are paying those farmers bringing their own produce to
the market, and the price that the itinerant traders are selling at. However, the market
prices can change abruptly and traders have more up-to-date information:
"I sold to a local trader going to Techiman. I wanted to sell for C30,000 but the
trader said that the price was falling in Techiman so she would only buy at
C28,000" (Kwame Asare, Manso farmer, Interview 28).
Information can also come from villagers who are returning from the market on other
business.
Information on prices from neighbouring villages is the most important source and
allows farmers to make sure that their prices are within the same range. For example
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in Manso the farmers may watch the price changes in Tuobodum, 6 km away, as there
are more traders going there and some larger farms. The farmers in Nchira can send
someone to Awisa (20 km away) or Offuman. In Dwomo, they go to Techimentia (2
km away) as that town is in touch with the other major producing towns such as
Derma and Akumadan:
"It was C40,000 in the morning but some farmers went to Techimentia to check
on the price and found that it was C50,000. They found some traders from
Takoradi there who offered them C50,000 so they brought the boxes back."
(Martin Addae, Dwomo farmer, Interview 4).
The informal farmer associations may use contributions to the association to send
someone to one of the other main producing areas. The person who was bargaining
on behalf of all tomato farmers in Awisa stated that he sends a small boy to
Tuobodum and Akumadan to find the price. The spread of information follows the
main roads with certain villages acting as important nodes. Alcumadan, in Ashanti
Region, is a very well established tomato growing area and is used as a source of
price information by farmers in villages in the Wenchi and Techimentia areas.
The supply of tomatoes in the system can be assessed by how readily the traders
accept the price offered to them on the previous sale. In periods of scarcity the traders
may accept the farmers price immediately and the farmers know that they can ask for
a higher price next time. When there is an increase in the supply of tomatoes
elsewhere, farmers can also tell:
"Farmers may expect me to come back but if I find another trader who is
buying from farmers at a lower price then I will go with them. The farmers in
the high price place will know that there is plenty tomato around" (Effia
Quaye, Kumasi trader, Interview 2)
"When traders come they ask our price and if the cars rush off to other areas
then we know the price is cheaper there."(' SK' Dwomo farmer, Interview 1).
The number of traders who arrive and the quantity of vegetables that they want to buy
indicates to the farmers the bargaining position they are in. Traders will want to fill
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the lorry up in one place and so will be willing to pay higher prices to entice more
farmers to harvest:
"There were so many traders that day and few harvesting so the price went up
to C40,000" [before the price was C25,000](Kwame Afrifa, Dwomo farmer,
Interview 4).
"The trader could not come so I had to sell at C35,000 and the day before the
price was C50,000" [the price went back to C52,000 two days later] (Kofi
Johnson, Manso farmer, Interview 8)
6.5 Institutions for access to finance for trade
Most traders are reliant on their own capital that they have built up over time. Clark
(1994) documents the processes by which traders change their roles in the marketing
system as they accumulate more working capital and can move from being hawkers
to retailers to itinerant traders. Some women also start by being assistants to mothers
or aunts who are itinerant traders and then start their own trading once they have
gained some experience. Money can also come from relatives, husbands or 'sugar
daddies'. None of the traders reported that they had credit from the bank. The banks
reported that they are giving increasing amounts to traders but it is limited as they
perceive trading as risky and the traders do not save money at the banks but prefer
the susu system. The traders also feel constrained by the lack of personal contacts in
the bank that they say are necessary to get loans.
The survey found that a large majority of the farmers were giving some of their
produce to traders on credit, although this is usually a small proportion of the total
harvest. This is shown in table 6.4 and table 6.5. At times farmers will give all their
produce for a whole harvest on credit to one trader and then collect the money at the
end. More farmers give on credit in those villages that sell more in local markets such
as Akete and Kokoago. These farmers are more likely to have close customer
relationships and they can easily find the traders if they are not paid. Produce is often
given on credit to the rural based itinerant traders selling in urban markets. These
traders know the farmers well as they live nearby.
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Table 6.4 Farmers giving tomatoes to traders on credit
Number of farmers interviewed 	 Percentage of farmers giving to
traders on credit
Tano Boase 20 95.0%
Pamdu 20 70.0%
Techimentia 40 47.5%
Tanoso 28 57.1%
Akete 27 74.1%
Kokoago 24 75.0%
Total 159 66.7%
Table 6.5 Traders obtaining tomatoes from farmers on credit.
Small town Kumasi Central
Market
Asafo market,
Kumasi
Accra: 31st
December and
Total
Agbogbloshi
16 interviewed 12 interviewed 4 interviewed 5 interviewed 37 interviewed
Yes 50.0% 66.7% 100% 100% 67.6%
No 25.0% 0 0 0 10.8%
Don't
know/
unwilling
to answer
25.0% 33.3% 0 0 21.6%
During times of glut, when the farmers are not able to find a market, they may ask the
trader to take on credit rather than run the risk of not being able to sell at all, as there
are no storage facilities. In such cases the farmers are in a very weak position and
may have no choice but to give on credit and hope that they will be paid.
"When in abundance, farmers will beg us (traders) to take now and pay later"
(Anna Kwatima, Kumasi trader, Interview 31).
"During the major tomato season, they (traders) buy on credit but pay cash
during the lean season. They have power in the major season because the
tomatoes are in excess supply by then. In the lean season, we, the farmers, have
the power" (Adam Issahaku, Akete fanner, Interview 22).
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During the periods of abundance, the traders can also force the farmers to sell on
credit by arranging a price and waiting for the farmers to harvest before telling them
that they do not have enough money:
"She doesn't tell us from the beginning that she's not got the money to pay us,
but at the farm she tells us no money ... We give to her because after harvesting
there is nothing we can do with the tomatoes" (Augustine Tabiri, Kokoago
farmer, Interview 19).
"Because there are no factories here to buy the tomatoes, I sell to any trader
who comes to town. .... For instance, i f I harvest and it is getting dark, how do I
refuse to give to trader who wants to buy on credit" (Adepa, Tanoso farmer,
Interview 12).
Credit can also be given at times of scarcity, when the price rises and traders do not
have enough money to buy all the crates they require. This can happen when the price
changes suddenly, or when the trader made a loss on the previous trip:
"Wednesday two weeks ago I lost C400,000 ... I got the money back by going to
the farmers and telling them that I had lost .... I got the money back in 2 weeks"
(Adua, Kumasi trader, Interview 28).
This form of credit allows the traders to start trading without large amounts of capital
and continue after a loss.
The importance of having customers at times of crisis was demonstrated by a trader
who was stranded in Manso. She came with 80 boxes but was not able to fill them
immediately. When she came the price was C15,000 but 4 days later the price was
C23-25,000 and she did not have enough money to fill all the boxes. She could not
return with empty boxes as the driver was charging for every box, whether full or
empty.
The length of time that the traders take the goods on credit ranges from a few hours to
several weeks, with a few cases of traders taking all the produce of the farmers on
credit and then paying the farmer at the very end of the harvest. The itinerant traders
sell to retailers on credit so the farmers are repaid when the itinerant traders have
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been repaid themselves. Repayment will also depend on the frequency with which the
trader comes to the village.
The traders can try to renegotiate the price when they return with the money, claiming
that they made a loss in the market or the price was low.
"I bargained for C60,000 but the trader from Accra bought the boxes and
would pay later. Later I was paid C50,000 because according to them the
expected price in Accra was low" (Martin Addae, Dwomo farmer, Interview
17)
The farmers usually do not have the means to check this and it can be a cause of
dispute. It also allows the trader to pass the risk of trading onto the farmer. The trader
will ask the farmer to reduce the money that they are owed or give the full the amount
and ask that the farmer give her some back. The farmer may wait until the trader has
been to the market again and be repaid in instalments:
"Last week I lost heavily in Kumasi as there was over supply .. and I was not
able to pay ... but I have been trading for ten years so the farmers trust me and
let me take another harvest to sell before I bring the money". (Akwia,
Techiman trader, Interview 8).
Some farmers gave on credit the next time, but at a lower price, so that the traders can
make a profit. If the trader is a customer, the farmer is in a weak position because
they need the support of the trader for financing the next season and to buy from them
during the periods of abundance.
Some farmers will send a representative with the trader to the market to collect the
money if they have been underpaid. However, this is only feasible when there are a
large number of farmers who have been underpaid. Smaller scale farmers may not
have the resources necessary to follow the traders on their own, and women may not
able to go due to other obligations. There were several reported cases of the farmers'
delegate colluding with the traders or taking some of the money for himself. The
other farmers have to wait for the traders to come the next time before they can find
out the truth.
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When a trader does not return, farmers have to go to the traders' house or wait until
the trader or driver passes through the village again. However, traders who have
made a large loss and want to continue in business will send daughters or nieces to
buy for them in the villages. If traders are not willing to pay, the farmers can threaten
to take them to the police or even have them arrested. Farmers stated that this action
cannot be followed for local traders because as one farmer said, "they are our own".
One case of using collateral was reported by a farmer. A trader told the farmer that
she would have to take some of his crates on credit as she had run out of money. She
left her cooking utensils with a promise that she would come back in three days time,
but she never did.
When farmers have a choice of whom they give to on credit, they have to ensure that
they will be paid later. The basis of trust is familiarity and long term trading
relationships. Through continued dealings with a trader, a farmer will know how she
treats farmers and whether she is likely to return:
"Farmers get to know us (traders) from the first day based on how you pay
them. For instance, if you promise to pay on a certain day then you don't for a
few days ... then they won't trust you" (Ama Lotsu, Wenchi trader, Interview
14).
"Usually we give to traders on credit because of the trust we have in them.
When a trader comes here first week, second week, and then comes about four
times, we see that the person will be able to pay us back if we give to her on
credit" (Sule Musa, Tanoso farmer, Interview 1).
Farmers stated that the most important information is the location of the trader's
house and where they sell so that they can be traced. Several farmers reported that
they had been taken to the trader's house before they agreed to give on credit:
"She (a Wenchi trader) asked me to go with her to Wenchi and see where she
lives and sells at the market. She did this so that anytime she buys and is not
able to pay ready cash, I can trust and give her" (Kwabena Boateng, Kokoago
farmer, Interview 18).
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"If they fail to turn up, we know where they are so we can chase them up"
(Daniel Nsiah, Derma farmer, Interview 23).
While farmers may be forced into giving on credit because of the lack of alternative
traders, some are also obliged to sell on credit to traders resident in the village or who
are long term customers:
"Normally I do not depend on one trader. Sometimes when a trader becomes
too familiar they will one day buy on credit and come back to tell you that they
sold at a loss. It is best to be changing customers" (J. Pipim, Tanoso farmer
and school headmaster, Interview 13).
Women farmers living in the village of the trader may feel obliged to give on credit
especially if they are traders of some kind. One farmer referred to the need to help a
trader as she was a tomato trader once and so has to help her 'sister'.
Many traders use drivers or other farmers as guarantors or agyinamu'. The farmers
will take down the registration and details of the car so that they can locate the trader
through the driver if necessary. Local traders or assemblers can guarantee the
payment and they may even pay the farmer cash and give the goods on credit to the
trader themselves. Farmers act as guarantors if they know the trader already and have
a strong customer relationship.
"When boys refuse to sell on credit, the traders fall on certain men who know
their houses in Accra. If the traders don't come then the person they fall on has
to go to Accra to collect all or some of the money" (Samuel, Tuobodum farmer,
Interview 2).
Some of the fanners' associations have developed close links with the traders'
associations so that they can obtain help from the elder traders in following up debts.
Traders value the reputation of their association so members will put pressure on a
defaulting trader who has not repaid farmers as the case may jeopardise the business
of all members.
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6.6 Conclusion
The institutional aspects of the marketing system show how farmers' and traders'
enterprises can survive in very difficult conditions. In order to compete effectively
with others, each actor has to be able to draw on a range of customers and contacts so
that they can get access to key resources such as transport, information and credit. The
tomato marketing system has therefore evolved over the years and developed its own
procedures and bargaining processes. Two issues that shape each actor's ability to
function are the relationships of trust and the power relations that open opportunities
and place constraints on others as well. These two themes are developed in the next
chapter which looks at the marketing systems in the urban areas and the central
significance of the trader associations. This illustrates more formalised forms of
cooperation.
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Chapter 7 Institutions of marketing in urban areas
7.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with marketing institutions in the larger towns and cities. It
is based on data collected in Sunyani, Kumasi and Accra markets. The urban markets
are heavily influenced by the traders' associations that organise traders and have
powers over price negotiation, dispute settlement and supply control. They play a role
in shaping the retailing and portering system especially in Kumasi Central Market.
These institutions manage to sustain themselves when other group marketing
activities are very limited, and so this analysis aims to explore what their roles are
and how they are able to sustain collective action.
7.2 Association structures
Traders' associations are important players in the agricultural markets of Ghana and
similar forms have been found in other West African areas (Amonoo, 1975; Gladwin,
1980; Patten and Nukunya, 1983; Onokerhoraye, 1977; Saul, 1987; Smith and
Luttrell, 1994). Of particular interest in this chapter are the reasons why such groups
or associations arise, what determines their structure, how certain types of groups in
certain settings sustain themselves and why others fail. In asking these questions, I
draw on Granovetter (1994) and attempt to go beyond the functionalist or teleological
answers that suggest the motives for forming these institutions explain their
occurrence. Much of the New Institutional Economics empirical work makes the
implicit assumption that institutions exist purely to minimise transaction costs while
ignoring the limitations and opportunities that are the result of differing access to
resources and power. I pose a similar question to Granovetter (1994) who asks why
"in every known capitalist economy, firms do not conduct business as isolated units,
but rather form cooperative relations with other firms" (ibid: 454)1.
1 Granovetter refers to business groups which he defines as a "collection of firms
bound together in some formal and/or informal ways". He excludes the sets of firms
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There has been long standing debate over the role and benefit of associations in
business. Politicians and the media in Ghana, and elsewhere in the world, have been
highly critical of these associations in the past, drawing on preconceived ideas that
treat traders as scapegoats without the backing of research into the impact of
marketing systems 2 (Hollier, 1985). However, there are a range of other roles that
associations play which can minimise the transaction costs of the individual members
through what Schmitz (1995) refers to as 'collective efficiency'. In recent years there
has been a growing interest and acceptance of traders' associations. They are seen as
an important part of civil society mediating between the public and private sector in
the context of liberalised economies (Moore and Hamalai, 1993: 1895).
There is a long history of traders' associations in Ghana. In Kumasi, Clark (1994)
found that their origin was linked to the vacuum created when the colonial authorities
restricted the influence of chiefs over market affairs after the 1900s (ibid: 251). In the
pre-colonial period there were reports of "powerful guildlike organisations [that] gave
the trading magnates or abirempon political influence" (ibid: 87-88). Clark also states
that their roles were formalised between the 1930s and 1950s, linked to the
construction of wholesale yards. Gore (1978) found that the Koforidua market
associations flowered in the NIcrumah regime (1957-1966) as growth was encouraged
to mobilise local political support.
Traders' association roles include welfare of the traders, reducing conflicts,
controlling supplies, establishing an arena for setting prices, spreading information to
traders and representing the traders outside the market. Of particular interest in Ghana
bound by short term strategic alliances and those firms which are legally consolidated
into a single one.
2There is a long tradition of such perceptions, including Adam Smith's much repeated
statement in The Wealth of Nations that "people of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices" (Smith, 1776/1976: 145).
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is the structure of these associations with their formal leadership that draws on
traditional chieftaincy structures3.
In large markets, each commodity has an association and is led by an ohemma. In the
context of markets, ohemrna can be translated as market queen, although the term is
taken from the traditional title given to the leading woman of a chieftaincy. The
ohemma is chosen on personal qualities such as age, emotional reliability, familiarity
with market affairs, skills in negotiation and dispute settlement, financial
independence and wealth. Wealth is important so she can afford the time to carry out
her duties (Gore, 1978: 292). She is not paid a wage but receives gifts in kind; the
tomato queens receive a number of tomatoes from each crate sold. In Kumasi market
she is elected from amongst the 'elders for life but can be rejected or "destooled"
(Clark, 1994) while in Sunyani the present ohenuna for tomatoes was put in place by
the Sunyanihemma (the ohemma for the chieftaincy of the Sunyani traditional area).
Assisting the ohemma are a group of elders, paninfo, who advise and help her. In
Kumasi Central Market the associations for different commodities also employ a
secretary, usually male. The secretary of the tomato association started the job when
his mother was the old ohemma; he is treated as one of the elders. He is paid
according to how may crates come in. His role is to document the number of crates
each trader brings to avoid disputes later. He takes notes at meetings and deals with
contacts with the Kumasi Municipal Assembly and national bodies.
The associations are divided by commodity but, in most markets, there are
associations of vegetable sellers that includes garden eggs and, at times, pepper and
okra. In Kumasi the okra and leafy vegetable sellers have a separate association. This
may be due to the fact that most of the members are migrants from the north of
Ghana, as these commodities are not popular among Akans. The ohemma is usually a
tomato seller as they are the more important economically. The Techiman market
may be an exception as the ohemma of vegetables is a dried pepper seller. Pepper is
3 Livingstone (1996:34) found similar titles and structures in a wide range of
associations in Ghana.
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more important than tomatoes there because of Techiman's special role as a relay
market for less perishable produce.
The associations in each of the markets studied cover retailers, resident wholesalers
and itinerant traders. Within the formal association there are informal groupings of
retailers, itinerant traders and sedentary wholesalers who each select two or three
traders to bargain on their behalf. There are also divisions within each group based on
seniority and privileged access to marketing opportunities.
The groups are more homogenous in terms of ethnicity and gender, which is seen as
an important reason for their long term sustainability. Membership is relatively fluid
as some traders may stop for a period and then return. There is a registration fee when
starting called the amanten nsa (literally the 'latecomers wine'), which is higher for
the itinerant traders than the retailers.
There are also other associations and groups linked to the traders. In Kumasi there are
groups of Gao porters from Mali who are responsible for carrying and selling the
crates of tomatoes on behalf of the itinerant traders and wholesalers. There are also
associations of drivers who make up the Tomato Cargo Branch of the GPRTU
(Ghana Private Road-users Trade Union).
The association tries to make the selling as quick as possible for its members. In
Kumasi, the 'elders' act as commission agents and play a role in reducing the
transaction costs as they sell for some of the itinerant traders and farmers. They are
always present in the market and so allow the trader to visit the farm again or rest
while the produce is being sold. Much of the trade to retailers is done on credit with
the retailer paying back later that day or occasionally the next day. The commission
agent has the important information of the credit worthiness of the retailers and the
location of their stalls so that the money can be collected.
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7.3 Services and roles of the traders' associations
This section will look in detail at the roles and services of the traders' marketing
associations. While an understanding of the services and roles of associations can
explain why the members want to have an association, they do not explain how an
association is established and sustained.
7.3.1 Welfare
When asked about the role of the associations, the consistent reply from traders is that
they are there for welfare reasons, and for support of members at funerals for their
relatives. Social implications of funeral attendance revolve around status for the
bereaved person and their family. Prestige is gained when someone of high status,
such as the ohemma, comes to the funeral with a large number of her fellow traders.
In economic terms, associations assist the bereaved with contributions from the other
traders (C500 each in 1996). This can be used to defray the cost of the lavish funerals
expected among the people of southern Ghana and especially the Akan groups. Those
who do not contribute will not have help when they are bereaved and may also suffer
from a lack of support in disputes in the market.
In his study of Koforidua market, Gore (1978: 292) refers to funeral donations as an
insurance scheme to ensure that a trader's working capital is not lost and Dennis and
Peprah (1995) refer to it as a 'cushion' for unpredictability. Livingstone (1996: 33)
suggests that mutual aid groups are an extension of cooperative work that exists at the
level of the household, especially for women. The importance of welfare roles of
associations are also stressed by Gyelcye and Chinbuah (1995, cited in Livingstone,
1996) in their study of cooperatives and associations. They claim that most
associations exist for members "to help each other meet individual goals, provide a
kind of collective insurance, assisting each other in times of need, or bereavement". A
similar point has been made with respect to associations in Kenya (Haan, 1998).
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7.3.2 Reducing transaction costs
The transaction costs relevant to traders include information about prices,
production, reputation of other traders and farmers, transport4 and calibration of
weights and measures, as well as dispute resolution (Harriss-White, 1996: 340;
Whetham, 1972: 88). Smith and Luttrell (1994: 330) in their study of the egbe
associations in Ibadan, Nigeria, found that the "associations' regulatory activities in
the rural markets and contractual arrangements with transporters enable their
members to have greater information concerning rural purchase prices and transport
costs, and hence to some extent prices in urban markets other than their own". This
information is not disseminated formally but through gossiping with other members
of the association with whom they have built up social relations over some time.
Menlchoff (1994:119) also comments on the importance of gossip as an efficient
'information service' among Chinese traders' associations in Singapore. However,
the use of gossip is quite discriminatory and not all members of the association have
equal access to it. Farmers frequently complain that traders do not tell their
colleagues if there is a large supply of tomatoes in one area as the price may then
increase when more traders arrive. This was denied by traders
Information is also needed for extending credit and members of the association know
the credit rating of their colleagues through observing them over some time. Similar
situations are described by Clark in Kumasi market where other traders will
encourage repayment to protect their general reputation and know not to support
those with outstanding debts (Clark, 1994:222)5 . In this way associations can be seen
4 Transaction costs can be lowered by helping traders get access to transport. The
association will negotiate with the transport union over the price of transport per box.
Smith and Luttrell (1994: 329) note that associations in Ibadan contract transporters
for their services and for insurance in case of damage or loss of goods. They also act
as transporters of last resort when there is a disruption of regular services, providing
alternatives that the traders would not have time or energy to seek out. This was not
found to be happening in any of the markets studied.
5 Dennis and Peprah (1995:46) show that being seen as a member of an association
improves the traders credit rating. Smith and Luttrell (1994: 330) report that in Ibadan,
"association members have a great deal of information about each other and their
business activities, and hence have no difficulty ... in screening potential borrowers
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as brokers of trust. Unlike the orange sellers in Kumasi Central Market, mentioned by
(Clark, 1994: 223), the tomato association does not operate a formal system with
credit recorders and collectors, although the existence of the association reduces the
risk of lending and allows the traders to lend greater amounts to each other.
The credit flow system in the Kumasi Central Market for tomato traders centres on
the role of the `Gao' porters (see section 7.5.1 for a detailed discussion). The retailers
take the goods from the itinerant traders on credit and the Gao will collect the money
later in the day. The Gao build up links to the retailer and they are responsible for
collecting the money.
7.3.3 Settling disputes
The leaders of the association are selected for their skills in negotiation and dispute
settlement and this allows the traders to work more efficiently, reducing their
transaction costs. These costs come in the form of wasted time and the extra costs of
ensuring that goods or money are not stolen. This allows traders to operate without
bringing in the police or formal court proceedings that are very costly and not trusted
by the traders. In settling disputes, both sides openly state their case to the elders and
ohemma who decide who is to blame and what action should be taken. Clark (1994)
describes a range of conflicts in Kumasi Central Market in detail and stresses the
importance of group solidarity and respect for the ohemma in settling disputes. One
of the main punishments or deterrents is the bad publicity and damage to a traders'
reputation or creditworthiness.
The power of the association in settling disputes does not extend outside the market
itself. There is often conflict between traders when at the farm gate. This was
frequently observed when one trader arranges a price and another trader comes with a
higher price and the farmer empties the harvested tomatoes into the crate of the trader
and monitoring credit usage. Furthermore there is no enforcement problem, for the
costs of default are significant. The borrower, in effect, puts his or her social
standing, business reputation, and business contacts as collateral."
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with the higher price. One such case was reported to the Kumasi Central Market
ohemma and the offending trader was banned for two months. However, the
punishment was deemed ineffective as she gave her working capital to a relative to
carry on the business for her. Exceptions to the limited power of the association
outside the market occurs during the harvesting period in the Tono irrigation scheme
in the Upper East Region of Ghana. This is discussed in section 7.4.
7.3.4 Arenas for price setting
Linked to the reduction of disputes, the associations act to establish bargaining
etiquette and an arena for bargaining over prices. Traders are frequently accused by
the media and public figures of fixing prices but a detailed study of the functioning of
the associations in Kumasi and Sunyani does not bear this out. The association is
made up of retailers and itinerant or sedentary wholesale traders and representatives
of each will bargain on behalf of the others. In setting the price, all the traders have
to ensure that the produce being sold will be retailed that day or the next, so they will
set the price after knowing the supply entering the market that day. The retailers will
consider the farm gate price, the marketing costs and profit margins of the itinerant
traders bringing the produce in. The ohemma will not play a role unless there is
dispute between the two groups that delays the setting of the price for the day.
By setting the price at the beginning of the day, the selling of the produce is easier
and there is less bargaining on each crate. The price is set for the early sales of
premium quality produce and, later in the day, the prices tend to drop as there is
limited storage and there may be difficulties selling the produce the next day when
fresh produce has arrived at the market. If the price is set too high at the beginning of
the day then the drop in price will be greater as itinerant traders will try to clear their
stocks.
There are opportunities for the retailers to bargain if the produce is perceived to be
below premium quality or it is later in the day. The Gao men may be bargaining when
representing the itinerant traders although they have to get approval from the trader or
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an elder of the association before reducing the price. This supports the findings by
Gore (1978) and Clark (1994: 249) that direct price manipulation by market leaders
and associations is very limited.
In the part of the Kumasi market which depends on tomato farmers coming to sell
through the commission agents, there are no fixed prices and there is bargaining every
time with the commission agent mediating. The quality in this market is much better
as the farmers do more grading themselves. There are others who grade the produce
further and sell in 'rubbers' (black plastic buckets). See table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Prices and quality of graded tomatoes
Price	 Quality
C6,000 The very best quality - big, red no damage
C4,000 Big, red, very few defects. The usual top quality
C3,500 Big but cracked
C3,500 Hard but small/medium sized
C3,000 Soft and medium/small sized
C2,000 Rotting and soft
C2,000 Less ripe, smaller and pest damaged
C1,200 Very unripe
Note: Prices given for one 'rubber' (8-9 kg bucket) in Kumasi Central Market August 2, 1996
7.3.5 Controlling the supply
While the traders cannot fix prices, they can have an impact on competition, and
therefore price, by controlling the supply entering the markets and the number of
traders allowed to sell. This has been observed in many West African markets (Bauer,
1963: 391; Gore, 1978: 300; Ministry of Agriculture, 1987: 16; Smith and Luttrell,
1994).
By controlling entry into the market, the traders in the association can increase their
bargaining power against other traders and farmers who do not have the option of
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selling their produce themselves. This keeps the prices higher for consumers than
they would otherwise be, decreases the price for farmers if there are fewer buyers,
increases the losses on the farms when there is no market for the ripe fruit and
reduces the marketed output of the commodity. Bauer (1963: 37) states that this can
reduce national income per head by "hindering the most economical use of
resources... [and] retarding the growth and development of the economy". The
political implications of this debate came to the fore in Ghana in 1979 and 1982 when
traders were portrayed as the cause of economic difficulties and suffered verbal and
physical attacks by agents of the government (Clark, 1994: 216).
Traders state that there are benefits to supply control in terms of reducing over
supply. Gluts can result in post harvest losses in the market, in terms of lower value
produce being thrown away, as there are limited storage facilities for perishable crops
such as tomatoes. Controlling supplies also allows the produce to be sold quickly and
avoids congestion from unsold boxes. However, when there is a glut due to a rapid
increase in supply, a common occurrence with tomato crops, then it is the farmers
who will suffer and have to accept losses.
Traders want to sell quickly so that their capital is not tied up and they can continue
to trade. They justify having control over the supply in order to reduce the risk of
losing all their working capital from sudden changes in price 6 as shown in figure 6.2.
One trader stated:
"Last trip to Kumasi I lost heavily as there was over supply .... [the price in
Kumasi market was C35,000 for one crate of tomatoes when she left and
C15,000 when she returned] ... I took 60 boxes and made a big loss. Now I only
have enough for 15 boxes" (Effiah, Kumasi trader, Interview 15).
Capital for trading perishable crops is scarce so such losses will reduce the amount
that itinerant traders can market and will increase the margins that they require to
sustain their business in the long term. Relatively large amounts of capital are
6 This argument has been put forward by Smith and Luttrell (1994), in relation to
Ibadan, Nigeria, and Whetham (1972: 89) and Jones (1972) in studies of markets in
west Africa in general
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required for tomato marketing and the risks are very high compared to other trading
activities. The variation in price can be seen from figure 6.1. Dennis and Peprah
(1995: 48) justify the roles of associations in Techiman market and state that:
"it may be that some regulation of social and economic relationships is
necessary to provide the confidence for traders to expand their operations and
risk in a trading system".
The extent to which this is a form of extracting monopolistic profits and of
exploitation of farmers and consumers, or a way of keeping prices steady to protect
limited trader capital, appears to be linked to different authors' personal views rather
than any clear analysis of data (Hollier, 1985; Harriss, 1982). Evidence to support
either side of the argument is lacking. Many studies have shown that there is a certain
level of competition and information that flows around the system (Southworth et al,
1979; Gladwin, 1980: 135; Jones, 1972: 105) and go on to suggest that these
associations do not significantly alter the competitive nature of food marketing
(Smith and Luttrell, 1994). Amonoo (1975: 29) states that:
"In analysing the foodstuff marketing system in the Central region of Ghana,
we conclude that the flow of commodities is normally influenced by such
factors as rain, drought and harvest, and much less by the institutions that
handle the flow ... Indeed, the queens are not really able to regulate the flow
and prices of goods because there are no binding agreements between them
and intermediaries. It appears that there is no deliberate policy to create an
oligopoly."
However, Harriss (1982) explores the problems with the existing data on food
markets in West Africa, and questions the validity of the associated analysis and the
conclusions that the markets are competitive, despite contradictory evidence that
there are very strong barriers to entry.
This study has found that there are varying degrees of competition which change from
market to market, within the market, and from day to day. Limited evidence7 does
7 Calculations of margins in complex and informal markets are highly problematic
and require a detailed study of daily produce price and marketing costs fluctations
(Hollier, 1985: 405-9)
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suggest that the Accra traders can have bigger margins, as shown in tables 6.1 and
6.2, and this was supported by many claims of envious traders from other markets.
However, tables 6.1 and 6.2, and figure 6.2 show that prices and margins fluctuate
dramatically from day to day. All of the traders' association leaders interviewed
stated that they wanted to have more control over the market but could- not. This
supports Gore's (1978: 300) point on the study of collusion in Koforidua food
market:
"Trading associations have a clear economic purpose, that is to ensure the
survival of their members' businesses and to boost their profits by
manipulating prices or supplies. They have all enacted rules to control market
conduct towards this end. One cannot but expect it. From this viewpoint of
market structure, the critical issue is not whether they attempt collusive action
but what factors limit their power".
7.3.6 Associations to represent members
The traders are working in a political environment and use the association to
represent them in dealings with the government and traditional authorities, as well as
other market associations and associations of transporters. Much of this work is done
by the ohemma, or by the secretary in Kumasi market, either formally through written
letters or meetings with officials, or informally at public events, especially funerals.
The latter are important in building up connections that can be drawn on in times of
need (Clark, 1994). When there are official functions to perform that cut across a
range of commodities, there is a clear hierarchy of associations, led by the yam
sellers.
Links to the local government are important to secure rights to trade. The most
important links are to the Municipal or District Assemblies which are responsible for
the market infrastructure and collect a sizeable proportion of their revenue from taxes
on the traders. Despite the returns coming in from the markets, the selling areas in
Kumasi and Sunyani and most of the other smaller markets studied have received
very little investment over the years. There are, for example, no covered or paved
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areas and no water supply although there are infrastructthe projects taking place in
Kumasi and Techiman as part of World Bank initiated projects.
The lack of support in the past is linked to the long standing policy of successive
governments to see traders as a restriction on development and therefore not an area
to invest in. Associations often have to provide the market infrastructure themselves.
Southworth et al (1979: 171) reports that the yam traders association in Atebubu,
Ghana provided some storage and protection from theft to their members, although
Clark (1994:157-9) found that the physical space was limited for any large scale
storage in Kumasi Central Market. However, she found that the associations had
erected many of the stalls in the wholesale yard and levelled the land in the 1930s
(ibid: 251). The associations in Ibadan paid for the improvement of roads around the
market when the government failed to do so (Smith and Luttrell, 1994: 330).
Traders' associations also have to lobby the government agencies to secure their
positions and barriers to entry. In Kumasi there are the well known cases of the
ethnically based trading group of Gaos from Mali who were removed by the
authorities following lobbying (Bauer, 1963), although now the powers of the traders
associations are much less. Clark (1994: 121) attributes this to the decline in access to
political decision making following the lapse of electoral politics in the 1970s and
1980s. There are examples of traders' associations in other countries developing in
order to negotiate with goverment officials. Babb (1989) reports on the groups in
Peru and Harriss-White (1993) gives a review of several market systems with traders
associations in South Asia; associations in Tamil Nadu have developed as a response
to unionised labour, the threat of regulation and the threat from capitalist farmers. In
this way the traders are able to gain political power and defend their interests. Harriss
White (1993: 61) questions the social costs of these activities to society and suggests
that there is a need for legal reform and the encouragement of other forms of civil
society such as labourer, consumer and producer groups to regulate the merchants.
Although there is much public rhetoric levelled at the traders' associations by
government bodies, the bureaucrats and politicians often prefer to deal with a single
representative for the sake of administrative convenience (Moore and Hamalai,
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1993:1896; Bauer, 1963:37). There have also been attempts to co-opt the traders into
political parties at various times since independence and the present government has
set up a national umbrella organisation to strengthen their political base in the small
business sector (Haan, 1998). While the leaders of the Kumasi vegetable sellers
associations were working with the government initiated organisation, they were not
actively supporting it8.
The links to the chiefs are also important. They play a role in settling disputes and
have control over the traders as they own the land in many of the markets. The traders
recognise this and the associations are responsible for collecting produce for the chief
every week in Sunyani and particularly at special events. Clark (1994:270) also
suggests that the associations and market ohemma publicly attend certain events
linked to the traditional leaders in order to keep up the image of the market. However,
the traders' links to the Asante chieftaincy are ambiguous as they cannot rely on the
full protection of customary law but can draw on the chiefly connections when under
threat (ibid: 413). In this way the traders' associations are similar to the farmer
associations as both have the option to use the authority of chiefs if the need arises.
7.4 Powers of exclusion and controlling the market space
As mentioned earlier, the traders' associations use their control of nodal or key
spaces, such as the wholesale yards in the major markets, in order to have greater
control over the marketing system as a whole Clark (1994:127). In this way power is
exercised by limiting access and membership. The control of the market space differs
between markets but it occurs, to a certain extent, in all markets in southern Ghana.
8This is not surprising considering the strength of the opposition parties in Kumasi
and the history of abuse that many members of the present ruling party gave to the
traders, most notably in the early 1980s during military rule. This is compounded with
the memory of difficulties faced when the traders were more politically aligned in the
1950s (Clark, 1994: 277).
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However, the issue of exclusion is contentious and hard to define. Traders'
association elders claim they do not exclude, as long as the person pays the
subscription fees and is accepted by the other members. Farmers and other traders not
in the association complain of not being able to sell when they want to. The extent of
the control also differs, with greater restrictions over entry in the Accra markets. This
may be a cause of the higher margins received there (see table 6.2).
A study in Ibadan (Smith and Luttrell, 1994), found that traders were controlling the
supply areas by preventing non-members from buying in the rural areas. This was not
found to occur in the tomato trade in Ghana except with reference to the supplies
from the Tono irrigation Scheme in Bolgatanga in Upper East Region. Tomatoes are
produced in the dry season and supplied to the major cities. The elders of the Kumasi
and Accra markets have a tight control over which of their members buy from the
Upper East farmers and there are many reports of them operating monopolistic
control over the supplies from this area. Traders mentioned that this was accepted as
a privilege of their elders, although detailed studies were not possible. Their control
in this location may be due to the centralised pattern of production at an irrigation site
compared to the dispersed production by other tomato producers.
The other traders are allowed to buy from other areas such as Brong Ahafo, although
the quality of the produce from these areas is lower. As dry season production in
Brong Ahafo is increasing, the control of the Kumasi and Accra traders over the
supply of tomatoes to the urban areas during the dry season is diminishing.
Control may also be exerted in the form of limiting the days that each trader can bring
produce into the market and the number of crates each trader can bring. This does not
occur in Kumasi tomato market but it is an important form of control in Accra and
smaller markets such as Sunyani. In Sunyani there are two groups of traders and they
have set days when they can bring tomatoes from the towns. The 20 senior traders
(nkwainsofo opaninfo), are allowed to sell 10 or 15 boxes depending on their
seniority. Membership of the senior group is inherited from mothers, aunts or
grandmothers. The 45 'junior traders' (nkwainsofo nkwada), are allowed to bring in
five crates each on Thursdays.
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The major traders' associations also try to control supply by allocating days for
itinerant traders to bring produce to the market; this is an attempt to ensure that there
are no gluts. The Accra tomato markets are well organised with between one and five
sub-groups in each market. Each group is allowed to bring in a certain number of
trucks per day, depending on the supply on the previous days. However, the ability of
the Kumasi market to restrict supply is limited9.
The sanctions available to the market association leaders include physical obstruction
of the trucks bringing in the produce, confiscation of goods, fines and banning of
itinerant traders from the market, although the most common recourse is for the
elders or ohemma to sell on the offending trader's behalf and take a large
commission. In Kumasi the extent of the commission varies, depending on the person
bringing the produce and the supply to the market that day. In Sunyani, the action
taken depends on whether it is a small amount being brought in by the farmers or if
there is a truck load brought in by an itinerant trader. In the former case, the farmer
has to accept a lower price and pay the ohemma C500 and four fruit per box, while
larger scale traders are pressured to leave by the wholesalers and local itinerant
traders to avoid the market becoming flooded. There is a conflict of interest within
the associations as the retailers want the cheaper produce but the wholesalers and
itinerant traders are more powerful.
Local Sunyani traders who break the rules and bring in more boxes of tomatoes than
they are allowed expect to have them confiscated and sold. This has also been
reported in the markets in Ibadan (Smith and Luttrell, 1994) and Burkina Faso (Saul,
1987; Sherman, 1984). Traders also reported that offenders were banned from
visiting the farmers to buy in bulk, although this is not possible to police effectively
as these traders may lend their working capital to relatives working in the tomato
trade to buy on their behalf.
9The garden egg traders of Kumasi had organised this with the farmers in the village
of Abesim that specialises in this vegetable and it is also reported among the onion
farmers of south east Ghana (Patten and Nukunya, 1982).
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The ability to enforce punishments differs from market to market and there are no
cases reported of traders using the formal legal system to settle disputes. The ability
to enforce punishments and to ensure that all the buyers restrain from buying cheaper
produce from non members depends on the strength of the association leadership, the
cohesion of the group, the balance of power between wholesalers and retailers, the
physical planning of the market and the support of the District Assembly or
Municipal Authority.
Accra markets have a reputation for being the most restricted of the large markets in
Ghana. The leadership association is strong and they can keep out or penalise non-
members using various threats, both economic and physical. One common tactic is to
insist on speaking the Ga language, which restricts the possible opportunities for
those from the producing areas in Ashanti and Brong Ahab° Region \who ait INNi
speakers. Accra traders discourage others from coming to Accra by spreading
rumours about the threats to, and treatment of, non members.
Kumasi market is less restrictive and the division of who is a market association
member and who is not is less clear. There are many traders from the producing areas
that are also members of the association and allowed to sell there, although these are
mainly Akan women. It appears that there is a certain moral economy 10 and as one
trader stated:
"Kumasi has been a trading centre for so long .... so there is a custom that
everyone has the right to sell and make a living. If we stop someone then they
can go to complain to the Asantehene or [Asante] ohemma." (Kumasi trader,
Interview 13)
Clark (1994:228) also found in Kumasi market that traders referred to the moral right
of a woman to earn a living for herself and her children.
The ability to punish through exclusion depends on the physical planning of the
market. In Kumasi, there are a number of entrances and three locations for selling
10 The concept of a moral economy is drawn on heavily by Scott (1976) and even
earlier by E. P. Thompson (1971). Granovetter (1994) quotes from Thompson in his
discussion on the normative and acceptable behaviour in an economy.
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tomatoes which means that traders excluded from one area can sell elsewhere. The
main area is by the well established tomato and yam yard while the second is on the
other side of the market. The second market used to be in the 'lorry park', or bus
station and started in parallel to the main tomato market following the early policies
of the Rawlings regime which reduced the powers of the associations. In the early
1980s traders in this second area were ordered to move into the market. They have
some links to the main association, although they have set up their own associational
structure for settling minor disputes, and have different selling patterns and units of
sale. The third area in of tomato sales in Kumasi Central Market appeared in the past
two years and is on a site that was previously a lorry park but is now part of the
infrastructural improvement programme for the market. The traders have not been
moved off the area as the Municipal Authority is raising taxes from the traders there.
Similar restrictions on the traders' ability to control tne supplies were report.tcl
Gore (1978) in Koforidua and Lyon (1999a) in Kasoa. One Kasoa trader stated:
"This is not like the big town markets where the ohemma can force people ...
Here the entire market is not fenced so it is difficult to enforce such a law. Now
they are building a market a few miles away - when it is built then maybe we
can have those laws".11.
The ability of the association to control the market shifts over time and depends on
the access that the traders have to policy makers and local elites. This includes both
the government (national, regional and local) and the traditional authority. The
District Assemblies have powers that can have serious impacts on the market system.
Firstly they are responsible for the planning of new market structures, and secondly
they can set up laws that restrict the sale of produce outside the markets. The control
of selling outside the markets is based on town planning regulations that allow
District Assemblies to specify which economic activities can take place in certain
areas. This is enforced by the police. The extent to which such laws are established
and followed through depends on the lobbying power of different interest groups. In
11 The new market is part of the World Bank funded Agricultural Sector
Improvement Project. The implications of these new markets could entail
considerable loss of earnings to many farmers and consumers if the traders are able to
exert more monopolistic power.
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many cases the local traders are a powerful and vocal lobby that has greater influence
than disunited farmers or traders from outside the district.
The District Assemblies are often faced with several competing claims. On the one
hand they are dependent on the markets for raising a large proportion of their
revenue. This is easier if the markets are structured and organised, with all the traders
in one area, renting stalls from the assembly. However, as explained above, this can
have implications for both consumers and farmers. The District Assemblies also have
to balance the demands of traders to secure their livelihood against the complaints
from farmers and traders who are not members of local associations. There is a
further complication as the District Assemblies may have a reduction in their revenue
if people are restricted from trading.
Farmers can call on the District Assembly if they are restricted from selling in the
markets. A case where this occurred was reported by the District Chief Executive in
Gomoa, Central Region:
"At times, in Swedru, my people took pepe [chilli pepper] and tomatoes. The
queens were dictating what they bring and at what price. I went to see my
counterpart, he called the leaders and warned them - he said this was against
the law of the land"
It is interesting to note that this single case involved farmers wanting to sell in a
market outside their district, where the DCE had nothing to loose in confronting the
traders. It is not known what the outcome was. In other cases the district authorities
do not take any action.
The traders lobby the District Assembly by visiting the leaders, electing assembly
men to represent market interests and also threatening violence against those non
members trying to sell. Another District Chief Executive in the Central Region
narrated the following case:
"There was the case of the Techiman yam sellers who came with a lorry and
sold cheap yams on the roadside. Local traders tried to restrict them. There
was almost a fight and the Techiman women went to the police. Trade
associations can be good - it acts like a check it is like tariffs in world trade.
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Whether we like it or not there are cartels elsewhere [in Ghana]. So if you
come and sell below the price in the market then you destabilise the market. I
told this to the Techiman women - `yours is temporary', I have to protect my
whole market, who will sell at other times otherwise. I told them `you can sell
in the designated areas'. I told my women that we are in a free economy so
can't stop people, but they have to play by the rules, so if they have cheap
yams, local women traders can buy at your cheap price and sell on. It's hard
for us politicians - we don't protect the women they say we are not in their
interest but we can't go against our government policy."
The issue of the District Assembly's role in deciding who has the right to trade raises
wider questions about the whole decentralisation process 12 . The literature states that it
is aimed to give a voice to local people and allow a more participatory form of
politics. In reality the District Assemblies are often directed by powerful local lobbies
that are empowered by decentralisation but which disempower other local groups. In
this case, the traders' associations appear more powerful than the farmers. There are
no functioning farmers association as the Ghana National Association of Farmers and
Fishermen (GNAFF) does not play an active role and is constrained by its close
political ties.
7.5 Institutions of retailing
Retailers in the urban markets can be stall holders who sell on the ground or hawk
produce by carrying it around the market, or around other parts of the town. Often the
hawkers are daughters or relatives of the small-holders. Women will usually inherit
the right to trade in the market from their mothers or aunts and they will spend time
learning how to bargain, the conventions of the market, judging quality and quantity,
and about getting customers.
12The process of decentralisation in Ghana has taken place through the 1970s and
then again in the late 1980s and 1990s. Ayee (1994) is critical of the present process
and distinguishes between political decentralisation as devolution and administrative
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7.5.1 Institutions for portering
Kumasi Central Market has a slightly different tomato selling system from the other
markets studied that will be considered separately here. There are a larger number of
itinerant traders who are not based in Kumasi, but in the producing areas. They-arrive
in the market and sell to the retailers through the Gao men. These men are originally
from Mali but came to Kumasi as porters. Today they play a larger role; as well as
unloading trucks and carrying the produce, they also sell on behalf of the itinerant
trader, distribute the boxes of tomatoes to the retailers and go to collect the money at
the end of the day. Some may also pay the drivers on behalf of the itinerant traders
when the goods arrive and are repaid when the traders collect the money from the
tomato sales.
The role of the Gao porters developed because elderly traders could not carry the
tomatoes and there was a high rate of stealing from the tomato boxes. As one older
trader said: "We found that they [the porters] could be trusted even more than our
family members and with any amount of money". A younger trader claimed: "our
mothers invited the Gao and now our mothers have adopted them as their children."
This system appears to have started 20 to 30 years ago. Not all of the porters are from
the Gao ethnic group but any person who carries out these tasks is referred to as 'a
Gao'.
The ohemma has control over the Gao and can sack them at any time. During the field
work she banned two of them from the market for fighting. There are 10 groups of
Gao and each is linked to one of the 10 elders. Each Gao group leader has been
working with their elder since they arrived and many Gao were invited to live in the
same house. The members of each group are brothers or nephews of the leader and
the person who introduces a new member to a group is held responsible for their
conduct.
decentralisation as deconcentration. Ayee suggests that the early policies in Ghana
followed the latter.
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Each man in the group will have responsibility for a certain number of boxes, and
they will mark these with their initials or nick names. (There may also be other
markings on the box relating to retailers who are regular customers.) The traders own
the boxes but often get the Gao to buy them and then reimburse them later. They will
carry and sell these boxes on behalf of the trader and do maintenance on them after
each trip.
In 1996-7 the Gao were paid C2000 per box sold, from which they have to pay the
fees to Kumasi Metropolitan Authority and the association. The elders also receive
some money and the rest is kept by the Gao. The money is shared among each group
and divided at the end of the week. The Gao also receive two to three tomatoes for
themselves from each crate as payment. The boxes weigh between 70 and 80 kg and
this limits the number of people who are able to do this work.
Gao also sell on behalf of traders who do not want to sit in the sun (see section 7.3.4).
The price is usually fixed but the retailers can bargain over quality and ask for lower
prices later in the day. The Gao will bargain and check with the seller, or the queen
mother if the seller is not there, before finalising the sale. The Gao were paid 6
tomatoes per crate in 1996. Retailers who are far from the tomato yard will need the
Gao to carry the box to their stall. The money may be paid later and the Gao is
responsible for bringing the money back.
Tomato traders with good links to the Gao send produce to Kumasi unaccompanied.
The Gao man will sell it for them and then send the money back with other traders or
a driver. They will tie the money up in a bundle with a special knot that will indicate
if anyone has tried to tamper with it. Traders do not send produce unaccompanied
often, as the price changes so suddenly in the market that they prefer to be there to
ensure they obtain a good price.
As mentioned in section 7.3.2, the transaction costs of marketing are reduced as the
itinerant traders give on credit to retailers with the Gao acting as guarantors. The
itinerant traders would not be able to do this as they do not have the information on
the creditworthiness of the retailers, where they sell or where they live. The Gao will
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deliver in the morning and collect the money in the afternoon. If the retailer cannot
pay then the Gao is responsible for paying the itinerant trader using his own money,
or borrowing from other Gao. Alternatively he may ask the itinerant trader to wait for
a few days.
There are very few reported cases of the Gao not paying and they are trusted by all the
traders. This is because they have been there a long time, the traders work with the
same Gao each time and they all recognise their are in a weak and insecure position.
If there are cases of cheating then it would be very easy for the elders of the
association to stop using them. As they are not from Kumasi, they can get little
support to protect their position.
7.5.2 Credit to retailers
The retail system in other markets is based on similar credit arrangements, although
without the role of Gao intermediaries. Itinerant traders or commission agents have
customer relationships with retailers similar to those between traders and farmers.
When giving goods on credit, the itinerant trader is repaid at the end of the day or
several days later. If the itinerant trader does not want to wait they can collect the
money the next time they come to the market. There were no reported cases of
retailers advancing capital to itinerant traders, although this may have been due to the
stigma attached to admitting such deals (Clark, 1994).
The extent of selling on credit is shown in table 7.2. The percentage of itinerant
traders selling on credit is lower in small towns as many of them are retailers
themselves and only sell to consumers. The amount of credit and length of time it is
given will depend on the quantity the retailer can sell and the trust between the two
parties: A young trader in Wenchi stated:
"We start with smaller credit and when the person is truthful and repays each
time she buys, we continue to trust her and give more" (Eunice Amponsah,
Wenchi trader, Interview 13).
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The itinerant traders need to know the location of the house so that they can follow up
any debts:
"I have traded with them for more than five years so I have confidence. 	
know the house and the town and I can go to visit them when money delays to see
if the person is sick or the business is not going well" (Effiah Hemma, -Techiman
trader, Interview 22).
When selling on credit to traders who work in the same market, the risks are reduced
as they are members of the same association, know each other and the close
proximity of trading means that they cannot avoid creditors.
Table 7.2 Traders selling on credit
Small town Kumasi
Central
Asafo market,
Kumasi
Accra: 31st
December and
Total
Market Agbogbloshi
16 interviewed	 12 interviewed
4 interviewed 5 interviewed 37 interviewed
Yes 56.3% 83.3% 100% 100% 75.7%
No 37.3% 8.3% 0 0 18.9%
Don't know/
unwilling to
answer
6.3% 8.3% 0 0 5.4%
However, most itinerant traders reported that they are owed some money from
retailers unable pay as they had lost all their money. The itinerant trader can ask the
ohemma to help settle the dispute but this may not be possible if the retailer has
stopped selling. In one case in Accra, there was a dispute over the amount of money
owed and the case was taken to the chief:
"One retailer owes me C365,000 from over 6 years ago. The case is before the
elders of the Ga chief She reported that the total amount is not correct .... I
won the case and she has deposited C200,000 with the elders about 5 months
ago. ... I will collect the total amount after full payment" (Comfort, Accra
trader, Interview 42).
The chiefs decision was accepted by the offending trader because if she fails to
comply, she could not expect to get support from the chief or other members of the
community in future.
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7.5.3 Institutions for sales to consumers
Retail prices are usually fixed for the day for a given quantity, but retailers try to
attract customers by changing the quality of the produce, the size of the piles and gifts
(dash) given after the sale has taken place. There is a wide range of sizes and qualities
and some of the consumers pride themselves on being able to select the best buy from
what appears to others to be relatively similar qualities and quantities. Consumers
will thus examine the piles of vegetables on a range of retailers' tables or mats before
selecting.
The size and the quality of the dash given by the retailers depends on the relationship
between the retailers and buyer and it is important in retaining custom. It is often as
much as 50% extra, although it may be of lower quality and is taken from a container
under the stall so that other potential customers will not see how much is given, and
so will not demand a larger quantity when they buy. This creates serious problems for
the collection of retail price data.
There is a convention in markets that traders cannot steal customers or people about
to buy from other traders. This reduces the potential for conflict and the relationship
between retailers is one of colleagues, rather than competitors. Neighbours will look
after each others' stall for long periods of time and sell on behalf of their neighbour
even when they have similar products.
Retailers can have piles of produce of different degrees of ripeness, as some
consumers like to buy slightly unripe tomatoes that will last a few days. There are
also different preferences among consumers belonging to different ethnic groups.
Retailers will try to sell the slightly damaged and riper ones first, especially if they are
not buying every day. This is an important strategy for the retailers in Sunyani who
buy from farmers every Thursday and then sell on Friday, Saturday and Monday. The
definitions of different quality grades can change through the year as produce gets
scarce.
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Some retailers process or package the vegetables in plastic bags to make them more
appealing. Very little is thrown away with the very low quality tomatoes being sold
to those women who prepare cooked food on the street. The low quality tomatoes,
sometimes mixed with chilli peppers, are taken to a pulping machine with the pulp
collected in plastic bags or pots if the buyer is cooking near by. These machines are
run on electricity and managed by men.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has completed the examination of the institutional forms of marketing
system for tomatoes. Again it demonstrates the wide variety of complex institutions
that have evolved over time and are based on a diverse range of social. The
cooperative activities of associations have a wide impact on the other institutional
forms of marketing in urban areas. This cooperation is based on the trust that comes
through working closely together. It is also based on the power that the traders have.
The nature of trust and power relations will be explored in detail in the next chapter.
The extent to which cooperation is based on power or trust is also examined.
The success of the traders' associations is highly surprising given the fact that they
have had to face severe political and economic crises in the past 20 years and they are
made up of large groups. These groups have conflicting objectives as subgroups of
retailers and wholesalers are in competition with each other. Traders' associations
also challenge the view that women always "have less access to resources than men,
less education and decision making power which inevitably affects their ability to
lead and manage groups effectively" (Livingstone, 1996: 41). The success of certain
groups can be attributed to the self identified -objectives that are flexible and fluid.
This is in contrast to those associations that are set up by government or external
agencies and tend to be donor driven and unlikely to survive when the funding
finishes (Lyon, 1999a; Coulter, 1996).
The success of associations may also be due to their clear leadership structure,
although this may not be participatory and involves exercising control and power.
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This is easier for traders' associations in the market place as they control the selling
space and can therefore exclude others and have wider effects on the vegetable
production and marketing system. In this way their social organisation and control of
key locations shapes the spatial organisation of the industry even at a regional level.
On the existing evidence, I do not want to state that associations are beneficial or
oppressive for the people of Ghana, be they farmers, consumers or traders
themselves. While associations can reduce transaction costs, they may allow traders
to get large returns at the expense of poor farmers and consumers. However, the
extent to which these large margins make up for the high risk and frequent losses
experienced by traders is not known. Many observers have commented on this issue
without full information. On the one hand there are those who see the associations as
oppressive and restrictive cartels. In Ghana this argument has been repeatedly used by
politicians usually responding to individual cases where there have been negative
impacts on farmers and consumers. The television pictures of rotting tomatoes are
powerful media images.
There are apologists who attempt to justify the role of the traders' associations.
Firstly there are authors who, drawing on the work of Jones (1972), examine the
performance of markets based on the analysis of price data. Harriss (1982) has shown
that many of their studies have conclusions supporting the liberalisation of markets
that contradict the evidence they present. Secondly there are those who make detailed
studies of the associations by looking at the function they play in reducing transaction
costs. I take issue with some of these functionalist New Institutional Economics
approaches, such as Smith and Luttrell (1994), that suggest the reasons for the
success of an association is based on how much it is needed or in terms of the benefit
it brings to its members through reducing transaction costs. Khalil (1994) states that
there are many cases of inefficient rules and property rights that persist beyond their
economic usefulness which cannot be explained by an analysis of transaction costs
alone. The view that institutions are shaped by the minimisation of transaction costs
and the drive to efficiency is seen as a form of post hoc explanation (Harriss-White,
1993; Mulberg, 1995) although this is based on a critique of the cruder forms of New
Institutional Economics (Acheson, 1994).
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The third group of apologists come from a feminist approach that explores the roles
and powers of women in the market place (see Clark, 1994 and Dennis and Peprah,
1995). This approach also leads to questions regarding the role of women's agency
in -and gendered access to power resources. This study shows that women . n Ghana
cannot be seen as muted subjects, as women's agency can manifest itself in differing
ways including oppression of other women and men (Jeffery, 1998: 227).
To study how associations work requires a careful analysis of both trust and power
and the interplay between the two. Groups, networks and associations are also
hierarchies so cooperation is underpinned by both trust and the different types of
power relations within the network (Amin and Hausner, 1997). The role of trust also
requires a careful deconstruction to differentiate between acts of cooperation because
of perceived long term economic benefit, cooperation because of perceived prestige,
obligations and fear of shame, and finally those acts of cooperation that are impulsive
and habitual.
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Chapter 8. Towards an institutional theory of market relations
8.1 Introduction
This penultimate chapter aims to draw together some of the theoretical implications
of the case study material presented in the previous three chapters. The common
theme that has run through the range of institutional forms presented in the study, is
the importance of social relations in shaping outcomes, and the ways in which
economic action is socially embedded. This supports the contention of Moore (1997)
and many others that social relations are a central part of institutions in a variety of
economies. In this chapter I draw together the material on how social relations are
built up, with particular reference to the mechanisms of trust production. Through
this I aim to propose a framework for understanding social relations in markets that
recognises the embeddedness of economic behaviour and can be used for a better
understanding of cooperation, trust and power.
8.2 Mechanisms of trust
Agents have to find ways of reducing the transaction costs of cooperation through
having enforceable sanctions and reducing the risk of default by getting information
on others. In this context, I use the term agent to include both the individual people
involved and groups or organisations.
One mechanism needed for trust is information on the reputations of others. The costs
of getting information are a major part of the transaction costs in deciding whether or
not to cooperate. This information can come about through links to networks and
through previous interactions which allows the parties to know what to expect. The
table below summarises the arenas and spaces where there are opportunities for
cheating, if relations based on trust are not present.
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Farmer price setting
associations
Bargaining
Paying for produce
after harvesting
Diverting harvested
produce to traders
with higher prices
Low quality produce
Trader associations
Sales to retailers
Table 8.1 Opportunism in vegetable production and marketing
Arena
Hiring labour
Labouring
Nnoboa cooperative
labour
Sharecropping
Credit from agro-
chemical retailers
Potential opportunism
Do not pay as agreed
Do not work as agreed, steal from farmers crops
Do not work as hard as others, leave the group after your
farm has been worked on
Harvesting without the sponsor knowing
Farmers not repaying, buying from other sellers
Savings with agro- Retailers do not return money
chemical retailers
Credit from agro-
chemical wholesalers 
Credit from traders
Retailer does not repay, and buys from other wholesalers
Not repaying, diverting sales to other traders, not reducing
price for trader as agreed 
Farmers selling secretly at a lower price than the committee
has fixed. Farmer representative colludes with traders
Farmers and traders withholding information on supply or
prices from the other party 
Traders reducing the price negotiated with farmers after they
have harvested
Farmers negotiate a price to harvest for some traders and
more traders come offering higher prices. Farmers dump the
earlier traders' boxes and harvest for the higher price
Farmer hides grass, rocks and unripe or damaged tomatoes
in the crate
Traders take on credit Traders ask to take on credit and do not return. Traders
return saying the price was low in the market and so cannot
pay the full amount 
Trader does not cooperate with association members.
Stealing customers of other traders in the market 
Retailers fail to pay later when taken on credit or cannot pay
the full amount
This section aims to examine why actors are not opportunistic and, more importantly,
how people know that others are not going to cheat them. For this I divide the types
of trust production into four: working relations, customer friendships, existing
networks and intermediaries. In addition to this there is trust based on norms.
However, relationships are shifting constantly and people may draw on more than one
form of trust production. The categorisation of different types of trust production has
evolved out of responses that interviews made to questions concerning the means by
which they knew they were not going to be cheated. The open questions allowed the
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relationships friendships networks mediaries
Networks
Information Sanctions
Figure 8.1 Networks, norms and trust formation
8.2.1 Trust based on networks of working relationships
The most commonly reported reason for trusting someone was the establishment of a
long standing trading relationship. This category is similar to Zucker's (1986: 60)
'process-based' mode of trust production, where trust is tied to past or expected
exchange, such as reputation, and reciprocity.
Working relationships can build up over a few transactions or after many years of
continuous transactions. The cooperation is sanctioned through the threat of loss of
future earnings. The continued interaction allows each party to collect information on
the capability of the others and build up confidence. This can be in the form of visits
to the farms of farmers who want to take agro-chemicals on credit, or obtain loans
from traders. Traders and agro-chemical sellers resident in the villages will note how
much farmers harvest and the amount of time they put into their farms. However,
confidence in a person's ability should be distinguished from trust in their actions.
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Issues of gender were not found to have a large impact on the strength of the
customer relationships that built up. There is some evidence that traders prefer to deal
with male farmers although this may be due to the fact that they have larger farms.
However, the limited trader interaction with women may be a factor in explanations
of women's small farm size. Amongst traders, the issue of a common gender is given
as a reason for their ability to act collectively:
"the strongest and most elaborate groups arise in commodities where a large
proportion of the traders are of one sex and one ethnic background. This ethnic
and gender homogeneity brings general agreement on correct leadership styles
and procedures and facilitates shared ceremonial observances" (Clark, 1994:
254-5).
Those lending money or giving goods on credit will test the other party over a series
of transactions. This will involve a certain amount of risk at the beginning. Those
giving are continually testing the other party and, as the probability of default is
perceived to fall, then the amount given increases. Those giving will look at the rate,
regularity and timing of repayment and whether the other party sticks to the
agreement. Several agro-chemical retailers reported that they had many customers
obtaining fertiliser and pesticides on credit at first, but many did not repay. Through
this experience they had found out who they could give to in the future.
The loyalty of each party to the customer relationship is important and each party will
want to know if the other has been buying or selling from others and whether their
customer has been giving the correct prices. Fanners share this kind of information
and traders resident in a village were found to be sharing information on who was
defaulting. Itinerant traders and chemical dealers who are not resident in the village
find it hard to get information on the activities of their customers.
Reciprocity is an important part of building relationships and reputations. This can be
in the form of leaving money with the trader or agro-chemical seller for some time to
prove that there is mutual trust. Farmers can also introduce new customers to traders
or agro-chemical sellers and help the trader when she makes losses. One of the most
important aspects of the customer relationships between farmers and traders is the
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guarantee that the trader will buy from the customer farmer when there is a glut and
the guaranteed supply for the traders when there is a shortage. Farmers will also
ensure that they give their customers good quality produce.
One of the main requirements before giving credit is to know where the -individual
lives and works. When visiting them at their house or at their work place, the creditor
can criticise them publicly, refuse to go away and hope that this will disgrace the
person into repaying the money. After they have chased up the debtor several times
and have not received any money, the debt is written off; the lender knows the person
will not pay as they do not mind what others say about them.
On the one hand, this basis of trust can be seen as calculative when actors invest
much time and money in building their reputation. Actors can make rational,
conscious decisions that minimise their transaction costs in order to maximise their
individual material gains. However, many of those interviewed referred to the
knowledge they had of the customers' character or suban. They were able to trust a
person in a certain transaction as they had seen the person to be trustworthy before.
Common statements included: "I have studied her character", "I know what is in her
head", "I have read his face", "I can tell by their speech and actions", "I know how
she talks". This information comes in the form of tacit knowledge and can be
instinctive as well as calculative.
8.2.2 Trust based on customer friendship
The division between social and economic activities is not clear cut and many of the
customer relations established for business are referred to in terms of friendship and
love. Each party may try to build up these links in order to have better safeguards
based on a common understanding of moral behaviour to friends. While these actions
can be seen in an economically functionalist way, and are based on the same
information and sanctions as working relationships, they also draw on shared
concepts of morality and altruism based on culturally specific norms. They are also
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based on the understanding that there are different norms dependent on the existing
and emerging relationship of the two parties.
These relationships are built up though gift giving and reciprocity. These include gifts
of food when a trader comes to the village or when the farmer goes to the .customer.
Gore (1978: 185) also found that yam traders in Koforidua would give gifts of
clothing, provisions or fish to farmers. Many farmers and traders also visit their
customers when passing. The customer trader of one large farmer in Derma village
had built up a friendship with the farmer's mother and brought gifts for her too. This
farmer will also go to stay with his trader customer for several days at a time when he
goes to Accra. In another case, an agro-chemical dealer obtained credit from his
wholesaler supplier only after the wholesaler made a journey of several hours to visit
the retailer's church and introduce himself to the church elders.
Another farmer in Derma had built up such close links with an Accra trader that his
daughter went to stay in Accra to be educated and help the trader with household
tasks. Gore (1978: 185) reports similar cases of temporary fostering of children.
Other farmers had named a child after a customer as a sign of great respect for that
person. These friendships are also built up through visiting the customer when they or
a member of their family are sick or for ceremonies such as weddings or `outdooring'
when a new-born child is first taken outside. Attendance at the funerals of a
customer's family member is considered important. The traders gave funeral
attendance as the main reason for having market associations. Through attending
funerals, additional links are created and obligations reinforced. A large number of
guests at a funeral is a sign of status and so traders will ensure they attend and make a
contribution to each funeral. If they do not, they will not be supported, in turn, when a
bereavement occurs in their own family. These ties of friendship mean that the person
giving has more confidence that the other party will repay the money because of
moral obligations to reciprocate.
These examples show that the relationship and the type of reciprocity developed in
customer friendships is considered to be different from a simple working relationship.
Sahlins (1972) distinguishes between balanced reciprocity where the benefit is
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calculated and generalised reciprocity where maintenance of the relationship is more
important than short term gain, and where the norm of the relationship is altruism.
8.2.3 Trust based on pre-existing networks
The simplest form of trust is that based on existing networks. These networks or
institutions are used to reduce transaction costs but are not formed for that purpose.
The form of this basis of trust is systemic or part of the society within which
individuals act and is therefore shaped by political and historical background to the
relations of gender, ethnicity and class. In such cases actors will have information on
each other as they have interacted and formed a common bond before they enter into
any credit giving relationship.
These forms of trust are still based on some form of calculation as individuals can
weigh up the costs of defaulting. In this case, the sanctions are in the form of moral
pressures from the other party, and from other members of the common network or
group, in addition to the threats of loss of future benefit. The basis of these existing
networks can range in size from family to a group in a village such as a church, to a
community and even an ethnic group. However, these networks only allow
interactions with a limited number of people.
Family links are the most common form of existing network in the study area, with
family members giving money to their relations to farm. Traders also rely on family
members to work for them. These can be daughters and nieces of traders, or the
brothers of agro-chemical shop owners who manage the store. Long-term friends can
be relied on, as the party that is giving can be confident that the other person will
behave as expected.
Churches play a role in allowing people to establish contracts with others whom they
do not know well. People who attend the same church may find it difficult to behave
badly towards each other.. A trader in Sunyani reported :
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"This farmer could harvest all his produce for me and I keep all the money
until the end of the harvest	 He made me keep his money because we lived in
the same area, he was my church member and so knew me well before he
started farming" (Ama Kumi, Sunyani trader, Interview 28).
It was also found that some people will start giving goods on credit as- the other
person is of the same denomination
By living in the same community, individuals already know each other. Those
lending money know if the farmer works hard and know about the borrower's past
dealings with others. Positions of responsibility in the community can be seen by
others as a reason to trust an individual. Two of the susu collectors interviewed had
positions on the development committees of their community and so could use the
reputation they had built up to start their susu business. By working in the same
location, traders have networks that are strengthened because of a sense of shared
problems and exploitation at the hands of the government, and because of the powers
of the association to exclude people.
Other existing networks can be found along ethnic lines. Those farmers from ethnic
groups in the north of Ghana often referred to trusting someone because he is 'my
countryman'. There is also a common perception that 'northerners' or 'strangers' as
they are called, are more trustworthy than indigenous people, although there is a risk
that they can run away with any money as they are not always full time residents in
the area. Suggested reasons for this perception include the fact that non-indigenous
farmers are in a weaker position when it comes to disputes over repayment and that
the cultural differences are reflected in different norms of behaviour. These issues
could not be pursued in detail.
8.2.4 Trust based on intermediaries
Trust can be based on both parties having a link to a common person, intermediary or
agyinamu. This person can act as a character witness or a guarantor in case the
borrower defaults. The agyinamu has information on both parties, each of which has
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information on the agyinufnu. Information can come from existing links or working
relationships. Intermediaries act as links between networks or gatekeepers. Each party
is sanctioned by pressure from members of their group or network, either by the
threat of losing future earnings or through social or moral obligations.
Acting as a character witness can be in the form of telling other people about how
well a certain trader or agro-chemical seller treats his or her customers. Knowledge of
certain individuals who are deemed trustworthy can spread through gossip. People
can also ask others whom they know in common for a recommendation. This role is
often carried out by the elders of a family, but one agro-chemical retailer interviewed
did not like to do this as it had made him very unpopular when the farmer could not
repay and he had to make demands of the elder. Church elders are used as witnesses
to farmers and traders taking goods on credit, especially when both parties are
members of the same religious denomination. Police may also act as witnesses, but
this only occurs in larger villages with a police station.
Traders taking tomatoes on credit can ask the driver of the vehicle or a customer
farmer to act as a guarantor. In such cases, the guarantor offers to pay the farmers if
the trader does not return. Traders themselves can act as guarantors for farmers when
they want to obtain agro-chemicals on credit. A trader will go with the fanner to the
shop and she will promise to pay if the farmer cannot. Acting as a guarantor is a
different form of trust than being a character witness as it involves more explicit
sanctions and is much more of a calculative relationship.
8.3 Norms
Norms define what actions are considered acceptable or unacceptable and, in this
study, include customs of cooperation, reciprocity, avoiding deception and keeping
verbal contracts. Norms are therefore the basis of building and maintaining
personalised trust. Norms can also be relied upon to stop some forms of opportunism
where the exchange is a 'one off transaction with no previous contact between
parties and no expectations of future interaction. Examples of this are found during
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marketing, when farmers harvest before receiving money on the assumption that
traders will stick to the agreed price. Traders also assume that the farmers will not
include tomatoes below a certain quality or put rocks and grass in the boxes. These
forms of opportunism do happen occasionally as these norms are not often
enforceable.
There is debate over the extent to which norms determine economic development
(Platteau, 1994; Moore, 1994). While there are arguments that show the importance
of norms, there is scant empirical evidence. Ethnographic studies have not
illuminated the subject. Many of the key quoted texts on the subject draw on game
theory and historical studies. Axelrod's work on the Prisoners' Dilemma shows that it
is rational to defect when there is imperfect information about the other player. The
optimal strategy is tit-for-tat where the first player co-operates to start with then on
subsequent games follows what the other player did on the previous game (Axelrod,
1984). This adaptive behaviour works when the number of games is indefinite. For
this to arise, there is a need for generalised trust (or altruism) in the first move.
However, Prisoners' Dilemma is based on the assumption that individuai action is
only for the strict defence of the individual's own interest (Storper, 1997). There is no
discussion on how the rules emerge and the process of how individuals learn
(Mulberg, 1995).
Harriss-White (1996:318) drawing on Ramanujam (1990), questions the concept of
societal norms and stresses the importance of context-specific rules in Indian society
and the plurality of norms:
"(Moral) behaviour can be specific to life-stage, caste or class, season,
external pressures .... market exchange has probably flourished with a plurality
of norms for centuries".
There can be norms which restrict the ability to enforce sanctions against some
parties; these are often based on loyalty to people in the same network. This study
shows that there are norms and these can be defined more specifically as the scale of
the analysis is reduced. There is a danger of referring to societal or cultural norms
specific to an ethnic group, as this leads to inaccurate stereotypes and ethnic groups
are defined by their norms and cultural beliefs.
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Norms can come in the form of habits'. Habits are articulated by practice and are hard
to identify in empirical research. In this study they often became apparent by the
reaction of respondents to questions that they considered to be ridiculous. When
asked the question 'how do you know this person will pay you back?', many
respondents laughed and had to think for some time before answering.
Norms can also be applied more consciously and rely on social consensus to enforce
sanctions. These sanctions or motivations come in the form of shame and obligations
(Scott, 1976). Individuals are pressured into keeping to norms by those around them.
This can be done by withdrawal of co-operation, disapproval and attaching social
stigma to norm breakers, although this is limited to cases where those involved live in
proximity or work closely together. This is demonstrated in the study area by the
importance that those lending money attached to visiting the house of those receiving
credit, so that they could visit them later and if necessary embarrass them in front of
their neighbours. In the study many of the interviewees stressed the importance of
religious beliefs, both Christian and Islamic, in their decisions on how to act.
Platteau (1994b:765-6) also mentions that norms can be enforced through a self-
policing mechanism whereby agents take moral norms and internalise them, behaving
morally in order because of guilt and shame.
Norms cannot be created at will. The production of norms is based on what Platteau
(1994a: 536) refers to as "historically-rooted cultural endowments", upon which
norms of a more generalised morality can be encouraged when the right conditions
arise. This can be limited in cultures which emphasise the strength of ties to close
social relations. In such cases, reward and sanction are linked to patronage and
dominated by the political power structures (Platteau, 1994b: 799).
Norms can be strengthened through processes of socialisation. The most common
means for this found in the study was through families and religious institutions.
Ensminger (1992) describes how the development of markets for the pastoralist Orma
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people in Kenya was influenced by their conversion to Islam, and the use of Islamic
institutions and rules of law. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993:1324-5) use the term
'bounded solidarity' which can lead to "the emergence of principled group-oriented
behaviour ...If sufficiently strong, this emergent sentiment will lead to the observance
of norms of mutual support, appropriable [sic] by individuals as a resource in their
own pursuits." Generalised norms can come from the state when rulers ensure that
rules are enforced and they act as role models. Norms can also come from civil
society if it is willing to take action against those who act outside the norms (Platteau,
1994b: 772).
There is debate over the role of the market in generating or eroding trust. Platteau
(1994a and b) stresses the role of history and cultural fabric in generating norms and
questions how these norms are created. Moore (1994: 826) recognises, on the one
hand, that markets can erode social relationships and norms, while also
acknowledging the point, made by Albert Hirschman (1982: 1467), that moral values
can be generated by the market, its practices and incentives. It can also be argued that
selective trust can lead to more generalised trust. Misztal (1996: 15) gives the
example of trust in the medical system: "each positive contact with our local doctor,
for example, may gradually increase our confidence in the medical system." Norms or
conventions that developed from past selective trust based on proximity may continue
in certain localities (Storper, 1997).
8.4 Sanctions and power relations
Embedded economic action is shaped by power relations. In all the cases of contracts
based on cooperation and trust described in this thesis, there are differing balances of
power. Social relations can be conceptualised as being a combination of trust and
power that rely to varying extents on moral norms, information on the other parties
and enforceable sanctions. These vary through time and depend on the contracts
being negotiated.
'Hodgson (1998: 178) defines habits as "a largely deliberate and self actuating
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Cooperation in groups works if all members trust each other or there is trust in certain
leading individuals who act as intermediaries. The larger the group, the harder it is to
establish interpersonal relationships based on moral norms and information about
others' reputations. As numbers increase, groups appear to be more reliant- on power
relations to coerce people into cooperation because of the higher transaction costs in
terms of obtaining information on others' reputations and establishing interpersonal
relationships. In this way the larger market associations operate in hierarchies that are
similar to some larger scale firms. They are able to coerce because they have control
over the key market spaces. The farmers' market associations do not have such power
and so collective action is limited.
In contracts between individuals, the form is based on a balance of power. Those with
greater power are able to set up contracts or institutions that benefit one party more
than another. The more powerful party is able to have a greater say over how much is
repaid and when. Agents can manipulate the exchange process, depending on their
control over supply, access to information, capital and credit, transport and
knowledge of marketing procedures as well as the organisation of the market
(Harriss, 1993). All agents have access to some resources and so can exert a certain
amount of power. However, the constraints on certain agents are much greater than
on others. The outcome of such relationships with a basis of trust is closely linked to
the extent of competition and choice available to farmers. These relationships can
still be said to have an element of trust until the extent of power exerted is so great
that the weaker has no alternative and is coerced into exchange.
An important issue is the extent to which the agreement allows producers to supply
other traders and whether the weaker partner has a choice of traders with whom to
develop a relationship. Patron-client or bonded relationships are found in Northern
Nigeria (Clough, 1981; Watts, 1987) and widely reported in South Asia, although
they were not reported in this or previous studies in Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions
of Ghana (Clark, 1994; Southworth et al, 1979). However, farmers can be forced into
propensity to engage in a previously adopted pattern of behaviour".
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giving on credit at times when there are few traders buying because of thc perishable
nature of the tomato crop.
As mentioned in chapter two, the bases of power over others come from social
structure, agency and collective action. The means by which power over others is
built up and exerted is demonstrated diagramatically in Figure 8.2. Social structure or
inscribed power is in the form of class, gender or ethnicity relations and these relate
to norms of behaviour and routine compliance. This was demonstrated by the
interviewees who could not conceive of any occasion when someone might disobey
the chief or leaders of transport associations; their reaction was often similar to the
cases of non-calculative trust and norms when respondents laughed at my questions.
Agency refers to the ability to build up power either individually or collectively. It is
used to have power over others through setting organisational forms, surveillance,
and enrolling or convincing others to join networks led by a trusted individual with
power based on having information on others. Surveillance involves observing how
others carry out activities and contracts.
These 'bases of power' lead to the ability to have power over others through threats
and actions, and through norms of behaviour. The norms of behaviour include moral
obligations, both acknowledged explicitly and internalised such as routine,
unquestioning compliance to chiefs or group leaders. Power can be used to set the
rules of the 'moral economy' allowing the values of certain groups to become
internalised in the society (Lukes, 1974). In such cases the concepts of trust and
power are closely intertwined as norms and generalised trust are based on the power
exerted over some people that denies them the ability to reflect.
Power of threats and actions is exerted through the use of strength, authority and peer
pressure. The strength can be either physical or in numbers and allows groups to
inflict violence and/or exclude others from economic activities. The ability to make
threats and carry them out is shaped by the norms of what is deemed acceptable
behaviour. Individuals claimed they were restricted from taking forceful action
against people from their own community as they did not want a confrontation and to
'get a bad name'.
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Threats of more drastic action are often made, but there were few reports during this
research of any action being taken. Two people admitted to threatening violent action,
both of them men and one tomato trader in Techiman said that she threatens those
farmers who do not repay her with juju.
The market associations are all based to a large degree on the powers that they have
to exclude non cooperators from certain spaces or economic activities. The control of
the market places is based on official or tacit support from central and local
government (Lyon, 1999a). The ability to exclude is only a threat if there is a risk of
loosing future benefits. This will only be the case when members believe that there
are long term benefits to receive and that the group will not collapse.
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The second of the means of exerting power over others is the reference to authority.
The strength of authority is based on common beliefs, values, traditions and practice
that result in the recognition of the authority's right to command. This is shaped by
the norms of behaviour and issues of organisational virtue and obedience (Clegg,
1989). The ability to exert power through leadership is shaped by the leadership
patterns within groups and the external authorities that groups can call on. In this case
the most common external authority is the chief. Chiefs have the ability to fine people
and continued disobedience is discouraged by the ability to refuse a person a burial in
the community which is seen as a matter of greatest shame. Traders in market places
can draw on the market leaders, who can put pressure on traders by threatening to
exclude them from the market or fine them. The police are another form of authority
that can be drawn on, such as when traders fail to pay for goods taken on credit and
return after a long time. However, farmers stated that they cannot take traders who
are resident in the village to the police because 'they are our own'.
The ability to exert these powers is based on official or tacit support from central and
local government. However, the power of the chief varies dramatically between areas,
depending upon when there have been conflicts and chieftaincy disputes. It must be
recognised, though, that networks and associated institutions are continually
renegotiated by those participating (Berry, 1997). All cases of authority are
discriminatory although to varying degrees. Non-indigenous farmers, especially
'northerners', face some discrimination in cases that are taken to the chief. Similarly,
traders from other markets are unlikely to have the same support from market
associations as local traders.
The third of the means of exerting power over others is that of peer pressure and
sanctioned through shame. This can be linked to the exertion of authority as they both
use the sanction of shaming. Shame occurs when someone is seen to have broken a
norm and for the other members of the group to ridicule and undermine the person's
prestige and position in the community (Bleek, 1981). This pressure can be exerted
because they see each other frequently and through knowing where the person lived
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so that moral and other pressure could be used. This carries greater weight in certain
societies and it is closely linked to the role of networks:
"In a society characterised by dense networks of civic engagement, where most
people abide by civic norms, it is easier to spot and punish the occasional "bad
apple", so that defection is riskier and less tempting" (Putnam, 1993:- 178).
Dei Ottati (1994) uses the term 'personal capital', drawing on the comments by
Marshall (1932) in referring to the importance of reputations. Reputations can also be
transferred or lent through being a member of a certain community or association2.
8.5 Socio-spatial relations: market relations and the location of tomato
production
The location and spatial development of tomato production has been shaped by
market relations and the associated social capital that is perceived to accrue to certain
communities or areas3 . While physical attributes such as soil conditions, weather and
access to irrigation are important factors in shaping geographical patterns, certain
areas have become specialised in tomato production while other locations that may
have similar natural resources, have not.
Road access plays a major role, with traders preferring to buy from locations nearer to
their market and avoiding bad roads. These roads tend to be heavily potholed and
gullied, resulting in damage to vehicles, longer journeys and, most importantly, lack
of vehicle owners or drivers willing to visit the communities. This in turn restricts
economic opportunities as access to markets is limited because of increased costs of
inputs and transporting produce. Access to improved roads depends on links to
politicians and relevant people in government; a similar finding was reported in the
2Threats to reputations is the sustaining force for group micro credit schemes because
there are no other ways of putting on pressure except excluding the person. Peer
pressure may not be explicit as it can be internalised by group members as a form of
understood obligation and a form of moral economy. In this sense it is closely linked
to the issues of trust.
3 Similar relationships are reported in research on 'clusters' (Porter, 1990; Schmitz,
1992; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999).
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post independence period (Gould, 1960). These links are based on personal
relationships, which restricts many groups from obtaining assistance. Those with the
access to policy makers tend to be people from richer settlements.
Less accessible areas may also have much weaker bargaining power when .marketing
their produce. This is due to the lack of competition among traders wanting to buy
and the lack of information the producers or local traders have of market supply and
prices in the major assembling or retailing markets. Without this information they
cannot bargain effectively, especially if the produce is perishable and has to be sold
quickly. In such cases, producers have to headload the produce for long distances or
use passing cars to carry small amounts. This was found in the village of Kokoago in
Wenchi District.
Access to capital is a major constraint, especially in those villages with few other
income sources. Villages with agro-chemical shops are at an advantage, as they are
able to build up the necessary trust and obtain goods on credit. This indicates the
importance of proximity as a factor in customer relationships and credit supply. There
are certain villages that have better access to capital because of their historical legacy.
The cocoa industry shaped the economic history of the study area and this has
resulted in certain villages having far greater access to capital than others. These
communities may or may not be in accessible areas with good roads. This shows that
access to capital is not necessarily linked to road access and proximity to formal
credit institutions. Access to land and labour is also spatially differentiated and again
it is closely linked to historical processes.
Farmers considered the reputation a village possesses to be one of the most important
factors shaping the location of vegetable production. Traders were found to be willing
to travel to areas with bad roads if they had customers there. When traders know that
they can fill all their boxes in one location they will prefer to go there as it will save
time. Traders also prefer to buy from farmers who are not producing on a very small
scale as they do not want to spend time collecting small quantities. Farmers from
smaller or less well known villages have to convince the traders that there is enough
to buy there. However, people in many of these areas cannot afford to have larger
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farms because of the risks of not finding anyone to buy the harvested crop of
tomatoes.
The reputation of the village will grow if it is able to produce in a large enough
quantity at a certain time so that traders can be assured of getting tomatoes. to buy. It
is therefore necessary to have a critical mass of farmers producing tomatoes. Once
there are better marketing opportunities the risk for the producers of growing a
perishable crop, such as tomatoes, is reduced and more people will be willing to grow
tomatoes as a cash crop at the expense of other food crops. Those villages with a long
history of tomato production in Brong Ahafo now import a large amount of their
food.
Reputations can also be built by farmers with established customer relations based on
trust, who move into a new area and bring those links with them. These 'pioneer
farmers' already have trader customer relations from farming in another area. A
remote hamlet near the village of Tanoso has increased its tomato production recently
because of the links to Afrancho, one of the famous producing areas:
"Some Afrancho farmers have been farming here. They know the tomato work
more than we do. When we are about to harvest, these Afrancho farmers go
and bring traders from Afrancho so that all of us can sell" (Group interview
with four farmers, Asubrofo hamlet, Tanoso, Interview 22).
In the village of Kokoago, tomato production is also increasing as marketing
improves:
"Some farmers come from Tuobodum and Techiman and do it on a large scale
.... because they have been growing tomatoes in their village for quite some
time, they know the Accra traders so they bring them here to buy. Before the
Accra traders did not come at all" (Au Issah, Kokoago farmer, Interview 12).
Many young men in Derma village were found to be moving into new areas once they
had become established tomato farmers. Derma is one of the oldest and most famous
commercial tomato growing areas in Ghana, although now the risks of tomato
production are increasing as the quantity of tomatoes produced can lead to gluts and
the land has deteriorated after many years of use for tomatoes. When these 'pioneer
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farmers' invite their trader customers to buy from the new area, a market is created
for the other farmers and this remains after the 'pioneer farmers' have left. Several
villages were found to have started growing tomaotes for the urban markets after an
indivual had returned to the area, having learnt to grow and built up customer
relations elsewhere
Some villages have a reputation for the quality of their crops. This may be because
they use a certain variety that the traders like. It is also affected by the effectiveness
of pest control. When farmers cannot afford the required pesticides, there is greater
pest damage to the fruit that increases the post harvest losses. (The impact of the
pesticides on consumers and the environment is rarely considered). Some farmers
were concerned about their village getting a bad reputation for hiding lower quality
produce (damaged or unripe) at the bottom of the crates and want to build a
reputation for honesty and trustworthiness. An elder of Tanoso complained:
"Sometimes after harvesting they [the farmers] put leaves at the bottom of the
crates so that a fewer quantity of tomatoes can fill the crates. When this
happened the Accra traders stopped coming here 	  they pass through this
town and go to Tuobodum. They cancel our name" (Nana Kwabena Appiah,
Tanoso farmer and village elder, Interview 34).
In several cases, traders reported that they could take the farmers who had hidden low
quality produce in the crates to the elders of the community. The farmers would be
punished as the community is trying to attract traders by maintaining the quality.
Villages also try to develop a reputation for producing at a certain time of year.
Farmers will time their planting at a certain time as they know the traders will come
during the harvest period. Villages without a reputation will start to produce at the
same time as neighbouring villages and try to attract traders who intend going there.
The location and spatial development of the tomato industry in Ghana has thus been
shaped by a number of factors. The patterns of land use cannot be explained by
transport access or environmental conditions alone. Many geographical studies have
'asstimed away' other factors such as social relations as they are preoccupied with
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issues of location while other social scientists have failed to look at the spatial
aspects: Siddle and Swindell (1990: 89) state that
"Geographers, quite naturally, have been preoccupied with the physical
manifestations of exchange in rural markets 	  At the same time,
anthropologists and ethnographers, political scientists and rural economists
sometimes analyse the dimensions of this process [reciprocity and ties of
association] which remain unconnected with the realities of space-time
structuration which embrace the geographical study".
This thesis has shown that social relations shape spatial relations, just as the patterns
of production and marketing shape social relations. It is important to recognise the
role of 'relational proximity' through netwoiks, and historical aspects that shape
access to land, labour and capital. The location of the 'higher level marketing centres'
is derived from social, political and historical aspects as well as economic factors.
The role of Kumasi as a marketing centre is based on its traditional authority and the
establishment of a pre-colonial road network that forced all trade to pass through it
(Gould, 1960). The location of producing areas is also influenced by the existing
power relations. The trader associations restrict access to markets and therefore
privilege certain locations where members have farmer customers.
8.6 Conclusion
This final analytical chapter has explored some of the theoretical implications of the
research. It has attempted to draw out of the empirical work a richer explanation of
how social relations are built up and changed. This has involved an exploration of the
concept of trust and power relations that shape the social linkages between the
different actors in the tomato industry.
The institutional approach taken demonstrates the importance of understanding the
diversity of action and the ability of individuals to take different action while being
constrained by prevailing power relations. The conclusions justify the initial approach
to the research that aimed to look beyond the over-socialised or structuralist
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approaches that do not accept that there is room for human agency. I also attempt to
provide a richer explanation than the neo-classical approaches to economics and
formalist approaches to anthropology that assume humans act in a `volunteristic'
manner and ignore the cultural context and historical aspects that shape action (Long,
1992). This issue will be taken up in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 9 Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
This thesis set out to examine the role played by social relations in food production,
finance and marketing in rural Ghana. Taking the case of the tomato sector, it
explores the range of institutions and informal arrangements that exist and how they
operate. Detailed studies of the operations of farmers, traders, input suppliers and
others illustrate how the actions of individuals and groups are embedded in social
structures (Granovetter, 1985). The results have implications beyond this case study:
they raise questions about policy approaches and theoretical paradigms that are
currently prevalent in some quarters of applied development research. The study
clearly demonstrates the importance of starting research by examining the diversity of
practices. Attempts should also be made to understand how individuals' actions are
shaped by social structures and respond to 'market signals'. Such an approach allows
for an understanding of how markets actually function and are shaped by trust and
power relations.
9.2 Summary of research findings
Chapter one introduced a series of research questions which were derived from a
central research issue, namely: what are the interactions of farmers and traders that
allow them access to resources for production and marketing and what is the nature of
these links? In this section, the results of the surveys are summarised in relation to
each of the four sets of subsidiary research questions.
The surveys identified a large number of institutional forms which have to be seen in
their social, political, historical and environmental context. These contexts were
examined in chapter four in relation to production, agricultural input supply and
produce marketing. In the production context, details are given on the history of
commercial agriculture in Ghana and the study area, the changing environmental
factors that shape location of tomato production, a background discussion of the
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fanning system, and an investigation into the differences between farmers in terms of
marketing orientation, gender, wealth, age and ethnicity. Details of the agricultural
input supply systems and participants was followed by a discussion of the historical
and present marketing systems and a disaggregation of the traders (who are all
women).
The first subsidiary research question of the thesis, examined in chapter five, was: how
do farmers access resources to farm? The key resources required by the farmers are
land, finance, labour and agricultural inputs. Farmers may use their own or family land
that they are entitled to under customary law, although 25% of farmers interviewed
were found to be renting.
Finance comes from farmers' other income generating activities and from private
individuals who lend money. Loans from banks were limited as tomato farmers are
considered to be a high risk category, and farmers complained of the high transaction
costs involved in obtaining bank loans. Other important sources of finance are the
informal savings (susu) collectors who concentrate on providing saving services
through daily or weekly contributions but who may also lend to some of their
customers. Farmers can also enter into share cropping agreements where the farmer
receives money from a sponsor who takes a share of the output or profit. There are a
range of these types of share agreements and they have evolved out of similar contract
forms used for renting land for cocoa and other crops. The survey found that 11% of
farmers were receiving credit from traders and that 65% of the traders were extending
credit to their customers. Some traders lend to farmers who on-lend to other tomato
growers. Traders collect their money when farmers harvest. Traders benefit as they can
offer lower prices and have a guaranteed supply of tomatoes. Farmers were not found
to be tied to selling all their crop to the credit giving traders and no cases of farmers
being forced into long term indebtedness were reported.
Tomato production is very labour intensive and farmers rely on their own and family
labour for much of the work. Labour is hired for more demanding tasks and either paid
by the day or a contract is given for a certain task to be done. If the farmer does not
have adequate funds the labourers are paid later but receive more money. Some
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farmers also use cooperative labour agreements whereby groups will agree to work on
each persons' farm in rotation.
Farmers have to obtain access to agricultural inputs and given the financial constraints
under which they operate, they often rely on purchasing the agro-chemicals on- credit.
The extent to which input sellers will give goods on credit is limited by the risk of
lending and the lack of trading capital. The survey found that 27% of tomato farmers
received agro-chemicals on credit and this covered an average of 55% of their total
agro-chemical costs. The ability to obtain credit depends on the customer relationship
and trust between buyer and seller. Some sellers charge higher prices if they sell on
credit while others use the credit as a way of building their customer base. Eighty-six
percent of the sellers offered saving facilities for the farmers in the months before the
production starts. The sellers can finance their business by having credit agreements
with the wholesalers once they have built up a customer relationship or if they have
close links already. In addition to agro-chemicals, farmers need to obtain seed. Most of
the farmers use their own, but 15 % of farmers interviewed had received seed from
other sources in the previous year, usually from other farmers in the village. A small
number received seed from traders.
In chapter six, the thesis addresses the issues of rural marketing and the interaction
between farmers and traders. A number of questions were set out in the introduction,
the first of which was: how do farmers access markets and how do traders access
producers? This question related in part to the range of types of transport, from head
loading to urban-based trucks. It was also found that there are remote areas with higher
transport costs but with good access to transport because of the customer links they
have with traders and transport operators. The urban based transport system in Ghana
is centred around the lorry park system. The Ghana Private Road-users Trade Union
acts as an organising body and controls most of the loading stations in the cities. They
levy registration fees and user charges and can operate as a monopoly as they can
exclude other groups of transport owners from having alternative associations.
The second question relating to rural marketing was: what shapes the marketing
process and the prices received by farmers? Customer relations were found to be of
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central importance to both farmers and traders as they can benefit from having
guaranteed buyers or sellers. Prices received by farmers were found to be constantly
shifting from hour to hour. This is linked to the supply conditions and the bargaining
power of each party. The bargaining process and units of sale were also studied. Of
particular interest were the cooperative marketing institutions where a group of-farmers
will select representatives to bargain on behalf of the whole village. The strength of
these depends on both the cooperation between the farmers that enables them to stop
people accepting lower prices from traders, and the trust that farmers have in their
representatives. It was also found that there are adjustments made to contracts after the
price negotiation if the price in the village rises or there is produce of a lower quality
than that usually accepted.
One of the major factors in shaping bargaining power is information and this relates to
the third question on rural marketing: how are the farmers and traders able to obtain
information? Comparison of price changes in urban and rural areas showed that there
is a time lag in dissemination of information. The thesis examined the traders'
information sources, which included other traders and farmers, and also farmers'
sources, such as sending people to markets or neighbouring villages, and assessing how
readily traders accept prices offered. The final question in relation to rural marketing
was: how are the traders able to secure access to finance for trade? The sources of
finance included their own capital, borrowing from others, and receiving tomatoes on
credit from farmers who are customers. This last method can be risky for the farmers
and only occurs when the farmers trust the traders or at times when there is such a glut
of produce that the farmers have no choice.
The final empirical chapter explored the question: how are the urban market systems
organised? How can the role and survival of traders' associations be explained? The
urban marketing systems of Ghana are heavily influenced by the trader institutions that
organise the traders and have powers over price negotiation, dispute settlement, and
supply control. Each commodity has an ohemma, or market queen, and elders who
advise her. The association leaders justify the controls over supplies to the market as
traders cannot withstand wildly fluctuating prices. However, such practices can be used
to set up cartels that exploit farmers and consumers. This study found that there are
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varying degrees of competition which vary from market to market and within markets
from day to day. The ability of the associations to survive over many years while other
forms of associational activity have not, is explored. It was found to be based on their
ability to control the market spaces with support from local governments and chiefs.
Finally, the thesis examines the institutions of retailing that include the special role of
porters in Kumasi market, a range of credit arrangements between itinerant traders and
resident retailers, and the institutions of sales to consumers.
9.3 Theoretical implications
In this thesis I have attempted to take an approach that is neither over- nor under-
socialised (Granovetter, 1985) and that is neither overly structuralist nor
methodologically individualist (Long, 1992). I have endeavoured to balance both
structure and agency in a way that allows a detailed understanding of how economic
action, such as individual marketing and collective action, operates.
Chapter two outlined the limitations of neo-classical approaches to economic
analysis. The assumptions of perfect information, no barriers to entry, homogenous
goods and economically rational profit maximising behaviour, rendered the approach
problematic for a study such as this; the very factors which such approaches assume
away, are the issues that are of most interest in this study. I was also trying to move
away from the methodology-driven approaches that concentrate on quantitative data
for modelling. It is ironic that the paradigms promoted by those who support the
market system most strongly provide a shallow view of how capitalism and market
relations actually operate in practice. Much of their analysis is based on assumptions
that relate to universalist conceptions of "market forces" while ignoring the historical,
political, social and cultural specificity of the context.
New Institutional Economics has reacted to some of the limitations of neo-classical
economics. However, some of the NIE approaches have been highly functional' t in
that they suggest that institutions only exist to reduce the transaction costs and serve
the benefits of potential beneficiaries. There can also be institutions that do not exist
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for the general good. The cases of the trader associations given in chapter seven
demonstrate the difficulty in evaluating the impact of institutions. The definition of
'inefficient institutions' is highly subjective and dependent on ideological stance.
Gambetta (1988:214) points out that individuals see trust as beneficial when those
with whom they co-operate do not hinder them. In such situations, institutional
economics that only looks at transaction cost minimisation cannot explain the
continued existence of certain institutions. Platteau (1994a: 536) criticises this
approach for its assumption that institutions are "evolving more or less spontaneously
towards efficient forms under the pressure of relative price changes", while Khalil
(1994a: 253) states that there are "moral principles, ideological commitments and
socio-cultural norms that are not devised, to start with, to attain greater efficiency".
While structuralist approaches allow greater attention to be placed on the role of
history and power relations, they can be overly deterministic and therefore not allow
for a detailed study of the role of agency. There is also a concentration on class as an
analytical category despite the fact that such categorisation is difficult to identify in
Ghana (Konings, 1986; Berry, 1993). The pattern of commercialisation in rural
Ghana has not followed the process expected by models of capitalism and peasant
agriculture. Increased involvement in the cash crop economy has not led to the
elimination of social relations in production and marketing but has resulted in new
socio-economic forms. The case of cocoa and the development of sharecropping
agreements is a case in point (Hill, 1956; 1963). Such institutions for access to land
and capital are still prevalent today for a range of crops, as shown in chapter five.
Other institutional forms have evolved that have allowed small holders to continue to
dominate the agricultural system and are a factor in limiting the expansion of a
plantation economy.
This research drew on a framework derived from the socio-economic literature and
old institutionalism (Hodgson, 1988; Swedburg and Granovetter, 1992) and attempts
to contribute to the theory of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). These approaches
provide a language and mode of analysis that are useful in understanding how
markets are embedded in social relations, especially when the economic system is not
formalised. This allows for an examination of exchange relations not just based on
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price and minimisation of transaction costs, but also on issues such as trust, loyalty
and power relations. A clear conceptual framework for looking at these themes was
essential for the analysis of the case study in relation to farmers' access to land,
labour, agricultural inputs and capital, the interaction of farmers and traders, and
trader cooperation.
In chapter eight, the processes by which trust and power are built up, shaped and
modified were explored. Trust is a central factor in a large number of the institutional
forms that farmers and traders depend on. Trust was found to have been built up
through four means: networks of working relationships based on reciprocity;
customer friendships where working relationships become merged with more social
activities; pre-existing networks such as families, communities, churches and ethnic
groups; and finally, intermediaries who are trusted by both sides. Norms are also an
important aspect of building up trust and are discussed later in this section. Power
relations depend on both the pre-existing or inscribed power and the ability of
individuals to build up power, either individually or collectively. Power over others is
exerted through threats and actions such as punishments and fines, the use of physical
strength to exclude individuals, reference to authority such as chiefs or police, or peer
pressure and shaming. Power is also exerted through setting norms of behaviour.
Cooperation is poorly conceptualised in much of development practice and theory. In
many cases there are the simplistic artificial models such as "prisoners' dilemma" and
"tragedy of the commons". These are based on the assumptions of rational choice and
individualism which ignore the issues of sanctions and norms. These are external
issues that cannot be explained by new institutionalist thought as they involve
recognition of wider social structures and values. The interpretation offered here also
tries to move away from the deterministic or functionalist approaches that assume
that cooperation will exist because it is needed. These approaches may be over-
socialised as they assume trust is always present. This study has attempted to explore
how contracts and cooperation occur when trust and power relations are built up. It is
therefore necessary to understand the processes involved in changing social relations.
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A range of cases of cooperation have been examined in this thesis. This has involved
looking at the basis of cooperation through understanding the continuum of power
and trust, and through understanding how social relations are created. This shows
how a theory of embedded economic action must have a clear concept of agency and
the means by which different actors obtain access to resources through negotiation
within social institutions (Berry, 1993). This allows a better understanding of issues
of differentiation, as there is considerable conflict of interest within many of the
categories used in social science such as gender, ethnicity and class.
At the same time it is important to set each action within its social and historical
context. The importance of history and previously existing institutional settings is
shown in the case study in terms of trust based on pre-existing networks. It is also
necessary to have a detailed conception of changing norms. The role of customer
friendships demonstrates that there are different norms for different relations. The
study also shows how trust produced in different ways can be both calculative and
instinctive. Each party will take in tacit knowledge that will be used to decide
whether to trust the other in the future.
The theory of embedded economic action can contribute to conceptualising the term
'social capital'. This term has become increasingly popular in social science although
it is defined in vague terms which weakens its capacity as a theoretical tool. Robert
Putnam defines the term in his analysis of governance and economic development in
Italy, as "features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993: 167).
Social capital comes from the interplay of a range of factors, each of which entails
social relations that shape how agents react, and the more social capital is used the
greater it becomes'.
'It is questionable whether the term social capital can be used if it increases the more
it is used. Narayan (1997) states that it is capital because it raises incomes but others
claim that capital should have an opportunity cost. While this can be the case when
people deliberately create social capital, it is not the case when it is an inherited
endowment (Woolcock, 1998: note 21).
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Social capital acts as an umbrella term that covers a range of processes by which
social relations are formed, and become the basis for other institutions and
relationships (Lyon, in press). The concept of social capital allows for an open debate
about issues such as social structure, norms and habits in economics that challenge
the concept of 'methodological individualism'. It is also an opportunity to bting a
wide range of debates into policy discussions, in the same way that the concept of
`sustainability' has brought a wide range of views together for discussion, despite (or
because of) the differing definitions used.
Networks are the most visible, clearly definable and measurable part of social capital,
and for this reason they have received most attention. Putnam's thesis rests on the
role taken up by the networks that lead to what he terms 'civic engagement'. Many
analyses, especially those that attempt to quantify social capital, concentrate on
formal networks and groups with an assumption that the quality and quantity of
associational life can be used as a proxy for social capital (Narayan and Pritchett,
1997: 2). However, formal associations may only be a minor factor in the production
of trust or social capital and the links between networks, norms and the mechanism of
creating institutions based on trust are not made clear.
While it is accepted that networks are important for the creation of social capital,
there is a danger of taking a romanticised view of networks, or 'the community'.
Amin (1996: 327) warns of the danger of ignoring the fact that civil society is an
arena for social contestation. Closed networks can be used in the development of
cartels and in restricting access to markets. In the study area, traders justify these
associations as a way of stabilising the very volatile prices of perishable crops,
although the extent to which they act to reduce their transaction costs or to act in a
way to increase their market power differs considerably between markets. Power
struggles exist and affect which groups control which resources, what they do and
who is excluded.
Norms are an important part of social capital that are drawn on by actors when
making decisions on whether to trust an individual. There is a wide range of norms,
of which reciprocity is the most visible. Reciprocity can be seen to be both
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calculative, when part of building a working relationship, and also a generalised norm
that is more instinctive. There are unanswered questions over whether there are
'pervasive norms of generalised morality' that shape whole markets or societies, or
whether each relationship has to be considered in its own context. There is a danger
of over-socialised or deterministic views that attribute economic success or failure to
cultural attributes while ignoring the role of agency and the interplay of actors with
different power relations.
Finally, this thesis raises theoretical issues regarding the study of the spatiality of
social processes and production of the territory. The patterns of commercial
agriculture and market access depend on a range of issues. These include the physical
environment and transport costs, as well as historical aspects that shape access to key
productive resources especially capital. However, social relations are constantly
changing as new links and networks are formulated, especially through the
development of customer relationships. In this way it is important to distinguish
between physical proximity and relational proximity. The study found that a major
factor in the specialisation of certain places in one crop are reputations arising out of
customer relationships built up by individual farmers and traders.
9.4 Policy Implications
The case study illustrates various ways that rural people and urban traders create
sustainable livelihoods. Developing coping strategies is an important part of this,
especially in cases where there is a shortage of finance. In this way the study adds to
the debates on policies for sustainable rural livelihoods2 (Carney, 1998). Carney
(1998) presents an analytical framework for understanding sustainable rural
livelihoods, that concentrates on the various 'capital assets' that influence (and are
Carney (1998: 4) adapts the definition of Chambers and Conway (1992): "A
livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable
when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance
its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the
natural resource base".
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influenced by) institutions, incentives, policies and laws of the government and
private sector. The capital assets include natural, human, financial, physical and
finally social capital. Policies that aim to have an impact on social capital will be
flawed if the concept of social capital is not understood.
This study provides an example of how a large number of people have been able to
enter into commercial agriculture and thereby reduce their poverty. It must be noted
that that the benefits of tomato farming are not spread evenly and those participating
in its production tend to be younger men and older women. This was discussed in
detail in chapter four, and the differentiation is based on the physical strength of the
young men and the access to working capital of the older women. The extent to
which commercial crops do improve rural livelihoods depends on the access to
markets. This study has shown how market relationships are vital for providing
access to market information and finance. Without these networks and links the
farmers would not be able to grow tomatoes for the urban markets. Therefore,
discussions on building sustainable rural livelihoods through producing and
marketing cash crops must examine these relationships that often extend far beyond
the rural communities.
This study also raises questions regarding the role of traders in rural development and
the extent to which their activities should be supported. On the one hand traders can
be seen as forming vital links between the urban and rural economy by taking the risk
of investing capital in rural areas. On the other hand they have been accused by the
media and politicians of exploiting farmers through offering low prices for produce
and lending money at 'usurious' interest rates. Exploitation can occur when farmers
are locked into indebtedness and have no choice over what crops they grow, and
whom they sell to. This situation was not found in the study area, although there is a
need to examine each context by understanding individual circumstances and
disaggregating the traders.
There are questions over what are exploitative rates of interest, as lending to farmers
is costly in terms of ensuring repayment and highly risky because of the unpredictable
harvests. The government fixed rates of interest at 30-40% were not accessible to
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farmers, as banks did not consider it profitable lending to them. The access to bank
credit is also limited by the social distance between small scale farmers and officials
as well as the difficulty farmers have in providing collateral; they do not have clear
ownership of the land as it is vested in the chief. They manage to get loans from other
sources using other forms of collateral based on trust. There is a long history of credit
being passed backwards and forwards between farmers and traders (Reynolds, 1974:
80). However, farmers are often at a disadvantage as the interest rates are linked to
the price of produce sold and traders tend to have greater bargaining power as they
have better market information. There is therefore a need to develop more effective
market information systems for farmers and build on the existing information
channels described in chapter six.
Timely and accurate information systems are especially important for perishable
crops such as tomatoes. At present there are limited channels available to traders and
farmers, with many reliant on their own observations and word of mouth. There is
potential for using the local FM radio stations operating in most towns. Prices being
received in different producing and selling areas could be collected by District
Assemblies or individuals funded through sponsorship by local private firms. Agro-
chemical sellers are potential sponsors and already use this media for advertising.
Other ways of improving information is through the use of telephones, either land-
lines or mobile phones. These are becoming more accessible in the producing areas.
The perishability of produce is a major concern for tomato farmers world-wide. The
difficulty in storing tomatoes or processing it into a form that can be stored, results in
farmers being in weak bargaining position compared to traders. The shelf life of
tomatoes could be extended through having varieties with better post harvest
qualities although such varieties were not found to be popular with Ghanaian
consumers. Cold storage would increase the shelf life but none of the traders used it
as the margins from tomato trade were considered to be too small and traders did not
have access to capital to install such storage. Furthermore the market areas are
already highly congested and traders value the ability to have a fast turn over of
capital.
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There have been several attempts at processing tomatoes on a commercial scale. Two
State owned factories were established in the 1960s, one in Wenchi, Brong Ahafo
and the other in the Upper East Region. Neither were profitable and both were closed
in the 1980s. There may be processing in the future as both plants have been bought;
there have also been proposals for smaller scale plants in Derma. The main .constraint
on processing is the ability to have access to the fresh tomatoes of the correct variety
throughout the year. The demands for processing plants are based on the low prices
received at certain times of the year. However, as shown in chapter six, the prices of
tomatoes vary considerably and a processing enterprise would not be profitable if it
bought at the market price for much of the year (Lyon et al, 1998).
While this thesis has examined the livelihoods of farmers and traders, I have not
explored the issue of environmental sustainability of the tomato production system.
The ability of the tomato crop to continue providing farmers with livelihoods may be
threatened by reported soil degradation in the form of soil fertility decline, soil pests
such as nematodes and damage to the soil structure. These factors are related the lack
of following especially on the river bank irrigated plots. The lack of organic matter
being applied to the soils and the reliance on inorganic fertiliser may accelerate the
problem. Farmers have very little knowledge of using organic fertiliser as it is not
readily available in the form of manure, and composting is seen as labour intensive.
However, there are research projects underway looking at its potential for tomato
farmers in Brong Ahafo. Bush fires also result in the decline of soil organic matter
but the alternative cultivation practices have considerable disadvantages especially
when dealing with certain types of vegetation. However, neither the extent to
degradation nor the differing causal factors have been measured or researched.
There are also environmental risks to the wider community and consumers of
tomatoes. The extent of pesticide residues in the tomatoes and in water courses is not
known as there is no monitoring system at present. The pollution of water courses
could have considerable implications for those communities who rely on rivers for
drinking water. Damage to the rivers can also come about through silting of the river
beds and reducing the dry season flow. Farmers report this to be increasing although,
again, there are no monitoring systems and no research into the impact of tomato
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farming on it. For farmers to tackle these environmental risks may entail costs in
terms of finance and labour, both of which are highly scarce in the tomato production
system. Therefore any environmental conservation measures involving farmers would
only work if the farmers were able to make a profit on the land.
This thesis also has more direct policy implications. The case study of Ghanaian
agricultural markets shows the importance of social relations for micro-enterprise
survival in conditions where the actors cannot rely on formal legal institutions. This
has implications for the privatisation of industries as a change of ownership and the
rigours of the market system alone cannot be expected to encourage a private sector
to flourish. A study of the privatised seed industry in Ghana that has followed the
framework and methodology laid out in this thesis, shows that it takes time for trust
to be built up and the different actors play a range of roles, many of them unexpected
and unpredictable at the time of privatisation (Lyon, 1999b). It is necessary to
understand how markets operate in different locations and be sensitive to local path
dependencies, rather than assuming that there are universal 'market forces' or
conditions that can be transplanted anywhere.
An understanding of the social relations that underpin the market system can be used
to identify those actors who are already financing production and marketing activities.
Such individuals or groups may be worthy of support as they generally have a much
better record of channelling credit to the rural poor than formal credit systems in low
income countries like Ghana. The risk of being cheated and the difficulty in taking
legal action dissuades many people from entering into contracts and building up
links. A legal system that is more appropriate for micro-enterprise development
would allow individuals to open up new opportunities, and more time and resources
could be put into building up other relationships.
It is necessary to identify those who are excluded from networks that have the
potential to lift them out of poverty, and also ensure that poorer individuals are not
tied into networks or dependency relationships that can be highly exploitative. Future
research needs to examine the characteristics of those who have escaped from poverty
and how some individuals can attain the appropriate attributes which allow this.
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Furthermore, it is necessary to identify the constraints which prevent others from
doing so. This requires detailed qualitative studies and a consideration of differences
such as gender, ethnicity, wealth and age. There may be a role for the state and other
external agencies to support those excluded through reducing risks and increasing
bargaining power, for example by assisting in the provision of information on market
opportunities and on other actors in the market system.
Finally, there are policy implications from the embeddedness theory outlined in the
previous section. An understanding of social relations and cultural context through in-
depth qualitative research can lead to the identification of existing institutions,
networks and people who act as intermediaries. Networks can be promoted through
facilitating links, identifying network brokers and mediating conflicts. The potential
for outside intervention to create groups or networks is limited as the successful ones
are embedded in social relations that take time to develop. Projects that attempt to
support the 'soft' institutional framework have to balance the nature of these
institutions with the constraints of 'short termism' in project planning with its
dependence on attaining pre-set targets. Successful interventions in this area have
occurred when there are enterprise support systems that have strategic goals to
innovate culturally specific approaches that create room for innovation. There is also a
need to build on existing institutions and avoid an approach to development based on
applying inappropriate models made popular by donor fashions and the desire to
'replicate and conquer'.
243
Appendix
Questionnaire
Village 	  Enumerator 	 Date
1. Name
2. Location of house 	
3. Estimated age 	 	 4. Sex 	
5. Where are you from? 	
6. When did you start veg production? 	
7. When have you harvested tomatato in the past year?
1. 3.
2. 4.
8. Who do you farm with?
Alone
Husband/wife
Friend/brother
Sharecropping 	
9. Who provides land, labour, chemicals, machines
	
How is harvest shared 	
10. Who decides what chemicals to buy?
	
(if it is not the interviewee then end interview)
11. How many boxes did you harvest? (give estimate if not known)
12. Whose land did you use for last season?
What size	 What cost
13. Last season what chemicals did you bu
quantity price Did you pay
ready cash or
pay later?
How much
paid later?
How is the price
different when
paid later
Fertiliser
ammonia
poison (insecticide)
Powder (fungicide)
Other
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14 E ui ment
days price Did you pay
ready cash or
pay later?
How much
paid later?
How is the price
different when
paid later
Tractor ploughing
Sprayer •
Irrigation pump
15. What other sources of money do you have for your tomoato farm? (Agricultural and other)
16. What other heli did you et for your vegetable farmin g in the nast year.
Who?
Trader, bank, other farmer,
other (give details of
occupation).
Where
based
How much When
given
When
repaid
How repaid.
cash or share
of harvest
How much
extra cash/
how much
lower was the
price?
How did they know that you would repay them
17. Do you he n other tomato farmers?
How much When given When repaid How repaid; cash
or share of harvest
How much extra cash/
What share of harvest
Share
cropping
Lending
money
Other
When you gave money, how did you know that they would come and pay you?
18. Do you give to traders and get paid later? Yes/No How many boxes?
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Abunu
Abusa
Abusua
Abusua panin
Adantsm
Agyinamu
Ahafo
AhoDden
Akan
Akpeteshi
Asantehene
Ashanti/Asante
Birempon
Brong
Dwetire
Fupe
Fupe kyire
Gyedi
Mpaninfo
Nkwainsofo
Nnoboa
Ohemma
Petra kan
Petra paa
Pito
Sukan
Susu
Twi
Zongo
Glossary
Sharecropping with equal shares
Sharecropping with shares divided one third - two thirds
Extended family( in relation to land tenure, it refers to matrilineal
kinship groups)
Head of matrilineal kinship group
Second part of the early rainy season (May-September)
Guarantor and intermediary in a contract
Ethnic group in southern part of Brong Ahafo
Strength
Ethnic groups of southern Ghana sharing a similar language
(includes Ashantis, Brongs and Ahafos)
Local gin, distilled from palm wine or sugar cane
King of the Ashantis
Twi speaking Akan ethnic group with Kumasi as capital
High ranking or respected people
Ethnic group in the north of Brong Ahafo
Working capital
Farming season from June to October
Farming season from July to November
Trust, as well as confidence, knowledge of a person's ability, belief
and faith
Elders
Itinerant traders
Cooperative labour groups
Queen mother or market queen
Farming season from October to February when the dry season
starts
Farming season from December to March during the thy season
Sorghum beer
Farming season from March to July at the start of the rainy season
Informal financial savings groups
Language of the Ashantis
Area of towns and villages where non-indigens mainly from the
north of Ghana live
A note on pronunciation
E sounds like the 'e' in 'hello'
p sounds like the 'o' in 'hot'
November 1997 £1 was 3800 Cedis.
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